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## ON THE POLITICS OF THE MASSACRES

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## 1. Introduction

Several hundred men, women and children were killed and burned one night, on Sunday 4 January 1998, in Meknassa, a cluster of hamlets in the district of Relizane in the West of Algeria.<sup>1</sup>

Six days earlier, on Tuesday 30 December 1997, in this very district, 176 people in Khrouba, 113 in Sahnoun, 73 in El Abadel, and 50 in Ouled Tayeb had met the same fate: all massacred in a single night.<sup>2</sup>

The night following the Meknassa massacre, Monday 5 January 1998, 29 people in Sidi Maamar and 33 people in Ouled Bounif were also massacred. Once more, both villages were in the district of Relizane.<sup>3</sup>

‘Source of Algerian massacres a mystery’ headlined Alan Sipress, the foreign correspondent of the *Detroit Free Press*. ‘Why would the militants turn against the people in whose name they claim to be waging an Islamic revolution? Why would the army murder the very people it is supposed to protect? Getting at the truth won’t be easy,’ Sipress added, ‘the mystery of the latest round of butchery is matched only by the magnitude of the massacres.’<sup>4</sup>

In addition to empathy with the victims and a condemnation of the still unidentified perpetrators, the massacres have prompted national and international questioning and demands for an inquiry. Articles and news reports on the mass killings abound in competing theories about the identities of the perpetrators and their intents.

Most of these articles and reports compared their putative intents with the particulars of individual massacres for asserting or assessing their truth. For instance, witness statements, reported appearance of assailants, passive proximity of security forces, or kinship details of the victims of a given massacre were used as supporting evidence. In fact, one may say that many of the explanations were framed to account for these particulars.

This paper also seeks to clarify the issue of responsibilities for the massacres. But its aim is not *to get* at the truth. Short of an international expert inquiry, any such claim would be inappropriate. It does intend however to make a contribution towards the truth by reviewing the alternative explanations put forward so far, analysing their explanatory contents, and demarcating their limits.

When reviewing this literature, five clusters of congruent theses on the intents behind the atrocities stood out. The massacres were claimed to be (1) an Islamist retributive campaign, (2) a counterinsurgency military tactic, (3) an expedient tool in factional hostilities within the army, (4) an eviction tactic for land privatisation, and (5) a generalised settling of family and tribal

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scores. This literature review is therefore synthesised and presented within this intent-based classification. Classifying by inferred intent, and not by alleged perpetrator, allows greater intelligibility and conciseness because the conflict does not simplistically pit a uniform incumbent regime against a monolithic Islamist insurgency.

To analyse the explanatory force and limits of these putative intents, this paper uses an approach that departs from the usual comparison of the theories with reported particulars of individual massacres. It attempts to test these claims against global patterns observable in the series of massacres. Such patterns are available from the recent study of Ait-Larbi *et al.* who constructed victimisation macro-indicators by aggregating data about individual mass killings.<sup>5</sup> For instance they looked at the annual and monthly variations of the number of massacres, their territorial distribution, and political geography. By testing the putative intents against such data it may help delimit their truth and falsity contents.

The structure of the paper is as follows.

Section 2 gives brief background information about the parties in the armed conflict, the alleged perpetrators.

Section 3 reviews each of the five alternative explanations. Section 3.1 looks at the massacres as an Islamist retributive intent. Section 3.2 surveys the counterinsurgency policy explanation. Section 3.3 is devoted to the claim that the massacres are outcomes of states of conflict between the factions within Algeria's military. The suggestion that the mass killings are intended as eviction measures for land privatisation is discussed in section 3.4. The thesis that the massacres are a tribal or social war is reviewed in section 3.5.

Section 4 analyses the explanatory scopes of these five intents. The comparison of their logical consequences to the time variations of the massacres is presented in section 4.1 and 4.2 while their testing against the political geography of the mass victimisation is carried out in section 4.3.

Section 5 summarises and concludes this work.

## **2. The Context**

Algeria became independent from France in 1962. French troops had taken Algiers in 1830. An armed struggle against the French was launched by the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN – National Liberation Front) in 1954. When the French left, they had killed three quarters of a million people; one and a half millions according to Algerian official figures. The fighters of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN – National Liberation Army) were no more than a few tens of thousands.

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Since the country's independence, the army has held the monopoly of power. National euphoria and buoyant oil prices gave Algeria some stability up to the mid-1980s. At that point, years of rigid one-party rule, mismanagement of the economy, corruption, social inequities, alienation from Islam and Berber culture, and marginalisation of civil society were causing widespread resentment. The international oil and gas price collapse in 1986 fuelled the latent crisis. Youth riots broke out in October 1988. The army repressed them, causing considerable bloodshed; at least 500 people were killed.

Constitutional reforms ensued, paving the way for a transition from the one-party socialist rule of the FLN to a multiparty system. However, when the multiparty legislative elections of December 1991 resulted in the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS – Islamic Salvation Front) gaining the majority of the votes in the first round of a two-round poll it was poised to win, the army cancelled it. Chadli was removed from power and the army set up a High Council of State in his stead. Thousands of real and suspected FIS members and supporters were arrested, to be detained without charge in camps in the Sahara desert where many were tortured. The FIS was outlawed.

Its fragmented and radicalised remnants triggered a violent counter-response against policemen, soldiers, civil servants and some journalists.

Algeria was hence caught in a widening cycle of violence. Civilians were entangled in the struggle between the Islamist insurgents and the incumbent military regime. There are about thirty thousand political prisoners.<sup>6</sup> The numbers of those tortured, 'disappeared' or summarily executed are numbered in tens of thousands.<sup>7</sup> Figures given for civilian deaths have ranged from 60,000 to more than 100,000.<sup>8</sup>

Allegations of responsibility in the massacres of civilians have been made against *all* the contending military forces.

On the incumbent side, the regular forces consist of the land forces, the air force and the navy, a 60,000 strong special anti-guerrilla force, the Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS – military intelligence) and the Direction du Renseignement Extérieur (DRE – military counter-intelligence), the Gendarmerie Nationale, and the Police. Altogether these forces are about 200,000 strong.

The army also fields a number of irregular forces. The main one, a paramilitary militia force of at least 200,000 men, operates for the most part under the command of the Gendarmerie. This force is divided into the Groupes d'Auto-Défense (GAD – Self-Defence Groups), a territorial defence force, and the Patriotes, a territorial offence militia force.

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The incumbent regime denies the allegations that its forces perpetrate the massacres. It accuses the Islamist insurgents of committing them.

On the insurgent side, there are two national guerrilla organisations, the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS – Islamic Salvation Army) and the Ligue Islamique de la Dawa et du Djihad (LIDD – Islamic League for Dawa and Jihad).<sup>9</sup> There is also an urban guerrilla organisation, the Front Islamique du Djihad Armé (FIDA – Islamic Front for Armed Struggle) mainly based in Algiers.<sup>10</sup> These forces are loyal to the political leadership of the FIS.<sup>11</sup> They have observed a unilateral truce since early October 1997.<sup>12</sup> There are other tiny groups of insurgents with no discernible political leadership.<sup>13</sup>

The Islamist insurgents accuse the incumbent military regime of perpetrating the massacres.<sup>14</sup> Up to their unilateral truce they claimed responsibility for killings members of the security forces, the army and the militias. Prior to 1995 the FIDA claimed responsibility for killing important civil servants. These insurgent forces are not known to have ever claimed responsibility for mass killings of civilians.<sup>15</sup> They deny the allegation that they are responsible for the massacres.<sup>16</sup>

Two other contending forces are in dispute. The army has been accused of operating a number of death squads<sup>17</sup>, only two of which are known: Organisation de la Sauvegarde de la République (OSRA) and Organisation de Jeunes Algériens Libres (OJAL).<sup>18</sup> It denies the existence of all these forces.

The DRS has been accused of fielding an irregular force, the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA – Islamic Armed Group) which is alleged to be a counter-guerrilla force and not an Islamist insurgent force as is widely believed.<sup>19</sup> Islamist insurgents identify the GIA somewhat differently. They say the GIA is a *Kharidjite* sect infiltrated and controlled by the military intelligence.<sup>20</sup> The army denies these claims. It says the GIA is a fundamentalist terrorist organisation.

### **3. Five Alternative Explanations**

Readers' familiarity with these claims is not uniform so the amount of space allocated to each claim is inversely proportional to the volume devoted to it in the dominant media. These reviews are simply digests. The only part where some fresh insights are contributed is section 3.3; a coherent account of the structure and dynamics of factions in the military is proposed.

#### **3.1. Massacres as an Islamist Retributive Campaign**

This is the thesis with the widest media exposure. It has been proposed in various forms that can roughly be sub-divided into two classes.

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The first kind accounts for the massacres by imputing to the Islamist insurgents retribution as a *psychological* motive. For instance, general-president Zeroual explained that the massacres are a proof that the ‘criminal groups’ have failed and, ‘because of this failure, they pour all their hatred out today and commit criminal acts against innocent civilians.’<sup>21</sup> Prime-minister Ahmed Ouyahia repeatedly termed the massacres ‘desperate acts’ of ‘criminals, traitors and mercenaries’, whose motive is ‘revenge against a population which has stood up to terrorism.’<sup>22</sup> The minister of cooperation, Lahcen Moussaoui, referred to the massacres as ‘the last spasms of the rabid beast,’<sup>23</sup> while the communiqués of Mostefa Benmansour, Minister of Interior, recurrently declared them ‘savage acts’ of ‘malevolent revenge against the Algerian people, who resists heroically against the attempts to destroy its homeland.’<sup>24</sup> Ex-minister Leila Aslaoui also speaks of the ‘logic of despair’:

the Islamists have lost politically and militarily. This is the reason they have turned against the people that supported them at one stage but who do not support them anymore today.<sup>25</sup>

Editorials of the ‘independent’ press typically point out to ‘the nihilism of the armed groups that realised their defeat and isolation in society.’<sup>26</sup>

In the alternative versions of the Islamist retribution thesis, the accounts emphasise and impute punishment as an *instrumental* intent. Here the claim is that insurgents carry out massacres to alter the political behaviour of the target populations, rather than simply release an ‘incensed despair’ as the thesis above would have it. There are four sub-species of such claims. They are distinguishable by their *kind* of imputed intent and the range of the corresponding target populations.

In the first one it is argued that the massacres are part of a terror policy the insurgents pursue to prevent their social base ‘from defecting’ by ‘making the price of crossing-over very costly.’<sup>27</sup> This kind of explanation presumes that the population, which once supported the insurgents by supplying them with money, food, shelter and intelligence, would have decreased or withdrawn such backing, become hostile to them or switched allegiance to the military regime.

In the second variety, it is suggested that, in response to the military regime’s strategy of forcing the civilian population to arm itself, the insurgents perpetrate the massacres to deter the population from going over into a paramilitary militia force. The purpose, says Adler, is ‘to retake terrorised peasants, to nip the rallying in the bud and to break the first vigilante forces that were slowly being set up.’<sup>28</sup> It is not acknowledged explicitly, but this explanation seeks to account only for a narrow range of the target population, i.e. the families of the members of the militia forces.

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The third type proposes that the insurgents perpetrate massacres against families of the militias in order to retaliate against the massacres committed by the paramilitary militias (against their own families and those of their supporters). A few commentators have spoken of the ‘spiral of exaction-retaliation operations between the Islamists and the militia armed by *le pouvoir*.’<sup>29</sup> This view is a hybrid thesis imputing the victimisation of the families of the militias to the insurgents, and that of the social base of insurgents to the militias.

In the fourth, the proposition is that the massacres are a result of ‘factional infighting among the rebels.’<sup>30</sup> This thesis is meant to account only for the victimisation of the social base of the insurgents. Such accounts never identify which among the AIS, LIDD and the FIDA are the in-fighters and why/how such infighting would cause the massacres.

The only accounts that are specific about the identity of the in-fighters assume the GIA is an insurgent force. For instance, Stora says that ‘the GIA appears to be punishing unarmed civilians’ in the areas under the control of its rival, the AIS, which implemented a unilateral cease-fire on the 1st October 1997, and seeks to sabotage a potential deal between the FIS and the regime.’<sup>31</sup>

It is however not obvious that the GIA is an insurgent force. Evidence to the contrary is quite compelling.<sup>32</sup> If one takes the view that the GIA is a DRS-commanded counter-guerrilla force, the GIA’s victimisation of the families of AIS members should be included in the thesis of massacres as counter-mobilisation tactics discussed in the next section.

This review focused only on the retributive intent, be it psychological or instrumental, because of its wider media exposure. There are however other intents that have been imputed to the Islamist insurgents. Malek, an ex-prime-minister and now leader of the Alliance Nationale Républicaine (ANR – National Republican Alliance), explains that:

Ramadan, a sacred month, is chosen by fundamentalist terrorism to set the most murderous actions it perceives as offering to God. Slaughtering is considered a pious act. The victims of bullet wounds are further slaughtered. This gives this barbarous act a ritual meaning.<sup>33</sup>

Khelladi makes the suggestions that the Algerian Islamic movement has adopted a new Islamism that:

is less interested in overthrowing a state than purifying its soul. By killing. It is an expiatory Jihad; the ritual of blood, the stained body that is slaughtered, mutilated, at which they go unrelentingly. The impossible redemption confirmed by the released violence. [...] The violence of the Islamic groups is deliberately primitive, barbarian, irrational. It does not kill. It exposes and proves [...]: mutilated bodies, old men and women killed, the policemen murdered by his brother, etc.

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This violence is deliberately nihilistic and seeks to reduce the inimical state to its zero degree by killing and terrorising the society that supports it actively or passively.<sup>34</sup>

Gallissot proposes yet another version of the purification intent. He says the Islamists, whom he calls ‘the dispossessed of the West’, kill in order to ‘purify the Islamic community’ from the Western Other, and that includes the national state which, he says, has not yet been indigenized.<sup>35</sup> He calls this *la purification communautaire*.<sup>36</sup>

Cherif, leader of the communist party, also thinks the massacres are intended as ‘moral and religious purification’ while, as instrumental intent, he claims they seek to ‘demonstrate the impotence of *le pouvoir* and incite international pressure against it.’<sup>37</sup> Messaoudi, a member of the RCD, says of the Islamists insurgents:

They want to massacre in the most barbarous way. Their aim is clear: create panic in the population, incite it to flee and surge onto Algiers to implode the capital. The FIS seeks to impose chaos to take power, all the power.<sup>38</sup>

### 3.2. Massacres as a Counterinsurgency Strategic Programme

To the exception of one mention in the British weekly *The Observer*<sup>39</sup> this thesis has had no exposure in the English or French language media and will therefore be reviewed here in some detail.

Basically, it conjectures that the campaign of massacres is a counter-mobilisation tactic prescribed by the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy implemented by the Algerian generals.

Three different but complementary accounts of this explanation are reviewed alternately in sections 3.2.2-4. To make this survey more intelligible, some elementary notions of COIN strategy are briefly introduced in 3.2.1.

#### 3.2.1. *Elements of COIN strategy*

For a COIN-trained general, Algeria's violence is not so much a ‘civil war’, a ‘tragedy’ or ‘human rights crisis’ – as it is a circumscribed, protracted, low-intensity conflict (LIC) where military activities are strongly bound by political and psycho-social considerations to influence the perceptions and loyalties of the civilian population.<sup>40</sup>

According to French COIN military doctrine, to wage war against insurgents who establish strategic base areas (from which they expand through guerrilla operations), mobilise popular support and seek outside backing, one needs to implement a set of COIN strategic principles.<sup>41</sup> The strategic prin-

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ciple relevant to the issue of massacres is that of ‘counter-mobilisation of the population’.<sup>42</sup>

In order to fight expanding insurgents who ‘move like fish in water’ within a civilian population which they organise, administer, politicise and defend – and which in turn provides them with recruits, supplies, intelligence, political and moral support – French COIN military strategy prescribes a ‘destruction-construction’ programme. The destruction part requires the neutralisation or crippling of the mobilising organisation and influence of the insurgents. The construction part involves ‘counter-organising the masses’, i.e. separating them physically and politically from the insurgents and turning them into a bulwark in defence of the incumbent regime.<sup>43</sup> This strategic doctrine is implemented using various tactics, most of which involve the massive application of terror, and the exploitation of the threat of it, to bring about the prescribed reversal in the behaviour of the target population.

In the Algerian War (1954-1962), for instance, the French resorted on a large scale to indiscriminate retributive mass killings in pro-FLN populated rural areas, to root out the FLN's politico-administrative organisation (OPA).<sup>A</sup> Once this was achieved, they used psychological operations to steer the terrorised target populations into various counter-organisations such as professional or social associations and, more importantly, so-called local self-defence forces.<sup>44</sup>

These forces were paramilitary proxies organised on a territorial basis whose objectives were to destroy resistance organisations, enforce recruitment and support, gain control over territory and spread thuggery and terror.<sup>45</sup>

In under-populated and remote rural areas, the French army applied massive terror, using massacres by ground forces, artillery fire and aerial bombardments, to uproot and disperse the villagers. After this destruction stage the French counter-organised them into fewer and more easily controlled *centres de regroupements* (strategic hamlets) close to towns or cities. These hamlets provided the infrastructure needed to destroy the OPA of the FLN, to separate physically and politically the FLN from the villagers, and to facilitate their surveillance as well as the psychological actions to counter-mobilise them.<sup>46</sup> Referring to this strategic hamlet programme in the Algerian War, Jules Roy said:

The army has determined to make the zone where the rebels were hard to control into an empty area of misery. It has evacuated the inhabitants and razed the houses so that the FLN can find no refuge there. This is the reason for those pathetic regroupings of populations around the cities or towns, those clusters of sheet-metal

<sup>A</sup> See A. Aroua, ‘Reading Notes in French Colonial Massacres in Algeria’, in part V of this book.

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shacks. In all of Algeria, it is estimated that one million and a half men, women and children have been torn from their homes by force of their own fear, and are leading a terrible displaced life somewhere else.<sup>47</sup>

A concise summary of why the COIN doctrine entails massacres can be found in Leo Kuper's work on theories of genocide:

In the struggles for national independence after the Second World War, Sartre argues that the superiority of the colonialists in weapons, and of the colonised in numbers, determines the strategies employed. The insurgents rely on terrorism, ambushes, harassment, and extreme mobility, made possible by the support of the entire population, which feeds, hides and replenishes the liberation forces. Against partisans supported by the whole population, the only effective strategy is to 'empty the sea of its water', that is, to destroy the people, men, women and children. [...] It is [...] 'symbiosis between the liberation forces and the masses of the people' which encourages a genocidal response by the colonisers in the attempt to deny the insurgents their popular support.<sup>48</sup>

### 3.2.2. *Massacres in Urban Areas*

That COIN is the war strategy to which the army is committed in combating the insurgency is suggested, according to jurist Taha, by the pronouncements of the army's top officers on 'low intensity conflict (LIC) strategy' or on 'Islamists evolving [among the population] like fish in water'.<sup>49</sup> Lalioui argues the same because of 'the colonial heritage of Algeria's military', 'its French-trained generals', and the presence of multinational corporations of war known to offer counterinsurgency training.<sup>50</sup>

There is a literature that points to several measures perceived as a coherent part of the destruction segment of the COIN destruction-construction programme.<sup>51</sup> These include: the forced dissolution of the Islamic Salvation Front following its electoral victory, the arrests of its leadership, elected members of parliament, party members and active supporters, the removal from office of FIS elected mayors and officials in all municipal and regional councils, the disbanding of its parapolitical associations such as the Syndicat Islamique des Travailleurs (SIT – trade union), Islamic professional bodies, student unions, women social work associations, and charities, in addition to the extra-judicial killings, imprisonments or expulsions of FIS sympathisers from the armed forces, police, public administration, justice system, labour unions, media and universities.<sup>52</sup>

It has also been pointed out that the corresponding construction segment consisted of measures such as the setting up of executive governing bodies (DEC – Délégation Executive Communale) to run the municipal and regional councils, the creation of new political parties such as the ANR and the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND – National Democratic Rally), the artificial empowerment of co-opted Islamist parties such

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the Mouvement pour la Société de Paix (MSP – Movement for the Society of Peace) and Nahda (Renaissance Party) to absorb the FIS electorate, the creation or strong co-optation of parapolitical organisations such as trade unions (UGTA – Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens), professional bodies (journalists, medical doctors and engineers), student unions, youth and women associations and religious orders.<sup>53</sup> These bodies, it is asserted, served to assimilate and counter-mobilise segments of the urban populations into organisations loyal to the incumbent regime.<sup>54</sup>

The destruction of the Islamist organisations, influence and infrastructure in urban areas was achieved partly through intelligence work and partly by the use of torture, extra-judicial killings and disappearances.<sup>55</sup> Some FIS members and Algerian human rights activists claim the reversal in the political behaviour of part of the urban populations, and their counter-organisation, were prompted by terror, mostly through indiscriminate bombing campaigns, particularly in the months leading to the elections that took place in 1995, 1996 and 1997.<sup>56</sup>

### 3.2.3. *Massacres in Suburban and Rural Areas*

The second type of hypotheses that appeal to COIN strategy as explanatory intent is specific to massacres located in suburban or populated rural areas, such as in the South-East of Algiers and the districts of Blida, Médéa, Ain-Defla, Tipaza and Tiaret: locations with notable guerrilla activity. Here it is suggested that the campaigns of massacre are intended to counter-organise the target populations into irregular paramilitary forces. As José Garçon put it:

The arming of civilians is a strategic decision of the regime which marked a major shift in the anti-Islamist struggle of the army up to 1994. Aware of the inadequacy of its military strength (150,000 to 160,000 men) to cover an immense territory and wishing to save the army from “the dirty work”, *le pouvoir* made the arming of civilians a priority. [It did so] to the extent that a question became a leitmotiv whenever there were massacres in villages that had refused to accept the arms but resigned themselves to doing afterwards: was it not a case of forcing people to bear arms after ‘a need of security, hence of State, hence of militias’ had been induced in them (according to an expert)?<sup>57</sup>

In addition to relieving over-stretched regular forces, minimising their losses and disguising or evading, through irregular proxies, state responsibility for illegal acts, this ‘privatisation of the war’ serves to create cheap repressive energy supplies.<sup>58</sup> In her analysis of the arming of the civilian populations, social worker Ighilès says:

The only politics our junta knows is that of fear and manipulation. It manufactures large scale terror but imputes it to its discredited opponents in order to legitimise itself as the ultimate safeguard against the collective fear it underhandedly instigates.

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The only social development programme our top brass moral and intellectual cripples have is the magnification and exploitation of the divisions within the most deprived and insecure sections of our society. In their warped minds, social development equals transferring the conflict with their armed opponents into a social internecine war in which our poorest communities are divided, turned into mass spy networks, and kill and get killed without knowing why. The military propaganda calls these vigilantes *groupes d'auto-défense* (self-defence groups), *les patriotes* and *l'Algérie debout* (the standing up Algeria). But aren't these militias groups made up of the same social material as that of their armed opponents?

*L'Algérie debout* can then have one only meaning: an Algeria whose complex social fabric is shattered and levelled so that it can be easily patrolled; an Algeria where organic social interactions are disintegrated into reactions of lone, undifferentiated individuals juxtaposed in their fearful submission to the junta.<sup>59</sup>

Their point, Garçon and Ighilès, that the incumbent authorities covertly generate security needs within some target populations to enlist them into their paramilitary organisations, seems plausible but lacks details.

The closest thing to a specific explanatory scheme is expounded in an essay by Amer who claims that the regime uses massacres as 'goads to counter-organise the masses.'<sup>60</sup> Amer says:

The massacres appear purposeless and disorganised outburst of sadistic and nihilistic brutality. In fact, they are precise COIN instruments for producing determinate political effects. They are called 'special operations' in the psy-ops department of the DRS [military intelligence] and in the unconventional anti-guerrilla warfare courses taught at the Applied School of Special Troops in Biskra and at the Cherchell Military Academy. The massacres are carried out by two agencies. The GIA, an irregular force disguised as Islamist rebels; it uses guerrilla tactics to combat the genuine rebels and is managed by the DRS. Undercover death squads selected from the patriot militia force; they are operationally run by the Gendarmerie Nationale.<sup>61</sup>

Amer's account of 'the multiplicative generation of militias through massacres' involves many stages and seems to make heavy use of a biological analogy (pathogenesis). The diagram in figure 1 is a translated summary of the stages in his explanatory scheme. According to Amer the goading of a given target population starts with a GIA massacre:

A GIA massacre operates like a 'Trojan horse' mechanism. It offsets the natural defence of the host population and, through the application of terror, fragments it into polarised, isolated and highly vulnerable individuals and groups ready to be turned and recombined, through propaganda and organisation, into militia units. The use of assailants camouflaged as Muslim guerrilla fighters has determinate impacts on the targeted people, often the families and supporters of the rebels. The psycho-political response of the identification group of the victims is terror, confusion, disillusionment with, and distrust of, the guerrillas, and dissension. Shifts in loyalty set in. From the wider neutral population, these operations provoke extreme fear, condemnation and hostility towards the guerrilla fighters, in addition to a strong sense of insecurity and isolation.<sup>62</sup>

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


Figure 1: The Cycle of Proliferative Generation of Militias through Massacres

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These two processes are shown as ‘massacre’ and ‘shattering of social fabric’ on the diagram. Of the next three stages (3, 4, and 5 in the diagram), Amer asserts:

These shifts in loyalty are then entrenched by state and local propaganda operations drilling five key notions into the population: a) incriminations of ‘Islamist terrorists’, b) the inability of the guerrillas to protect their families and supporters, c) blaming the victims as deserving their fate for their erstwhile misguided political loyalties, d) the need for people to take up arms to ensure their own self defence against terrorism, e) the willingness of the authorities to cater for their security needs by providing them with arms and training as self-defence militias. The next stage is that of recombination and release. It involves inducting, arming and training screened ‘volunteers’, paying them for duty periods, providing them with social privileges (guaranteed jobs, free transport, health care, social activities etc.) and some badge of authority or uniform to enhance their prestige.<sup>63</sup>

According to Amer, this process could be thought of as the switching mechanism of the replicative cycle that depletes the social base of the Islamist rebels and fills up the armed counter-organisations of the regime. The second half of the ‘proliferative cycle’ (the lower semi-circle in the diagram) is a duplication of the process described above except that this time the perpetrators of the massacres include ‘selected units from the terror-induced militias themselves.’<sup>64</sup>

The Patriot militias are different from the SDG (Self Defence Groups or GAD in French) in terms of membership and operations. The latter are mainly scared villagers and peasants trained to perform territorial defence and surveillance tasks. But the Patriots are made up of volunteers who may have lost a male relative killed by the Muslim guerrillas, former criminals, ‘penitent terrorists’ (surrendered, or captured and turned guerrillas). They may include selected militiamen from the SDG, in particular revenge-bent young men whose entire families have been massacred in GIA special operations. These forces are led by veteran guerrillas of the Algerian liberation war. Operationally, they are mobile forces that engage in territorial offence, to track down and destroy local Muslim guerrilla units and infrastructure, and subversion. Undercover death squads from the Patriots also operate very much like the GIA. The DRS uses them to carry out massacres in areas other than their overt bases of operation to goad other target populations into the ever-increasing armed shield protecting the regime.<sup>65</sup>

This completes one replicative cycle in ‘the multiplicative generation of militias through massacres’ and, according to this explanatory scheme, makes the generation of militias a ‘self-perpetuating and snowballing process.’<sup>66</sup>

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*3.2.4. Massacres in Under-Populated Rural Areas*

The third type of conjectures accounting for massacres as COIN operations concentrate on those that take place in under-populated rural areas: for instance, in the Ouarsenis mountains in the West of Algeria.

Here it is claimed that the massacres are intended *to dislodge* and scatter villagers from isolated areas under the control of the Muslim guerrillas in order that they flock and *regroup* in large villages more easily dominated by the military, or in towns and cities where they can be readily controlled. This situation differs from mass killings in populated rural areas in that for the latter case the reversal of loyalty is sought *without the displacement* of the target population.

Sweeney accused the generals of perpetrating the massacres and, quoting Algerian intelligence officers and soldiers in exile, explained ‘they have launched their own version of what the British in Malaya and the Americans in Vietnam called the “strategic hamlet programme”.’<sup>67</sup> He put the case that massacres are perpetrated only after the villagers fail to meet verbal demands to evacuate the village or take up arms for ‘self-defence’.<sup>68</sup> Mari reported the same, including in the case when the villagers in a remote area (Ain Sour in Ain-Defla) did not respond to retributive warnings, and deprivations such as taking back state housing, closing the school, the infirmary etc.<sup>69</sup>

Amer suggests that ‘evacuating’ and resettling the villagers is intended to achieve several COIN objectives. He claims that:

[it] deprives the guerrillas from the human and material resources and the intelligence provided by the villagers. This isolation facilitates the tracking of the guerrillas and retaking territorial control of these remote areas from which the regime tactically retreated at an early stage of the war. The physical and political disjunction of the Muslim guerrillas from the villagers destroys their “parallel hierarchies” within the population in a way that prevents them from regenerating. Regrouping fleeing villagers in large hamlets, policed by hamlet militias, or in towns and cities simplifies their control and psychological actions to influence and counter-organise them, in particular through social and economic enticements.<sup>70</sup>

In an article entitled *La reconquête du terrain perdu* (the reconquest of the lost ground), the daily *El-Watan*, a paper widely seen in Algeria as a media agency of the DRS, made a statement that seems to support much of what Amer claims.<sup>71</sup> It may be interpreted as a thinly veiled endorsement of ‘the exodus of the populations victim of terrorism’:

The rural world, which is conservative by nature, was a compost to rampant islamism which presented itself as the alternative to the rent-seeking, incompetent and decadent FLN. It is not by accident that the socialist villages, theoretically supposed to be at the *avant-garde* of the peasantry, swung over into the hands of the dissolved party.

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[...] The thesis of Louisa Hanoune, amplified in France, that it is the eradicationist State which expels the peasants from their lands, is dangerous and insidious because it absolves terrorism from all its misdeeds. Although it is too early to speak of re-occupation of space in some regions, it is urgent to think from now on about post-terrorism for areas in the hinterland which are finding tranquillity and peace again. Everything must be revised there: repairing roads, gas, drinking water, social housing, jobs, women emancipation, etc. But can we apply such a programme with under-trained and most often isolated communes?

The State must get back its due and what it has lost. The same causes produce the same effects. This, at least, we know.<sup>72</sup>

### 3.3. Massacres as Instrument in the Army's Inter-Factional War

This thesis had some cursory exposure, especially at the height of the massacres of 1994, 1997 and 1998. We look at it here with some detail.

The basic claim is that the massacres are instigated by the 'hardline' faction of the military with the intent of undermining the power and political initiatives of its rival 'softline' faction in its bid to dominate the military institution and the whole political system.

This hypothesis has been suggested as explanation for particular bursts of massacres in 1994, 1997 and 1998, but not for *all* the massacres. Note also that this putative intent is not necessarily exclusive of the COIN programme intent. In fact it may be *mixed* with it, in that different corps and/or agents of the military would have factionalist or private – as opposed to institutional – objectives in implementing the COIN-war programme.

The typical form in which this explanation has been advocated involves two argumentative sequences. First, some sort of identification of the nature of the posited factions is given. Various accounts attempting to connect the massacres to particular states of conflict between the given factions are then proposed.

We review this explanation using the same outline. In section 3.3.1 we focus on the nature of the fault-lines that divide the factions apart. Section 3.3.2 discusses the principles that regulate the interactions between the factions and, after reviewing the main issues that throw them into states of conflict, explains how the massacres occur as outcomes of such states.

#### 3.3.1. *Factional Structure of the Military*

Algeria's military is an army of the praetorian type.<sup>73</sup> In other words it is distinguishable from a professional army by the following features:

- a) low professional standards ;<sup>74</sup>

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- b) loyalty principally to the military corporation rather than the state or the nation ;<sup>75</sup>
- c) a permanent disposition to intervene with naked force in the political system. There were, for example, four coups d'état (in September 1962, June 1965, January 1992, and September 1998), two attempted coups (in December 1967 and September 1997), and one civilian president assassinated by the DRS in June 1992 ;<sup>76</sup>
- d) ruling a decaying political system with extensively fragmented civil-military boundaries (in 34 years and 6 months of independence, from July 62 to December 98, there were 31 years of military rule – 13 years under colonel Boumediene, 13 years under colonel Chadli and 5 years under general Zeroual – and 3 years and 6 months of civilian rule – 3 years under Ben Bella and 6 months under Boudiaf) ;<sup>77</sup>
- e) a weak cohesiveness.

Of this last, Lahouari Addi states that:

Although the army exercises sovereignty and sees itself as Algeria's supreme authority, with the Council of Ministers merely running the administration, it does not form a homogeneous whole. It is made up of several structures – including the national police, the military security force, and various military districts – that are all formally subordinate to the general staff but nonetheless retain some autonomy. In addition, the officers in charge have their own networks of supporters, which make them even more independent of the authorities. The government, of which the army and police are supposed to be the secular branches, is short-circuited by a system outside the official power structure. This conflict mechanism, which is not apparent in normal circumstances, bursts into the open in times of crisis.<sup>78</sup>

In recent years, there has been an increasing realisation that the factional structure of Algeria's military consists of a number of amorphous groupings of officers that coalesce into two main factions, often referred to as the 'hardline' faction and the 'softline' faction. These factions have been designated by various other terms.

The 'softline' faction (*le clan réconciliateur*) has been described as the 'conciliators', the 'faction of the presidency', the 'Zeroual-Betchine faction', and the 'military-as-government faction'. Generals reportedly affiliated to this faction include Liamine Zeroual, Mohamed Betchine, Tayeb Derradji, Kamal Abderahmane, Abderahmane Cherif, Hassan Bendjalti, Mohamed Benhadid, Salah Gaid, Chabane Ghodbane, and Rabah Boughaba.<sup>79</sup> The softliner denotation suggests that members of this faction believe in less military interventionism, a politically negotiated settlement, and in the transition to a more inclusive form of government that would somehow integrate the FIS.

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The 'hardline' faction (*le clan éradicateur*) is also referred to as the 'eradicators', the 'faction of the chief-of-staff', the 'Lamari-Médiène faction', and the 'military-as-institution faction'. Generals said to belong to this faction include Mohamed Lamari, Mohamed Mediène, Smain Lamari, Fodhil Cherif, Said Bey, Zoubir Ghedaidia, Mohamed Benslimane, Ahmed Sanhadji, Ahmed Djenouhat, Abdelhamid Djouadi, and retired but still influential generals such as Larbi Belkheir, Khaled Nezzar, Abdelmalek Guenaizia, Mohamed Touati, and Abbas Ghezail.<sup>80</sup> The 'hardliner' reference suggests this faction is disposed towards seeking the indefinite perpetuation of military rule, an exclusively military outcome to the conflict, and the political and physical eradication of the FIS.

Although this two-faction model captures an important fault-line between the factions, the 'hardliners'-versus-'softliners' distinction can be criticised as misleading. It has been pointed out that the so-called softliner generals, for instance Rabah Boughaba, Mohamed Betchine and Kamal Abderahmane, have carried out brutally repressive orders against civilians.<sup>81</sup> There is scepticism about this faction's interest in genuine dialogue, inclusiveness and democracy, except as expedient tools or adjuncts in its struggle for the domination of the military institution and the political system. Similarly, it has been pointed out that the so-called military hardliners foster and use civilian allies, integrating even the Islamist MSP party into the process, as a tactical tool in their rivalry with their military competitors.

In other words, the hardliners-versus-softliners distinction is inadequate because it locates the genesis of (and the fault-lines between) the factions solely around the issue of the transition to a democratic system inclusive of the FIS. It obfuscates the existence of the factions and their history of rivalry for the domination of the military institution and political system *prior* to the issue of the transition.

The formation of these factions dates back to the Algerian war of liberation, which was a shared career experience that caused and cemented one of the main sets of centripetal bonds clustering each grouping of officers together. The 'softline' faction may be construed as the factional successor of the guerillas of the *interior* ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) and the 'hardline' faction as the factional successor of the officer corps of the military professionals of the *external* ALN and the ex-officers of the French army.<sup>82</sup> The current inter-factional struggle for the domination of the military institution and political system is a striking repetition of the conflicts that pitted the officers of the interior ALN (the *wilayists*) against the coalition of officers of the external ALN and the ex-officers in the French army.<sup>83</sup> The type of bonding inherited from the Algerian war of liberation does not, however, exhaust the sets of ties (vertical and horizontal) that cluster each faction together (and segment the two apart).

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In terms of vertical links, each faction has of course its basic network of patron-client connections. With regard to the branch of service, the public data indicate that the hardliners control the general staff of the army (Mohamed Lamari), the DRS (Mohamed Mediène and Smain Lamari), the Special Forces (Fodhil Cherif) and the Air Force (Benslimane and then Aouadi).<sup>84</sup> Up to September 1998, the softliners controlled the presidency (Liamine Zeroual), the military cabinet (Mohamed Betchine), the general secretariat of the ministry of defence (Mohamed Ghenime), the National Gendarmerie (Tayeb Derradji), and the Navy (Chabane Ghodhbane). From the available data about the regional origins of the officers, the 'softline' faction has a stronger *chawi* and a weaker *kabyle* memberships than the 'hardline' faction.<sup>85</sup> Not as much is known about family ties as factional bonds. The 'softline' faction has been termed nationalistic and conservative and the 'hardline' secularist and liberal. Yet past practices of the leaders of both factions indicate they are not committed to any specific ideology, which they regard as hindering their ability to attract military and civilian clients. Their only commitment is to a praetorian orientation.

In Algeria the general public identifies the factional rivalry as between *bizb frança* (the faction of France) and *bizb esserqa* (the faction of thievery) and not as 'eradicators' against 'conciliators', respectively. France is the military and political patron of the eradicator faction (Lamari-Mediène) whose predominant membership comprises ex-officers of France's colonial army and French-trained officers.<sup>86</sup> The conciliator faction (Zeroual-Betchine) has acted as a political client of the US.<sup>87</sup> Not much is known about generational factors and interests of rank as horizontal binders. These factions should also be distinguished by the kind of rent-creating apparatuses of the state that each grouping of generals has captured in order to appropriate resources for itself and its clients.<sup>88</sup>

Having explained the limitations of the established distinctions, we shall nonetheless recourse to the hardliners or 'eradicators' versus softliners or 'conciliators' designations, which are the distinctions in current use, for simplicity.

### *3.3.2. Factional Conflict within the Military*

The normal mode of interaction between the two factions is not conflict. Nor is it co-operation as occurred in the military coup of January 1992, a hybrid affair cobbled together to stave off a perceived vital threat to the whole military institution.<sup>89</sup>

The regular interaction mode between them has been described as a balance of the 'delicate' or 'unstable' kind.<sup>90</sup> Abdennour Ali-Yahia sees the 'precarious internal equilibrium' of Algeria's military system as following from a

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rule preventing the concentration of power within a single faction, a sort of regulative law of anarchy: ‘the factions agree to keep the power but not to the advantage of a dominant man or grouping that may eliminate them or curtail their role.’<sup>91</sup>

This balance is regulated through mechanisms such as joint meetings and common decision-making procedures. Addi states that:

In times of crises, the top military brass meets in conclaves to reach a compromise binding on all of them. That is the way the decision to cancel the 1991 [parliamentary] election or that to nominate Liamine Zeroual for the presidency were reached. The generals’ informal meetings are not reported in the press – understandably, since the Constitution does not provide for them. [...] Given the importance of the decisions it makes, this informal assembly is, in fact, installing itself as a sovereign body.<sup>92</sup>

The first of several conclaves took place, after the demise of colonel BouMediène, in December 1978 for the joint nomination of colonel Chadli Bendjedid as president. The next was held in December 1986 to arbitrate the conflict between Chadli and the then army chief-of-staff, general Mustapha Belloucif. A third, held in October 1988, saw the joint decision of decreeing emergency law. A month later, the conclave met again and agreed to nominate Chadli for a third presidential term. In May 91, another meeting was held and resulted in the common decision to remove the prime-minister, Mouloud Hamrouche, the arrest of the FIS political leaders, and the repression of demonstrators. Since the coup of 11 January 1992, also preceded by a conclave a week earlier, the meetings have been held on a regular basis. The participants of the conclave include the general-president, his military advisors, the chief-of-staff, the heads of the DRS, Navy, Airforce, Land forces, and the Gendarmerie Nationale, the commanders of the 6 military districts (MD), and the central directors of the ministry of defence. These are major-generals and generals but Addi says that in 1999 the colonels and even majors sought to attend these illegal meetings.<sup>93</sup> As for the decision-making procedures in such conclaves, Ali-Yahia says:

The important decisions are taken only after Marathon meetings to find a general consensus. Power is shared as the army has separate centres of decision that decide together by consensus and never by majority.<sup>94</sup>

The regulation of the equilibrium has limits however. This happens, for example, when the representative of the compromise between the factions seeks to exercise an independent authority by going beyond his mandate as delegate on behalf of his faction and caretaker of the delicate balance. Addi comments that:

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The system works only if the military figure appointed as head of state does not attempt to control it. A president who takes literally his constitutional role as supreme head of the armed forces critically upsets the balance of power.<sup>95</sup>

When the internal balance of the military is upset, the factions enter into a conflicting mode of interaction as they seek to assert their domination and/or counteract the facing threats thereof. The intensity of the factional rivalry fluctuates with political events and can reach the level of armed hostilities. It is only limited by their need to maintain unity in the face of ever-present civilians.

The factional hostilities can be direct and limited to the military sphere. Faction-motivated promotions, assignments, purges, assassinations and coup attempts are such instances briefly reviewed in the sections 3.3.2a-c.

They can also be indirect, through a third civilian party; members or organisations in the government or opposition, parapolitical organisations, media adjuncts, or paramilitary proxies for example. The third civilian party can also be massacred civilians, according to the thesis reviewed here. All these will be succinctly surveyed in the sections 3.3.2d-g.

### ***3.3.2a. Assignments, Promotions and Demotions***

Assignments and promotions to key command positions are the focus of fierce competition. The political survival of a faction depends on the ability of its leadership to advance the careers and interests of its officer *clientèle* (clientship), and safeguard the command of key units that prevent the other side gaining a dominating military position or potentially organising a coup.

The coup of 1992 had cross-factional support but was technically carried out by the eradicators; it was led by general Khaled Nezzar, then minister of defence. Following the assassination of president Boudiaf, the civilian façade of the regime was assigned to the ‘conciliator’ faction; Zeroual was nominated to the presidency in February 1994. The ensuing migration of officers of this faction, from the army to government, further weakened its holding within the military institution. This faction, with its stronger dominance in government and weaker presence in the military, sought to dislodge clients of the eradicators from their positions and convert its stronger political muscle into a less unfavourable balance of power within the military. If one looks at the profile of demotions (‘early retirements’) in the army from 1992 to October 1998, one sees a greater proportion of eradicator generals; Khaled Nezzar, Mohamed Touati, Larbi Belkheir, in November 1994, Senhadji in September 1996, Abbas Ghezail in July 1997, and Said Bey in October 1997. In 1997 there were reports that the eradicators quashed decisions to put tens of officers from their faction to early retirement.<sup>96</sup> This movement is to be contrasted to the sole eviction, from the conciliator grouping, of general Benhadid in May 1995. The pendulum swung back however in

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Autumn 1998 when the leaders of the conciliator faction were dislodged: Zeroual was coerced to step down in September 1998 and Betchine was forced to resign in October 1998.

The outline of assignments to the command of critical operational units reflects a small progress for the Zeroual faction. Up to May 1994, the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, and 5<sup>th</sup> MDs had been under the command of eradicator generals Ahmed Djenouhat, Khelifa Rahim, Said Bey and Abdelhamid Djouadi, respectively. In May 1994, the commands of the 6 military districts were assigned to a pool of relatively young generals, known as officers of the independence, on the basis of their kill-ratio records in the counterinsurgency campaign but also on their factional affiliation. Pro-Zeroual generals Hocine Benhadid, Fodhil Saidi and Rabah Boughaba were appointed to the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> MDs, respectively.<sup>97</sup> The factional affiliation of Belkacem Qadri, the commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> MD, is not known nor is that of Mohamed Bekkouche who was transferred from the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 2<sup>nd</sup> MD. But significantly, the 1<sup>st</sup> MD, vital from a coup-making point of view, remained under the control of the hardliners, as general Said Bey, a staunch eradicator, was transferred to this position from the 3<sup>rd</sup> MD. Since then, Benhadid was dislodged from the 3<sup>rd</sup> MD in May 1995, to the advantage of eradicator general Zoubir Ghedaidia. On the other hand pro-Zeroual general Kamal Abderahman took over the 2<sup>nd</sup> MD, at the expense of Bekkouche, in June 1996, and Rabah Boughaba swapped from the 5<sup>th</sup> MD and took over the critically important 1<sup>st</sup> MD from Said Bey in the midst of the massacre crisis of October 1997. The eradicators did however compensate the loss by taking the command of the 5<sup>th</sup> MD, now under Abdelhamid Djouadi. The factional affiliation, if any, of Abdelmajid Saheb the current commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> MD, who took over the position after the assassination of Saidi, is not public.

In faction-ridden armies, the traditional way of resolving competition for a finite number of senior positions is to promote an equal number of adherents to higher ranks and divide key commands in such a way as to prevent either side gaining a dominant position. The eradicators and conciliators reportedly agreed on a joint list only up to 1994.<sup>98</sup> In the summer and autumn 1995 both factions fiercely rejected each other's proposal and could not agree on a common list of officers to be promoted to the rank of general and major-general.<sup>99</sup> The deadlock recurred in July 1997 and July 1998; the promotion proposals were frozen.<sup>100</sup>

### ***3.3.2b. Assassinations***

This musical chair rivalry can take the form of assassinations. General Fodhil Saidi was assassinated in a booby-trapped car on 7 June 1996, a day before the public announcement of his appointment to head the military cabinet of

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general-president Zeroual.<sup>101</sup> This would have made him the effective minister of defence. General Saïdi, a first class military-academy graduate with a degree in political science, had been the chief of the DRE (counter-intelligence) during the rule of colonel Chadli. He was the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> MD at the time of his assassination. He had supported the nomination of Zeroual for the ministry of defence in 1993 and for the presidency in 1994, and had defended positions against an exclusively militaristic approach to the COIN campaign. Observers commented that eradicators Lamari and Mediene feared that the appointment of this strategist with strong links in the DRS would undermine irreversibly their domination and strengthen their rival.<sup>102</sup> There have also been reports of entrenched animosity between him and eradicator general Smain Lamari, the DRE chief.<sup>103</sup>

Another highly ranked fatality of eradicator assassination is general Mohamed Boutighane, second in command of the navy and close to Zeroual and Benhadid, and bitterly opposed to general Mohamed Lamari, reportedly for 'his over-zealous brutality in commanding the anti-terrorist campaign.'<sup>104</sup> He was assassinated on 27 November 1995.<sup>105</sup> Commander major Cherchali, a conciliator intelligence officer close to general Betchine, had been working in the DRE, under the command of eradicator Smain Lamari, at the time of his assassination on 24 June 1998.<sup>106</sup>

Two attempts to assassinate Zeroual, one in December 1996 and one in January 1997, were reported.<sup>107</sup> General Tayeb Derradji, a general trained in Arab military academies, so close to Zeroual that the latter had proposed him as president in his own stead in 1994, also escaped two assassination attempts, one on the last week of October 1994 during a visit to Paris<sup>108</sup>, and the other on 26 May 1999 in Algiers.<sup>109</sup> No high-ranking eradicator casualty has been reported but there was an assassination attempt on Khaled Nezzar, who escaped a remote-controlled bombing on 13 February 1993.<sup>110</sup>

The assassination of president Boudiaf for his corruption investigations was master-minded by eradicator general Smain Lamari but had the tacit backing of officers from both factions.<sup>111</sup> There have been claims that the killings of general Mohamed Touahri and Colonel Hachemi Touabih, both reported to be fatalities of a helicopter crash in Bechar in February 1998, are the results of factional infighting but other reports, however, say their work for the Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres (MAOL – Algerian Movement of Free Officers) was the cause of their murder.<sup>112</sup>

### ***3.3.2c. Coups and Attempted Coups***

The inter-factional rivalry of Algeria's military can intensify from isolated fratricides into coup attempts and armed hostilities. There was one attempted coup in 1997 and one successful coup in 1998, both by the eradicators against their conciliator rivals.

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September 1997 saw the worst massacres of the war, the holding of a conclave and the plotting of a military coup, by eradicator Lamari, staved off by the US.<sup>113</sup> Widespread rumours and some politicians (off-record) spoke of president Zeroual fleeing to the US embassy and of US threats to chief-of-staff Lamari. But the only visible indicator of a crisis was the unusual bolstering statement of support of US Ambassador Ronald Neumann to Zeroual.<sup>114</sup> Zemmouri observed that

The US ambassador, Ronald Neumann, a discreet and pragmatic diplomat, can pride himself for completing his three-year mission in Algeria with honours for preventing Algeria from sliding into a new coup d'état. Warned by informers worried by the feverish and unusual comings and goings between the ministry of defence and the staff headquarters, he took advantage of his farewell visit to president Zeroual to restate, in the midst of ever insistent rumours of an imminent coup, that Washington, without being opposed to the military measures against terrorism, wishes that they would be taken 'within the rule of law'. The message was perfectly clear: any action aimed at destabilising Zeroual would be denounced and combated. It was clear enough, in any case, for the knives to be put back in the cloakrooms and the conclave, originally planned by the 'eradicators' to put Zeroual and his military advisor (general Mohamed Betchine) in the dock, to be transformed into a stormy, but quite 'ordinary' in these times of crisis, working session.<sup>115</sup>

The next coup attempt, in September 1998, was more successful. Zeroual announced, on 11 September 1998, he would step down and organise early presidential elections. Reports said 'irresistible pressures' were brought to bear on him, by Mohamed Lamari, Mohamed Mediène and Smain Lamari, to either ditch general Betchine, his military and intelligence advisor, or step down.<sup>116</sup> Ali-Yahia likened the forced resignation technique of this coup to that used to oust president Chadli after the elections of December 1991.<sup>117</sup> Malley reported that 'Zeroual had informed some Arab and non-Arab leaders, through reliable allies, that a power struggle with the aim of threatening the army was imminent in Algiers.'<sup>118</sup> The conclave that ousted him reportedly took place early in the second week of September, in the midst of increased killings of civilians and the most vitriolic attacks on Zeroual and Betchine in the eradicator press.<sup>119</sup> These were the culmination of a crescendo of factional hostilities that had started late in May 1998 after Betchine had been elected to the political bureau of the RND: an initiative read as a measure prior to his candidacy for the 2000 presidential elections. Other observers explained that the eradicators reproached Zeroual for his refusal to sign the promotions of eradicator officers earlier in July and Betchine's increased encroachment into the oil rent apparatus.<sup>120</sup> After Zeroual's political demise, the eradicators' campaign of 'irresistible pressures' did not abate until Betchine was forced to resign from his post as military advisor to Zeroual in October 1998, and from the political bureau of the RND in November 1998.<sup>121</sup>

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**3.3.2d. Civilian Extensions of Barracks**

This internecine battleground is not confined to the military. It crosses Algeria's shattered civil-military boundaries into the civilian sphere. Each faction has its own sets of adjuncts in government, as and in political parties, parapolitical surrogates, media instruments, and as proxy paramilitary militias, all of which get mobilised to shore up its particular political position or, when required, undermine that of its rival. As Addi puts it:

The government composition reflects the political line of the army, whose various factions nominate their protégés as ministers. Those appointed have two briefs: to stand up for the general interests of the regime and to show their loyalty to the faction that appointed them.<sup>122</sup>

Ali-Yahia points out that the factions also negotiate the proportions of nominations of their clients in the regional governments (*walis*) and in diplomatic representations.<sup>123</sup> In his analysis of the extension of the military factions into the civilian sphere, Ait-Mehdi observes that:

Up to its demise in the autumn 98, Zeroual's faction controlled a larger serfdom at a ministerial level but had conceded the prime-ministry and foreign ministry to its rival. Prime-minister Ahmed Ouyahia and foreign minister Ahmed Attaf were protégés of eradicator generals Fodhil Cherif and Mohamed Mediène. At the parliamentary level, the main adjunct of the 'conciliator' faction was the RND, an artificial party that won the majority of seats within three months of its fabrication, while the main ally of the political wing of the eradicators was the MSP. The FLN is split because it does the bidding for both factions: the Benhamouda-Yahiaoui-Hadjar led grouping tends the conciliator patrons while the Belayat-led clique does the eradicators' bidding. Among the tiny parties in the parliament, the RCD stands out for its enlistment by the militarist wing of the eradicators. The senate is an extension of the conciliator barracks. A third of it is made up of what is known as the militia lobby, i.e. people like Boumaza, Boubnider, commandant Azzedine, Zbiri etc., and retired generals and ministers, all of whom were nominated by Zeroual. The rest of the senate more or less reflects the clientist distribution of the parliament. The high security council (HCS) is equally divided between the military rivals and has no political party membership.<sup>124</sup>

The factional affiliations of the parapolitical bodies were, on balance, in favor of the Zeroual faction until the summer of 1998. The main labour union (UGTA), the national organisation of mujahideen (ONM), and that of the children of martyrs, all of which make up the so-called revolutionary family, are co-opted by the softline faction. By contrast the hardline faction controls only smaller surrogate organisations such as women's rights (RAFD) and professional bodies like the Algerian medical union (UMA). This advantage is however offset by the stronger media muscle of the hardline faction. The public media like the national television, the French daily *El Moudjabid*, and the Arabic daily *Ashaab*, are under the tight control of general Mediène. These are however somewhat less partisan than the faction-owned

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and polarised 'independent' press, e.g. *El Watan*, *Liberté*, *Le Matin* and *Al Khabar*, which defend the eradicator barracks. Papers such as *L'Authentique*, *Demain l'Algérie* and *Al Acil* write for their patrons in the softline barracks.<sup>125</sup>

When the conflict between the military rivals increases in intensity, it reflects on these political, social and media agencies engaging into faction-motivated hostile statements, proposals for legislation, demonstrations, strikes and/or smear campaigns. Referring to such recurring episodes, Ali Yahia remarks that:

Each time there is a change in the balance of power in favour of dialogue, the hardliners in the military call upon the eradicationists in the political parties and in civil society to make violent statements in the press and organise 'spontaneous' demonstrations.<sup>126</sup>

October 1997 is remembered as a month in which the massacres reached genocidal proportions. At the time, the victory of the RND following the rigged local elections of October 23 was counter-acted by widespread demonstration, curiously the first to be allowed since the coup in January 1992. They were organised by an ostensibly incongruous coalition involving the Islamist MSP, the staunchly anti-Islamist RCD, part of the FLN, in addition to a short-lived alliance of genuine opposition parties such as the FFS, the Nahdah Movement (NM) and the Parti des Travailleurs (PT – Labour Party).<sup>127</sup> The demonstration, which was widely believed to be at the instigation of the eradicator faction to offset the political advantage of its rival, denounced both the electoral fraud and the RND, without success. The demonstrations were eventually called off when the number of demonstrators shouting '*pouvoir assassin*' and other faction-indiscriminate slogans increased alarmingly close to the boundary beyond which the imperative to dominate the civilian sphere supersedes internal military quarrels over power-sharing.

### ***3.3.2e. Competition over Paramilitary Control***

The competition over the control of armed civilians is a comparatively more decisive factional battlefield. In 1994, the initiative to arm the population served to support over-stretched regular troops with cheap repressive supplies expedient for COIN anti-guerrilla warfare. At a time when the conciliator faction was negotiating with the imprisoned FIS leaders, it also served to make the military eradication policy irreversible. Since then, this force, controlled by the Gendarmerie Nationale, has proliferated throughout the country and is now estimated at over 200,000 men. The bloating of this paramilitary structure, and the recession of insurgent activity, has made the control over this force a high factional stake.

The first reported factional wrangling over militia control took place in November 1995 when *L'Authentique*, speaking on behalf of Betchine, argued

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for the necessity of 'federating one day the Patriots', which at the time were led by veterans of the liberation war, many of whom sought autonomy to extract political and business privileges in exchange for their services.<sup>128</sup> Garçon said that the laws passed in March 1997 for the federation of the militias were motivated by a factional struggle for the appropriation of the paramilitaries:

The use of paramilitary groups has become a key element in the negotiations that led, in February 1997, to the creation of the RND, the presidential party needed to win the legislative elections. [...] Although each faction tries to appropriate this force, the army, which considers the militia necessary so as not to expose its units, does not intend to let the small warlords boost their family fortunes in the name of their 'resistance against fundamentalism' and extract negotiating power from it.<sup>129</sup>

The laws passed in March 1997 gave the operational control of the militias to the Gendarmerie Nationale, at the time under the command of eradicator general Abbas Ghezail.

But with Zeroual's dismissal of Ghezail and his appointment of general Tayeb Derradji as the head of this body, in July 1997, his faction completed the control over this armed structure, sparking hostile counter-reactions from the hardline grouping, which perceived it as a threatening military counter-weight.

At the emergency conclave held in September 1997, reports spoke of bitter rows between the factions over the fate of this paramilitary force. Hawkish eradicator Lamari proposed that, together with General Fodhil Cherif<sup>B</sup>, head of the anti-terrorist special forces, and general Kamal Abderahmane, head of the 2<sup>nd</sup> MD, they re-structure the paramilitaries and put them under the command of a then unnamed general.<sup>130</sup> Generals Nezzar and Mediène, once supporters of the militias project, reportedly argued that this proxy force was turning into an increasingly uncontrollable force involved in criminal activities. They proposed its gradual dismantling.<sup>131</sup>

On the opposite side, Zeroual, once a dove opposed to the militia initiative, is said to have defended the status quo, which was to the advantage of his faction. It was reported that he pointed out the duplicitous position of his rivals by referring to the earlier distribution of 25,000 Kalashnikovs to civilians in Kabylia, by eradicator General Said Bey, then head of the 1<sup>st</sup> MD.<sup>132</sup>

This factional conflict over militia-control played itself out in a different form in April 1998. Following an unprecedented arrest of two militia leaders, El-Abed, mayor of Jdioua, and Fergane, mayor of Relizane, eradicator pa-

<sup>B</sup> Few days before the conclave, General Fodhil Cherif had taken the unusual step of attacking publicly the Gendarmerie Nationale: 'It is the careless and grave abdication of the authorities that have led to this situation.' See *Le Monde*, 8 October 1997.

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pers *Liberté*, *El Watan* and *Al Khabar* initiated a series of articles denouncing these militias as involved in massacres of civilians, corruption, and in widespread extortion.<sup>133</sup> The response of the military rival was swift. The Algerian national TV ran adverts for militia recruitment and a documentary showing the wives and children of the alleged perpetrators praising their patriotism and integrity. The suspects were then released from detention on orders from Adami, the justice minister and client of the conciliator faction.

Some observers likened these hostilities to a precedent in Algeria's military politics. On 19 June 1965, Colonel BouMediène overthrew Ben Bella. This coup, by the factional genitors of today's eradicators, was carried out to pre-empt the setting up of a militia force. Ben Bella, the FLN left-wingers, and the guerrillas of the *internal* ALN (the factional genitors of today's conciliators) had sought to create a military counter-weight to the professional army whose core was comprised of the *external* ALN and ex-officers of the colonial army.<sup>134</sup>

### ***3.3.2f. Rivalry in Negotiations with the FIS***

States of factional conflict also arise over the issue of negotiations with the FIS. The faction led by Zeroual sought a negotiated transition to a more inclusive political system which would somehow re-instate and co-opt the FIS. That led by Lamari and Mediène has been in favour of the physical and political eradication of the FIS, and has been unwilling to tolerate any concession beyond individual defections. Ali Yahia comments that

The two strategies clashing within the National Popular Army are the cause of see-saw decisions, alternations of hardening, aggressiveness, and search for dialogue, which influence the political landscape in a negative way. As a matter of fact two opposing tendencies co-exist. One of them is concerned with maintaining order; it is a force of conservatism, and against progress. The other seeks to work for civil peace and national reconciliation through dialogue.<sup>135</sup>

The factional politics underlying these positions have been explained as follows. A negotiated settlement with the FIS is a favourable option to the conciliators for it would meet their interests of purging their institutional rivals as well as satisfy the demands of the FIS opposition. This stems from the fact that it was the eradicator faction that executed the military coup in January 1992 and has since carried the main operational burden of the repression. Responsibility settlements or trials for the bloodbath and destruction would predominantly affect the Lamari-Mediène faction. This is also said to be the recommended option of the US, the foreign patron of the conciliator faction.<sup>136</sup> On the other hand, the eradicator faction suspects that any negotiated settlement would be at its expense; this option is also said to be the policy recommendation of its patron, France.<sup>137</sup>

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Zeroual engaged in both direct and indirect discussions with jailed FIS political leaders in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1997.<sup>138</sup> Indirect contacts were made through generals Mohamed Betchine, Tayeb Derradji, and Abdelmajid Cherif, brother in law of Zeroual and related to FIS official Ali Djeddi. The negotiations invariably inflamed factional tensions and provoked two types of eradicator counter-action.

A novel and political type of counter-response was the holding of parallel talks with the military wing of the FIS (i.e. the AIS). In June and July 1997, FIS leaders Abbassi Madani and Abdelkader Hachani were released following earlier negotiations with generals from the softline faction. The next agreed step was reported to be Madani's televised appeal to the Islamic armed opposition for a cessation of hostilities.<sup>139</sup>

This however never occurred. The perpetration of massacres flared up in August 1997, and early in September Madani was re-arrested on orders from general Mediène, and, as already discussed, Lamari attempted a coup. Surprisingly, a month later, Madani Mezerag, commander of the eastern AIS force, declared a unilateral truce, broadcast on national TV, just a couple of days after Zeroual had made the public statement that 'the case of FIS is closed.'<sup>140</sup>

It transpired later that general Mediène and eradicator general Smain Lamari – the counter-intelligence chief – had initiated once illicit contacts with the AIS and negotiated a parallel truce, without the knowledge of Zeroual, hence appropriating and inverting a longstanding political weapon of their rivals.<sup>141</sup> This thwarted the threatening political initiative of the softline faction. Addi summed up this episode saying:

The truce signed with the AIS in October 1997 had the objective of preventing the success of the negotiations between the presidency and the political leadership of the FIS, which would have made of Zeroual the peacemaker and reinforced his power relative to the high command of the army.<sup>142</sup>

This type of eradicator counter-action was however singularly political. The typical neutralising response since 1994, as this thesis claims, has been the policy of escalating the repression.<sup>143</sup>

### ***3.3.2g. Instrumentality of Massacres in Factional Hostilities***

There are two types of claims that explain the massacres as outcomes of particular states of conflict between the contending factions.

In the first type, the belief that the massacres result from factional conflict is induced from the concurrence of the mass killings with factional feuding. The time correlation is ascribed causal content without it being explicitly articulated. For instance Garçon remarks that 'the coincidence of the

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acts of terror with the progress in negotiations suggests there is a real power struggle at the top of the state.<sup>144</sup> Amari says ‘the people can only take note that every time a child is killed and a woman is raped a fragment of power is being renegotiated.’<sup>145</sup>

In the second kind of explanation, specific intents are imputed to one of the factions. For example, the massacres of the summer and autumn 1997 were accounted for as general Mohamed Lamari ‘thwarting the peace initiative [and] warning [...] the advocates of a covert dialogue with FIS’<sup>146</sup> against initiatives at his expense. There have also been claims that the killings were intended ‘to discredit those inclined towards negotiations.’<sup>147</sup>

The ascription of such intents has been reinforced by the factions’ practices of exploiting the issue of human rights violations, and the responsibility for committing them. This was pointed out in the January 1997 news reports and most recently, in the summer of 1998, when the campaign to dislodge Zeroual and Betchine from power was at its most intense.

Through their media adjuncts, the eradicators accused Betchine of supporting the use of widespread torture to repress the youth uprising of October 1988; he was in charge of military intelligence at the time. This press also provided accounts of extortion, corruption and judicial crimes committed by Betchine. It also revealed that justice minister, Adami, a client of the conciliator faction, had ordered the displacement of thirty-two political prisoners who died during the transfer.<sup>148</sup>

These denunciations had been sparked off by earlier attacks, in the pro-Betchine press, which ‘broke a security taboo’<sup>149</sup> as this revealed that general Belkheir had been an informer of president Mitterand’s secretary and, together with general Nezzar, created ‘at least 300 death squads in Algiers only in 1992’, without the consent of the Haut Comité d’État (a temporary body that filled president Chadli’s post after his ousting).<sup>150</sup> These revelations had followed earlier leaks pointing to the eradicator faction bearing responsibility for the secret detention, torture, and summary executions of scores of civilians.<sup>151</sup>

The fact that these practices are not exclusive to Algeria’s military has been used to lend credence to this thesis. Faction-ridden armies of Latin America have resorted to the same arsenal of dirty tricks. Two cases in point are Brazil and Colombia; George Joffé, for instance, has pointed to the analogy between their military intelligence structures and that of Algeria’s military.<sup>152</sup>

In the 1970s, the *duros* (hardliners) and the *castelistas* (softliners) of the Brazilian army fought it out.<sup>153</sup> It was common for the *duros* to aggravate the repression to discredit their military rivals in government. For instance, Farcau says:

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Throughout 1974 and 1975, the hardline army commanders intentionally increased the number of brutal kidnappings, tortures, and murders of journalists, labour leaders, and even one American citizen, primarily to embarrass and discredit the government. And just as the hardliners used the security forces as a weapon against the *castelistas* in the struggle for power, so Geisel's reining in these forces should be viewed in this light and not necessarily in terms of a personal commitment to human rights.<sup>154</sup>

In Colombia, the same tactics were used in the rivalry that pitted the 'military as government' (led by president Natush) to the 'military as institution' faction (led by the army chief-of-staff Garcia Meza) in 1979. Farcau observed that 'Garcia Meza was able to commit the most heinous human rights violations and, while Natush and the 'generationalists' were helpless to stop him, they were forced to shoulder the blame.'<sup>155</sup>

### 3.4. Massacres as Eviction Tactics in Land Privatisation

This theory has had some media coverage. It suggests the massacres are instigated by big land-speculators, a large part of whom are retired army officers or active officers in part-time business activities. The alleged intent is the eviction of tenants from the most fertile land being considered for privatisation, in order to appropriate them. Michael Willis says:

The clearing of rural areas through the threat of renewed massacres opens the way for some to control and benefit from the abandonment of valuable land. The maintenance of a certain level of violence averts scrutiny, particularly from abroad, of a range of shady financial interests that many at the top undoubtedly operate.<sup>156</sup>

The claim has, for the most part, not been used to explain *all* the massacres. It has only been intended to account for the massacres in particular locations, such as those in the arable lands of the Mitidja region and the suburban areas West of Algiers.

Here also one can say that ascribing this purposive action may not exclude either the COIN programme intent or the factionalist war intent. The land privatisation motive is not necessarily exclusive of either intent since it may be combined with them, in the sense that different officers within Algeria's military have private – as opposed to institutional and/or factional – objectives coinciding with those of the COIN programme.

The usual structure in which this theory of the massacres is argued involves sketching out their correlations with the intrinsic economic value of the lands where they take place, and/or with the shifts in the value and legal status of these lands, prior and after the occurrence of the massacres.

Referring to the massacres of the summer and autumn 1997, Alain Joxe states:

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We observe that the recent big massacres, in Algeria, are located in the most populated, accessible, and best patrolled districts of 'useful Algeria': the fertile plains of the Mitidja, the big suburbs of Algiers. They often took place at a few hundreds meters away from barracks or police stations, and from security forces which remained 'neutral' and did not intervene, under orders or otherwise. Any observer of massacres carried out in fertile lands and areas under urban expansion knows that there cannot be massacres in such types of territory without underlying estate operations. Either they seek to recreate large land ownership by depopulating the co-operative farms set up at independence. Or they seek to depopulate lands for urban land speculation. To make rural populations flee, it is necessary and sufficient, in a state with no rule of law or in a military dictatorship, to massacre some entire villages. The effect of terror generates a multiplicative effect of flight.<sup>157</sup>

The Mitidja region, vast plains lying south-west of Algiers, is geohistorically known as Algeria's breadbasket because of its high return arable land. These lands are also coveted because they lie along the coast and are 'ideally located for building tourist complexes in anticipation of the return of peace when Algeria will re-establish its tourist industry, which has been curbed for the past thirty five years.'<sup>158</sup> There is currently a project to build four new cities in the Mitidja. The legal status of these lands changed drastically at independence when the Algerian state recovered what had been usurped by French colonisers, by nationalising eight million hectares of arable land over the whole country. About eighty percent of the land was to be cultivated by land tenants through collective farms. In accordance with the June 1962 Tripoli Charter of the FLN (which asserted that 'land belongs to those who cultivate it', and 'sharing, without parcelling out, the land' through a co-operative system), this principle became law by the decree of August 1969. The agrarian revolution charter of 1971 maintained the principle of small and medium property, and included legal provisions to prevent post-mortem land ownership fragmentation or concentration. It granted 'eternal usufruct' to the tenants who cultivated nationalised lands and gave them the right to transfer this usufruct to a male inheritor (not already recipient of land tenure) if committed to cultivating the land.

The legal status of these lands has however undergone a reverse change since September 1995 as the military regime announced it was intending to privatise 2.8 million hectares (out of 8 million hectares of arable land), 0.1 million hectares of which lie in the Mitidja region. Even before the privatisation law was passed, in 1998, about 60,000 hectares in the Mitidja region had reportedly been given to land speculation since September 1995.<sup>159</sup> The law facilitates acquisition by ex-mujahideen, former guerrilla fighters in the war of liberation, reconverted into business.<sup>160</sup> This is widely perceived as a preferential treatment of what is known as the militia lobby, a pressure group that includes people like commandant Azzedine, Boubnider, and Zbiri, former guerrilla commanders. Some of them were involved in setting up the paramilitary forces in 1994, and are to this day running the COIN operations

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in co-ordination with, and for, the military.<sup>161</sup> Other important beneficiaries include army officers engaged in part-time business activities, retired army officers, and powerful state bureaucrats who launder vast sums of money stolen from public institutions.<sup>162</sup> In October 1990, Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche ordered the publication of an initial list of 150 state bureaucrats and officers who had misappropriated nationalised land, an initiative which was promptly halted by powerful interests in the military.<sup>163</sup> Referring to these beneficiaries, Louisa Hanoune, leader of the labour party, stated:

For a whole series of people, there are many profits to be made. For instance, Algerian potatoes are left to rot in the ground and this allows 'cronies' to import foreign potatoes and embezzle a lot of money in the process. The same holds for the new law on the redistribution of land which profits 'liberation war mujahideen and their legal beneficiaries' who are in fact people close to *le pouvoir*, and some of them are real mafiosos. One should note that the lands where whole families are slaughtered as well as those of their neighbours who flee in terror are considered as abandoned and therefore liable to redistribution. The same holds true for small entrepreneurs who are harassed, racketed to the point of closing their businesses. These are then taken over by some other owners who, curiously, are never harassed.<sup>164</sup>

In summary then, those who infer a land privatisation intent from the massacres often do so on the grounds of particular physical, economic and legal consequences. Physically, the massacres have created a spiraling exodus of villagers to large urban centers. Economically, the massacres occur in lands of high intrinsic economic value but the sale prices of these killing fields has sharply decreased as farmers abandon, or sell the land for a paltry sum. Land ownership has shifted legally, from small tenant farmers to medium to big military-backed beneficiaries who steal or buy these depopulated lands. Some commentators, Forestier among them, have even suggested that the observed age-indiscriminate nature of the massacres serves the legal purpose of preventing anyone from the progeny of the victim legally claiming the 'eternal and bequeathable usufruct.' He says:

At each massacre, the land pushes the farmer to the cities. In order to accelerate this movement, the killings are increasingly vile. There have been reports of cases of cannibalism in the massacres. Babies have been nailed to doors or burned in the oven of a cooker. The murderers keep going at children to eliminate up to the last heir and hence prevent any future legal review of the allocations of lands. It happens that after a first massacre the survivors remain in their houses because they do not know where to go. At ar Rais, the death commandos came back a second time to decimate them.<sup>165</sup>

Finally, one should point out that not all accounts of this theory involve sketching out correlations between the massacres and land privatisation as such. Some advocates of the privatisation rationale of the massacres do so

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on the basis that it is just a particular instance of wider correlative patterns between the violence engulfing Algeria and the restructuring of its economy.

Many Algerians intuit that the ongoing economic restructuring maintains, modulates and shapes some of the violence. No empirical research into the various connections between the intensity, modulation and distribution of the violence, and the main economic and financial operations that have taken place in Algeria since 1992 is yet available. Some fragmentary pieces of information however do support that intuition. These can be classified into 3 sets of observations.

First, consider what Karabdjji reports about violence as an expedient tool for privatising public pharmaceutical companies:

A number of investors are exerting pressure on the government to sell sound companies such as *Air Algérie* or *Sonatrach* (oil company). At the same time, other profitable public companies are the target of real destabilisation attempts. This is the case, for instance, of *Saidal*, a pharmaceutical company which tries to revive the national industry against strong competition from private import companies. 'This dynamics is disturbing', explains an executive from *Saidal*. 'The director of our company has been the victim of several terrorist attacks. Our production installations are regularly targeted and we have been forced to create a subsidiary security company to protect us. No one will be able to convince us that these attacks are the work of Islamist groups.'

Clearly, the lobbies wishing Algeria to continue importing drugs instead of manufacturing them would be behind these attacks. Destabilisation through a violence that is easily attributable to terrorists is not the only weapon used by those who wish to transform Algeria into a gigantic commercial counter.<sup>166</sup>

The beneficiaries of the privatisation programme are officers of the army, relatives, other civilians acting as proxies for the officers, or people connected with the higher echelons of the military regime. Hadjadj remarks:

The wild privatisation of the economy, under the leadership of the IMF, has above all replaced the lucrative state monopoly by that exerted by the new godfathers who have divided the import market – about 10 billion dollars each year – among themselves. The weight of a godfather is proportional to his protection within *le pouvoir*. To identify the potential sectors of corruption, suffice to make an inventory of the state budgets or those offered by state banks (still waiting for a reform or privatisation of their management): health, farm-produce, equipment and infrastructure, industry, security, national defence.

A good example is that of drugs where, through private import companies, family links with the dignitaries of the regime are openly displayed. Among the best known names, one finds Ghenim, Bouhadja, Benmansour, Laroussi, Sidi Said, Lamari.<sup>167</sup>

Four of these names have access to the monopoly of institutional violence. Benmansour is the minister of the interior, Ghenim and Bouhadja are generals, and Lamari is the army chief-of-staff. Lamari is associated to Mo-

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hamed Ait Djedou, the pharmaceuticals magnate.<sup>168</sup> Many observers also see the connection with eradicator Lamari as crucial in benefiting, from the 'other side of the counter', the French pharmaceutical industry. Algeria imports 80 % of its drugs, which represents 4.5 % of its oil earnings (e.g. 500 million dollars in 1995), and most of them are produced by French pharmaceutical companies.<sup>169</sup>

In a study of the economy of the war, Martinez pointed out that:

The tactics of Islamic armed groups goes with a phenomenon of privatisation of the most exposed sectors. The systematic destruction of public vehicles has led to a proliferation of private transport companies which represent, now, 60 % of the market in Algiers. The decree of December 1987 allowed the private sector but it was only after the start of the civil war that a really wild privatisation occurred. [...] According to a study by the ministry of transport, financed by the World Bank, private transport companies hold 100 % of the market shares in Annaba and Setif, 98 % in Constantine, 86 % in Blida and 74 % in Oran. The violence of the emirs has also favoured the modernisation of the building industry. The sabotage of cement factories has led to the creation of new private companies.<sup>170</sup>

Karabджи agrees with Martinez about the economic motivation of the violence but does not share the latter's certainty about the identity of the instigators and perpetrators:

A civil servant at the Chamber of commerce acknowledges that 'the public monopolies have been replaced by private monopolies close to the circles of *le pouvoir*. It is useless to try to import food products, drugs or building materials. Everybody knows that in these markets there are people one cannot bypass and it would better, for one's own security, not to get close to them. I challenge any Algerian operator to import sugar or French cement. At best, he would receive a polite refusal from the supplier.' [...] Some operators have had less luck: Algerians are convinced that some assassinations attributed to Islamic armed groups are linked to affairs of rivalry in international commerce.<sup>171</sup>

In the second set of observations, it is often pointed out that it is no accident that those who hold the monopoly of institutional violence are the very ones who benefit most from the privatisation and corruption. Swiss member of parliament Ziegler says:

The hundreds of victims of the massacres of Rais and Beni Messous do not risk upsetting the military: their death contributes to maintaining the generals' oil rent deposited mainly in the banks of Geneva. For more than five years, since the military coup of January 1992, the bloody chaos organised by the killers, some of whose commanders work in the Algerian secret services, serves admirably the strategy of the generals. As long as women, men and children are slaughtered in the Mitidja, the suburbs of Algiers or in Kabylia no one will speak of free elections. The generals are certain to loose them, together with the staggering profits they extract monthly from the oil and gas revenues. In Geneva, through joint stock estate companies, whole streets belong now to generals and directors of petro-chemical public companies. In Berne, a general – Abdelmalek Guenaizia – occupies the embassy. He attends to the

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good running of the transfers. Some Algerian diplomats have even been called to order by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs: they spend their time setting up front companies in Lichtenstein. This is not exactly a diplomatic activity.<sup>172</sup>

*Le Nouvel Afrique Asie* reported that 'general Betchine, security advisor to the president of the republic, has become an element one cannot bypass in the East of Algeria, where he comes from. There he controls intelligence, the real estate, farm-produce industry and, despite his rivalries with the generals Smain Lamari and Mohamed Mediène, shares with them the repression apparatus.<sup>173</sup> He also owns several newspapers in Algeria and is said to have large land and estate properties in France, Switzerland, Tunisia and Syria. General Mediène controls important market shares in oil and gold prospecting, whilst his elder son represents the South Korea industrial giant, Dae-woo, in Algeria.<sup>174</sup> General Khaled Nezzar owns large estates and property in Algiers, Batna and Constantine. His son is said to control large shares in the import of farm-products, and to be married to the daughter of a multi-millionaire who owns, among others interests, the restaurant in the *Château de Versailles* in France and the *Go Fast* airline company that shuttles between Paris and Algeria's main oil base, Hassi Messaoud.<sup>175</sup> General Larbi Belkheir has estate property in Morocco, France, Switzerland, and Venezuela.<sup>176</sup> He amassed a fortune estimated in hundreds of millions of dollars from the Fiat car project that never saw the light of the day when he was secretary at the presidency, and from a regular rent from Italian gas pipeline companies.<sup>177</sup> Generals Abdelhamid Djouadi, Lakehal Ayat and Abdelmajid Cherif hold the monopoly of private security companies for the surveillance of oil fields.<sup>178</sup>

The third set of observations touches on less obvious correlations between the violence and the restructuring of the economy. Economist Bellami writes:

Economic liberalisation has been imposed using overt and covert state terror. The 'economic yield' of bomb attacks on public companies is the closing down of factories, and layoffs of hundreds of thousands of workers at no political cost since the blame is shifted on shadowy armed groups such as the GIA. In fact, a sizeable percentage of the workers made redundant are recycled as paramilitary repressive resources. In a country with 115 % inflation in 4 years, 8% decrease in industrial production, a wiped out middle class, and an unemployment affecting 30 % of the active population, can it be just a random coincidence that, on one hand, factories are closed down and more than 800,000 workers are made redundant and, on the other hand, over 200,000 militiamen, earning salaries 2 to 3 times the guaranteed minimum wage, be raised? Is it haphazard that the IMF 'restructuring' prescriptions give explicit support to this destruction of our economy and militarisation of our society?

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Bellami also observed that

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The new economic, financial and monetary laws serve to legalise an unchecked and socially brutal liberalisation, launder staggering thefts and sell cheaply national resources to some unscrupulous multinational companies. Most of them were passed between 1992 and 1996 by members of the National Council of Transition (CNT), that is to say, without a single exception, people appointed by the military and not elected by the people. Can it be incidental that these laws were passed when the country was swamped by the tides of terror? When there was not a single elected institution to make such decisions? At a time the visibility of the coercive power of the army was at a maximum? When the margins for social protest were absent? An Algerian proverb says 'coincidence is the will of others.'<sup>180</sup>

### 3.5. Massacres as a 'Barbarian Cycle'

This explanation is most frequently, though not exclusively, found in the writings of French commentators and 'experts' on violence. The suggestion here is that the massacres are an all-out social war, a 'spiral of revenge and hatred'<sup>181</sup>, a 'generalised settling of scores'<sup>182</sup>, a 'permanent feud'<sup>183</sup> a 'senseless frenzy of horror', or a 'barbarian cycle'<sup>184</sup> rooted in Algeria's history and culture. British journalist Hirst speaks of an 'obscure, almost indecipherable [...] barbarous civil war' with 'clan, family and community vendettas rooted in the country's harsh history.'<sup>185</sup> Grandguillaume, a French anthropologist, says 'history is part of the current events [and] we are witnessing an all out feud that leads to these atrocities.'<sup>186</sup>

Two aspects distinguish these theses from those reviewed earlier. Firstly, the instigators, perpetrators, and their victims are not narrowly, or politically, defined. They belong to universal social categories, such as the family, tribe, clan, or community, depicted as caught up in a politically blind and murderous pandemonium. Secondly, no instrumental intent, be it strategic, political, or economic, is invoked here to explain the atrocities. Some suggestions do ascribe psychological motives such as 'revenge' or 'hatred' to entities such as 'families' and 'tribes'. Typical accounts, however, appeal to historical, cultural and/or social facts and regularities in contra-distinction to putative intents in the states of consciousness or policies of the instigators or perpetrators as is the case in 3.1-3.4.

Grandguillaume believes that some massacres are attributable to 'family vendettas':

Family feuds do play a role. Traditional hatreds between villages, families, and clan subsist. What are their causes? Issues of shame, unresolved quarrels about land. They reappear these days at football games that may end with violent fights between opposing supporters.<sup>187</sup>

Garçon reports an unnamed Algerian official stating:

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*Intents and Perpetrators*

When the justice of the State does not exist, when there is no authority to appeal to, and the neutrality of the *djemaa* [traditional mediators] makes them suspect, personal revenge, family or tribal vendettas, *lex talionis* become the rule.<sup>188</sup>

For massacres as ‘tribal atavisms’, or as ‘clan punitive expeditions’<sup>189</sup>, Abdi invokes the psychological motives of ‘hatred’ and ‘revenge’:

In the rural areas, it has become a tribal war. Some tribes are loyal to *le pouvoir* because one of their members may be a minor civil servant, policeman, gendarme... or even an officer in the army. The spiral of horror starts when the Islamists kill a member of this tribe. The latter then decides to accept the arms offered by the security forces and takes revenge against those whose children have joined the guerrilla forces. In the end, the Islamists come back to massacre the avenging tribe. And this goes on, because the army has succeeded in implicating people who never wanted to take sides in the war since 1992.<sup>190</sup>

Now when the massacres are described as a matter of chaotic social criminality, the accounts speak of ‘Algeria becoming a gangland’<sup>191</sup> where the killings are perpetrated by ‘local mafias running their own militias’<sup>192</sup>, or ‘warlords recruiting men from their families and seeking to enlarge their fiefdom.’<sup>193</sup> Garçon perceives an anarchic violence:

The eruption of violence has never been so obscure since the beginning of the hostilities because it involves a multitude of actors: small warlords, Islamists or militiamen, various military factions, gangsters acting in the name of God or country, each of these having clientele to satisfy, targets to terrorise, lucrative trafficking to control and personal, tribal or local reprisals to assuage.<sup>194</sup>

Her account omits a particular form of banditry that Grandguillaume does not disregard:

One should include the existence of a massive criminality. With all this idle youth, in a climate of institutional violence where there is no place for the rule of law, criminality can only prosper.<sup>195</sup>

Clearly these accounts depict the massacres as empty of strategic, political or economic instrumental content.

Among the explanations in terms of cultural and/or historical facts and patterns, one finds claims that the cause of the massacres lies in the nature of Islam and the social character of Algerian people. Le Pen explains that ‘these spectacular massacres are part of [their] tradition.’<sup>196</sup> Leconte says ‘the killings are done in the name of Islam or, at least, of a certain idea of Islam.’<sup>197</sup> Grandguillaume asserts that Algeria is a ‘violent [and] harsh society.’<sup>198</sup> Articles in *Le Monde* and *L’Express* frequently use notions such as the ‘Algerian violence’, the ‘singularity of Algeria’s violence’, ‘Algeria’s culture of

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war' to explain the massacres. Hirst also claims 'historians and sociologists tend to agree' that 'Algerians have a natural bent for extremism.'<sup>199</sup> Amin, Egypt's former ambassador to Algeria, equally states

Algerians are much rougher than Egyptians or their neighbours in Morocco and Tunisia. They are good hearted, but even in their daily dealings they are harsh, tough, devoid of the softer ways of a civilised people. This is mainly because of the hardship they endured at the hands of the French.<sup>200</sup>

Historical explanations basically involve pointing out historical examples of violence among Algerians as instances of a regular pattern subsuming to-day's violence. Leconte says:

From the colonial night, some historians would have us believe, Bugeaud had exported Western barbarity to other shores of the Mediterranean. Nothing is said about the violence internal to the Algerian nationalist movement. Accepted in the name of the struggle against the occupier, this third world version of the 'end justifies the means' created havoc within the ranks of the militants before it turned against society. Since its liberation war, Algeria lives a permanent settling of scores whose current version is the most deadly.<sup>201</sup>

The havoc to which Leconte refers is the conflict between the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the Algerian National Movement (MNA).<sup>202</sup> Granguillaume also includes 'the violence of the FLN against the population in order to involve it in the struggle,' and 'that against the *barkis*', which continued after independence.<sup>203</sup> Of the latter, he makes the claim that:

Today, there are retributions whose origin should be searched for in the conflicts created by Algeria's independence in 1962. I am thinking of the massacres of the *barkis* that took place that summer, in the first months following independence. The number of victims is estimated at between 60,000 and 100,000. The *barkis* were Algerians recruited by France and were militias of the same type as those currently armed in villages by the Algerian authorities. At independence France denied the *barkis* access to the French territory. These people became prisoners in their own country. They were killed. These *barkis* were not isolated individuals. They belonged to families, and tribes. I am convinced there are deep-seated grudges that are re-activated by the current events. Today the qualifier '*barkiz*' or 'son of *barkiz*' is continuously used as an insult by both camps. The *barki* is the one who betrayed his country.<sup>204</sup>

These social or historical explanations locate the 'cause' of the massacres to facts *preceding* Algeria's independence in 1962. For similar explanatory claims appealing to *post-independence* facts, one can find references to the violence 'rooted in the Algerian schools'. Granguillaume again:

It is a harsh society. Just like its schools for instance. Children are often beaten and bullied in schools. Some years ago there was talk of introducing rules against corpo-

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ral punishment. This is to say that one is subjected to violence right from school, at a very young age. The citizens are brutalised in their daily lives.<sup>205</sup>

Adler says the national education of Algerians is suspect:

The hideous violence raging today is, before all, the daughter of colonial times and, of course, that of the mass nationalist education under the rule of Boumediene which, far from seeking the appeasement of minds, exalted, Soviet-way, a war of liberation totally mythicised.<sup>206</sup>

Grandguillaume also finds roots for 'the Algerian violence' in the linguistic policy of arabisation at the expense of the French language.<sup>207</sup>

#### 4. Explanatory Scopes of the Five Intents

We now attempt to evaluate the explanatory force and limits of these five putative intents.

Rather than compare them to particulars from individual massacres, we assess their consequences against some victimisation macro-indicators obtained by aggregating data from individual massacres. These collective data are available from the study of Ait-Larbi *et al.*, *An anatomy of the massacres*.<sup>208</sup>

They define two types of massacres: selective mass victimisation (SMV) events, and random mass victimisation (RMV) events. They characterise a massacre of the SMV kind as an episode where a selected sub-group of unarmed civilians are killed indiscriminately. One example would be the killing of members of a given family singled out in a quarter or village. They characterise a massacre of the RMV type as an event where a random victimisation of a random sub-group of the population takes place, for instance a bombing in a public place.

The data they used were obtained mainly from news reports in the international press. The authors acknowledged they were incomplete and distorted (by under-estimation). Their data were sketchy up to early 1996, but for the later period they integrated various data sources, which were searched through the Internet; this gave them a more comprehensive data set.

They first focused on the victimisation events as the relevant unit of analysis. They generated several indicators: the magnitudes and frequencies of the SMV and RMV events, their respective annual and monthly fluctuations, their district distribution over the national territory, and their political, military and economic geographies.

They then concentrated on the population of victims as a unit of analysis. The numbers of deaths and their time, space and social distributions were calculated. Non quantitative analyses of selectivity, vulnerability, and re-

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sponse in the victimisation were made, along with an account of the effects of the mass killings on the victimised populations.

Another unit they looked at was the population of crimes and perpetrators. They generated collective data about injuries and weapons in the SMV episodes, and weapon and target trends in RMV events. Some patterns about the organisational aspects of the perpetrators were also inferred.

Clearly there is a vast amount of data against which to test the logical consequences of the five putative intents we reviewed in section 3. A large programme would be needed to carry out an exhaustive inspection against the available data.

Our resolving of the scopes of the five explanations will be restricted to only a few of the time and space macro-indicators obtained in the study using the victimisation *events* as a unit of analysis. These are the most reliable observables of their data set, and one does not need many auxiliary assumptions to draw testable consequences from the putative intents.

#### 4.1. Monthly Fluctuations of the Massacres

Figure 2 shows the monthly fluctuations of the numbers of SMV and RMV events from April 1996 to December 1998. A phenomenon of *waves* of mass killings with lulls in between is clearly observable. The total massacre activity has seven *waves*, named  $W_1, \dots, W_7$  in the figure, i.e. eruptions of mass terror with different timings, levels of intensity and duration. Figure 3 displays the monthly fluctuations of the corresponding numbers of victims of selective and random mass victimisation for the same period. The wave structure is observed again. The timings and lifetimes<sup>C</sup> of these peaks of terror are equivalent to those observed in the total massacre activity. The intensities of the peaks are in proportional relation.

##### 4.1.1 Wave Structure of the Massacre Activity

How can the *wave* structure shown in figures 2 and 3 be an *exclusive* outcome of any of the five conjectured intents?

Take the barbarian cycle hypothesis (H<sub>BC</sub>). How can it entail that ‘clan, family and community vendettas rooted in the country’s harsh history’ flare up and abate in the way indicated in figures 2 and 3? Why would there be periods when clan and family vendettas and social criminality erupt collectively? Why would there be lulls in between these explosions of social may-

<sup>C</sup> Ait-Larbi *et al.* define the lifetime of a massacre wave as its full width at half-maximum. Suppose there is a train of massacres that increases, reaches a maximum of  $N$  massacres at some month  $t_{\text{month}}$ , and then decreases. The *lifetime* of such a *massacre wave* is the duration between the massacre activity registering  $N/2$  crescendo and decrescendo.

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hem? Why would the harshness of Algerian society, its schools and Arabic language produce massacres with an alternating time modulation?




Figure 2: Monthly Fluctuations of SMV and RMV Events, April. 96-Dec. 98




Figure 3: Monthly Fluctuations of SMV and RMV Deaths, April. 96-Dec. 98

It seems unlikely that Grandguillaume’s theories of ‘Algerian violence’ would engender the wave character of the massacre activity, except, perhaps,

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if some bizarre ad-hoc hypotheses were conjectured to save them. The burden of saving his theories is on him.

The problem with  $H_{BC}$  lies in that its explanandum is rather vague: ‘Algerian violence’, rather than some set of specific facts. Further, ascribing inaccessible subjective states such as ‘hatred’, ‘revenge’ and ‘harshness’ to sociological categories such as ‘family’, ‘clan’ or ‘society’ may be acceptable in ‘subjective rationales of violence’ discourses but is no help in accounting for specific facts. For one thing, such an approach obfuscates explanations in terms of strategies of actions prescribing specific facts of violence.

When reporting their finding of the wave character of the massacre activity, Ait-Larbi *et al.* pointed out, quoting Merloo, that the alternation in the regime of mass killings may be the outcome of a strategy for the effective maintenance of terror. The constant application of terror produces, over time, immunity to fear and the will to resist. Merloo says:

Totalitarian strategy in its tactical description of the techniques of mass intimidation and collective control discovered that the arousing of simple panic, fear and terror do not suffice. Too great a mental pressure exerted over a long period of time loses its frightening impact and often stirs rebellion and critical resistance in the people, militating against the final aim of producing obedient automatic thought machines out of human beings.

In order to better reach its goals, the more scientific strategy makes use of *waves of terror* ‘with in-between periods of relative calm and freedom’ – the so-called ‘*breathing spell*,’ (*peredishka*). These intervals of relative freedom and lack of overt tensions can be used to much better advantage for political persuasion and mass hypnosis provided some new wave of terror is anticipated. It is completely comparable with the patient in hypnotherapy who becomes easier to hypnotise at every session. The alternation of terror and breathing spell, for example, the alternation of a cold war of hatred with the opposite propaganda for harmonious, peaceful coexistence, can gradually cause confusion and increased anxious anticipation in people.<sup>209</sup>

Consider now the land privatisation hypothesis ( $H_{LP}$ ). There is no obvious land privatisation parameter that alternates with time. It is unlikely that all the massacre waves would be entailed by  $H_{LP}$  even if one assumes that the instigators of the massacres for land privatisation master this scientific strategy of terror and modulate the killings accordingly. Figures 2 and 3 display the massacre activities and victimisation volumes for all the territory, some parts of which have no particular land or estate value. The Mitidja would account for only a small part of the total victimisation. Furthermore, in the bare version of  $H_{LP}$ , given a particular region, once terror has been applied to drive the land tenants out, there would be no obvious need to maintain the terror. We will return to this point later.

Let us now look at the Islamist retribution hypothesis ( $H_{IR}$ ). It is not clear how the outpouring of ‘hatred’, ‘revenge’, ‘despair’ would bring about mass killings that flare up and abate in a structured way at a national level.

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Minister Moussaoui described the massacres as ‘the last spasms of the rabid beast’, the rabid beast referring the collective of Islamist insurgents.<sup>210</sup> The ‘spasm’ reference is a vivid representation of the wave structure of the massacre activity. But in so far that a spasm is an involuntary movement and ‘rabid beasts’ suggests uncontrollably violent fanatics, the probability of insurgents releasing their nihilistic anger collectively and synchronously at particular periods, in between lulls of collective quietude, appears rather remote. The *psychological* intent version of  $H_{IR}$  seems implausible.

Of course, one can assume that the Islamists master the scientific strategy of terror outlined by Merloo. In this case, only the instrumental version of  $H_{IR}$  would survive because ‘medieval and rabid fanatics’ in fits of ‘despair’, or seeking ritual, moral or religious purification, are not likely to engage in calculated instrumental violence. Unless, of course, Redha Malek, Hachemi Cherif and Khalida Messaoudi can save their theory with ad-hoc auxiliary assumptions to explain the time modulation of the rituals.

The *instrumental* version of  $H_{IR}$  cannot be ruled out in principle. To believe that  $H_{IR}$  explains the wave structure is to say that the insurgents punish their social base to prevent it from defecting to the incumbent side using a technique for *constant* deterrence. In other words, the time modulation of the terror would, in this case, be intended to maintain the populations *constantly* prevented from defecting to the military regime.

Consider now the COIN counter-mobilisation hypothesis ( $H_{COIN}$ ). The army has the monopoly of expertise and means in the application of force. The proposition that it modulates its COIN-prescribed mass killings in such a way as to maintain the whole society under *constant* terror is plausible. None of the features in figures 2 and 3 exclude  $H_{COIN}$ . The same can be said about the factional warfare hypothesis ( $H_{FW}$ ). Without further auxiliary assumptions, it cannot be excluded in principle.

Rather than test each of the putative intents against the *whole* wave structure of victimisation, we explore next how they may produce, individually or in combination, any of the  $W_1, \dots, W_7$  waves with intensities and lifetimes as shown in figures 2 and 3.

#### 4.1.2. *Timings of the Massacre Waves*

We focus only on  $H_{IR}$ ,  $H_{COIN}$ , and  $H_{FW}$ . As discussed above, it is probable that the massacres resulting from *exclusive* land privatisation intents do not contribute significantly to the time fluctuation of the victimisation activity. It is more likely they would contribute to the activity as *combined* with  $H_{COIN}$  and/or  $H_{FW}$  but then geographic indicators would test  $H_{LP}$  more stringently than time indicators.  $H_{BC}$  is an unlikely single explanation for the waves and will be ignored in what follows. Nevertheless, ignoring it does not mean that

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social units such as ‘family’ or ‘clan’ can be presumed to be uninvolved. The Algerian civil war, as with others, does not occur in a vacuum; it opposes various social units (family, clan, tribe, etc.).<sup>D</sup>

Now in order to assess whether any of the  $W_1, \dots, W_7$  waves supports or undermines  $H_{IR}$  and/or  $H_{COIN}$  and/or  $H_{FW}$ , we review some of the public and relevant political events concurrent with the waves.

**W<sub>1</sub>:** Take the victimisation sequence shown as  $W_1$  in figures 2 and 3. Its activity peaked in July 1996 (figure 2) and its deaths in August 1996 (figure 3). On the insurgent side the only public and relevant event was the creation of the Mouvement Islamique de la Dawa et du Djihad (MIDD – Islamic Movement for Predication and Struggle) in July 1996. On the incumbent side, Zouabri took over as the head of the GIA following the assassination of the monks of Tibherine, and the ensuing murder of GIA leader Zitouni, outcomes reportedly resulting from a clash between the DRS and the French SDECE.<sup>211</sup> There are three indications of factional hostilities. There was the assassination of conciliator general Saïdi, a day before his appointment at the defence cabinet, in June 1996. The promotions and assignments scheduled for 5 July were frozen as conciliators and eradicators could not agree on a joint list. Conciliator Zeroual intensified cross-party consultations, in July and August 1996, for the national conference on dialogue in September 1996. None of the events on the insurgent side or incumbent side refutes  $H_{IR}$  and/or  $H_{COIN}$  and/or  $H_{FW}$ .

**W<sub>2</sub>:** This wave peaks in November 1996. The only significant political event was the constitutional referendum held on 28 November 1996. This event seems irrelevant to  $H_{IR}$  and/or  $H_{COIN}$  and/or  $H_{FW}$ . This wave will however be resolved more finely by looking at its weekly constituent variations in section 4.2.

**W<sub>3</sub>:** Consider now the wave  $W_3$  that reaches a maximum in January 1997. Advocates of the thesis of massacres as ‘moral, religious or ritual purifica-

<sup>D</sup> What distinguishes a given civil war from another is not the involvement of social units such as family or clan, but the particular lines and configurations of conflict between these units. In this respect one could think of  $H_{BC}$  as accounted for, and subsumed under,  $H_{COIN}$  as follows. During the Algerian war of liberation the French military used sociologists and anthropologists to engineer counter-organisation techniques for their larger aim of counter-mobilising the populations against the revolution. The COIN campaign exploited family, clan, and tribal divisions and similarities to involve the civilian population against the FLN. McCuen says: ‘the French tried a similar counter-organisation of the population in Algeria, seeking to block the “parallel hierarchies” which they had seen the Viet-minh and FLN establish among the people. They tried to bring as many Algerians as possible into some type of organisation. The French army’s psychological and information service (SAPI) studied the population to determine what homogeneous divisions could be made in organising the Algerian people. A number were possible. For example, the religious brotherhood was a ready-made organisation. The shepherds, farmers, and fishermen were other possibilities. The SAPI decided however to concentrate the French efforts on the rural populations and specifically on the veterans, women, and youth. It considered these segments to be decisive in the struggle for the control of the people.’ (See J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*, op. cit., p. 98)

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tion' regard this wave as evidence of their claim because this timing partly overlaps with the month of Ramadan, which they regard as a special month for offering blood.<sup>212</sup> As for H<sub>IR</sub>, there are no apparent events, within the insurgent movement, which would be indicative of an intensification of the campaign to punish the populations to deter them from defecting to the regime. There is no reported indication of the social base of the insurgents increasing its disposition to support the regime.

Taking the opposite view, advocates of the H<sub>COIN</sub> intent may claim the month of Ramadan is a month of increased religiosity, mosque attendance, social activity and solidarity, hence greater political influence and deployment of the insurgents. This would jeopardise counter-mobilisation efforts of the COIN campaign, and hence incumbents' need to destroy the mobilisation momentum in favour of the insurgents.

With regard to H<sub>FW</sub>, several events may be taken to support it. Zeroual escaped two assassination attempts, one in December 1996 and one in January 1997.<sup>213</sup> Generals from both factions met in a blustering conclave whose reported issues of contention were the nature of the political party to be set up as a front for the army at the next legislative elections (the RND as it turned out later), and the control of the militia.<sup>214</sup> Abdelhaq Benhamouda, leader of the main labour union, and a client of the conciliator faction, was assassinated a few days after announcing his intention of creating a 'centrist party', and his criticism of the eradicator parties (RCD, ANR and Et-tahadi).<sup>215</sup>

**W<sub>4</sub>:** This wave peaks in April 1997. Laws for the legislative elections of June and regulations for the control of the militia were decreed by the National Council of Transition, a 'parliament' appointed by the military, in March 1997. The leader of the urban-based FIDA insurgent force was shot dead. In April and May 1997, there were no apparent event indicative of H<sub>IR</sub> and/or H<sub>COIN</sub> and/or H<sub>FW</sub> in the available literature.

**W<sub>5</sub>:** This wave of massacres picks up in June 1997, reaches a maximum in August and recedes in November of the same year. Although the massacre activity shows a double peak there should be no confusion that one is observing a *single* train of massacres, as can be ascertained from the structure of the respective numbers of victims at the time (see figure 3). On the insurgent side, two major events took place. In July 1997, Abbassi Madani and Abdelkader Hachani, the first and third leaders of the FIS respectively, were released from detention. In September the armed wing of the FIS declared a unilateral truce, Abbasi Madani was re-arrested, and in October the two remaining insurgent forces (LIDD and FIDA) joined the truce.

On the incumbent side, there are strong indications of factional hostilities. In June 1997, the RND, a party that had been created three months earlier, won the majority of seats at the legislative elections. This party acts as

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front for the army, but it is the members of the conciliator faction, general Betchine in particular, who have greater control over it. The release of the two FIS leaders, an initiative of the military conciliators, was bitterly criticised by the eradicator parties and the press in July. The factions reached a deadlock over a joint list of promotions and assignments, usually announced at the anniversary of independence. Still in July Zeroual dismissed eradicator general Ghezail from the command of the Gendarmerie Nationale and replaced him with conciliator Tayeb Derradji. Hubert Vedrine, foreign minister of France and supporter of the eradicators, visited Algeria. In September, the eradicators attempted a coup against Zeroual<sup>216</sup>, thwarted his dialogue initiative by re-arresting Abbasi Madani hence severing Zeroual's contacts with the political wing of the FIS, on one hand, and outdid their army rivals by brokering an agreement with the AIS, on the other.<sup>217</sup> In October 1997, eradicator general Cherif, commander of the special anti-terrorist forces, criticised publicly the commander of the Gendarmerie Nationale, conciliator Derradji, an unparalleled action in the history of the army. Zeroual dismissed eradicator major-general Said Bey from the command of the 1<sup>st</sup> MD and replaced him by conciliator general Rabah Boughaba, moved from the 5<sup>th</sup> MD, and the RND took an overwhelming share of the votes in the rigged local election. H<sub>FW</sub> draws strong support from the events concomitant with this wave of mass killings.

**W<sub>6</sub>:** This train of mass victimisation began in November 1997, peaked in January 1998 and subsided in February of the same year. January overlapped with the month of Ramadan (usually taken as evidence for the 'ritual purification' explanation). On the insurgent side, the truce still held effectively (since the first week of October) for the AIS, LIDD, and the FIDA, thus excluding H<sub>IR</sub>. The unilateral nature of the truce means one may not exclude H<sub>COIN</sub> for this wave. As an indication pertinent to H<sub>FW</sub>, in December 1997 elections for two thirds of the seats of the senate were held (Zeroual appointed the remaining third). The RND was victorious in capturing 80 out of the 92 seats, entrenching further the conciliators control of the government.

**W<sub>7</sub>:** This series of atrocities builds up from May 1998, peaks in August and ebbs in October of the same year. The truce of the AIS, LIDD, and FIDA was still effective. In May 1998, the affair of the Relizane militias brought to the open the factional conflict over militia control. Conciliator general Betchine was elected to the political bureau of the RND, an initiative that was interpreted as a step in his candidacy for the 2000 presidential elections. In June 1998, the eradicator press initiated a series of attacks on Betchine and Zeroual, accusing the former of corruption and human rights violations. In July 1998 the media war escalated as the press controlled by Betchine criticised both the eradicator generals and the eradicator press. No promotion or assignment of army officers was announced on the anniver-

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sary of independence in July. In August 1998 the media hostilities intensified further as specific allegations appeared against Betchine in the press: Ali Bensaad affair, Benboualia affair etc.<sup>218</sup> The RND party retaliated by orchestrating campaigns of support for general Betchine. In the first week of September, the press acting for Betchine counter-attacked further, accusing the leaders of the eradicator faction (generals Belkheir and Nezzar). Belkheir was accused of acting as informer for Mitterand's secretary and both of them of setting up hundreds of death squads after the military coup of January 1992. A conclave was held and Zeroual was coerced into resigning. In October 1998 Betchine followed suit from his position as military advisor to the president. All these concomitant events suggest this wave is predominantly engendered by factional hostilities ( $H_{FW}$ ).

#### 4.1.3. *Intensities of the Massacre Waves*

The peak intensities of the waves of massacres show an increasing trend<sup>E</sup> from  $W_1$  to  $W_6$  and then the maximum intensity of the next wave decreases sharply ( $W_7$ ).

Why do the intensities of the peaks gradually increase from  $W_1$  to  $W_6$ ? Why is the peak intensity of  $W_7$  smaller than expected from the preceding trend? How can these features be logical consequences of  $H_{IR}$  and/or  $H_{COIN}$  and/or  $H_{FW}$ ?

First consider  $H_{IR}$ ,  $H_{COIN}$  and  $H_{FW}$  taken individually.

To say that all the massacres are part of an Islamist retribution campaign is to claim that, from August 1996 to January 1998, the insurgents increased gradually the intensity of their punishment operations against their social base and the larger population to prevent them from switching loyalty to the military regime. It also entails claiming that the Islamist insurgents decreased their retributive campaign after January 1998. Is there an obvious reason for the insurgents to increase the intensity of their punishment up to January 1998 and then decrease it? If, as  $H_{IR}$  asserts, the intent is to administer some aversive stimulus contingent on a defecting political behaviour or 'fitting the crime of switching loyalty', then it would be implicit that somehow the rate of defection of the population would have increased gradually up to January 1998, after which this rate would have suddenly decreased. This does not correspond to the facts. If participation to the elections is any indicator of some loose loyalty, then, in fact, the rate of participation of the population decreased gradually in the 3 elections (November 1996, June 1997 and October 1997). It is not then clear why the insurgents would wage waves of massacres with increasing peaks in intensity. Furthermore, the insurgent

<sup>E</sup> For  $W_4$  the massacre activity peak does not follow the trend but the corresponding victimisation volume peak is about the same as that of  $W_3$ .

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forces were observing a unilateral truce early in October 1997. One would expect that, on assuming the terror waves are Islamist retributions, the waves would die down. But in fact the peak intensity of  $W_6$  is even larger than that of  $W_5$ , i.e. the truce does not affect in any way the logic and process of victimisation that increased after August 1996. The massacre wave  $W_7$  is also incompatible with  $H_{IR}$  given the truce.

Take now  $H_{COIN}$ . Here too it is not clear why the managers of the COIN campaign would increase gradually the peak intensities of the massacre waves up to January 1998 and then drastically decrease it. After their crushing military defeat of 1995, the insurgents could no longer defend their social base, and therefore one could interpret this fact as explaining why the campaign of massacres as 'counter-mobilisation goads' would pick up in 1996. One can also interpret the increase in the intensity of the massacre waves as a measure to counter-mobilise the population rapidly before the insurgents reconstitute themselves militarily and politically. But some of the rises in the peak intensities seem just too abrupt.

The sharp decrease after January 1998 does not seem attributable to a COIN logic. There was no definite reversal of population loyalty in January 1998, nor was there any re-organisation of the insurgents. What took place in January 1998 was an unprecedented international outcry to stop the diverging intensification of the massacres. The likely damper of the massacre activity was the strong international pressure to investigate responsibilities into the mass killings. This humanitarian intervention into the massacres runs counter to COIN strategy, which prescribes measures to win, and not alienate, outside support. This suggests a crisis and not a military textbook COIN campaign.

One way to save  $H_{COIN}$  would be to assume it is combined with  $H_{FW}$ .  $H_{FW}$  is in principle contingent on  $H_{COIN}$  and it can hardly account on its own for the increase in peak intensities. But combined with  $H_{COIN}$  it imports some element of crisis or uncontrollability into the COIN campaign, and hence would make ' $H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ ' a plausible explanation for the gradual rise in peak intensities up to January 1998. Again, the sharp drop in the peak of  $W_7$  would, in this case, also be due to the international pressure.

One could now think of alternative explanations involving various *combinations* of intents, say the least unlikely ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN}$ ' or ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ '. Consider ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN}$ ' as the candidate explanation. This would entail that both the insurgents and the incumbents perpetrate the massacres. They would compete for the loyalty of the civilian population using massacres as means to alter its political behaviour. The waves in figure 2 would be admixtures of two types of waves attributable to two agencies. The same can be said about the deaths time profile shown in figure 3.

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Nothing excludes this hybrid hypothesis up to  $W_5$ . The rise in the peak intensities can simply be said to result from an intensification in the dispute for the loyalty of the population. The problem with this hybrid explanation is the intensity of the  $W_6$  and  $W_7$  waves of mass killings. Given the truce in the first week of October, one would expect  $H_{IR}$  not to be operative beyond it. But then why is  $W_6$  subsumed by the same increasing pattern that covers  $W_1$  to  $W_5$ . Therefore  $H_{IR}$  seems redundant and, further, the massacre wave  $W_7$  excludes it. It follows that the only way of saving this hybrid explanation is to restrict its domain of relevance up to  $W_5$  and offer some auxiliary assumption to justify both the combination of intents and its restricted domain of bearing.

The same analysis may be repeated for the larger compounded intent ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ '. Analogous conclusions result.

#### 4.1.4. *Lifetimes of the Massacre Waves*

Figure 2 shows massacre waves with 3 levels of duration.  $W_5$  and  $W_7$  have the longest lifetimes (about 4 months),  $W_2$ ,  $W_3$  and  $W_6$  have the shortest lifetime (about 2 months) while  $W_1$  and  $W_4$  endured for an intermediate period (2.5 to 3 months).

Why do the waves of mass victimisation have different lifetimes? Why is it that after the international outcry in January 1998, only a *long lived* wave of massacre was perpetrated in 1998?

Assuming the waves  $W_1$  to  $W_5$  can be accounted for in terms of  $H_{IR}$  entails that the campaigns of retribution do not last the same amount of time.  $W_2$  and  $W_3$  are short lived,  $W_5$  lasts the longest, and  $W_1$  and  $W_4$  persist for a mean duration. It is not obvious what events and auxiliary assumptions one would need to look for to explain the differences in the lifetimes. In this state of affairs one can only safely say that the lifetimes of  $W_1, \dots, W_5$  neither support nor undermine  $H_{IR}$ .

As regards accounting for  $W_6$  and  $W_7$ ,  $H_{IR}$  is not plausible because of the insurgent truce. Supposing the same cause produces the same effect, given that the lifetime of  $W_6$  is about the same as that of  $W_2$  and  $W_3$ , and since the duration of  $W_7$  equals that of  $W_5$ , one might be justified in inferring that only  $W_1$  and  $W_4$  may be consequence of  $H_{IR}$ .

Consider now  $H_{COIN}$ . The lifetimes of the waves seem neutral to confirmation. It is not self-evident why  $H_{COIN}$  would entail waves of differing durations. It can only be said that the effect of the international pressures of January 1998 was to interrupt the massacres of short and intermediate lifetimes, up to December 1998.

As regards  $H_{FW}$ , the analysis of the timings of the waves indicated that for the  $W_3$ ,  $W_5$  and  $W_7$  massacres the factional hostilities are overwhelmingly

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present. Since  $W_5$  and  $W_7$  have the longest duration, it may be justified to correlate long-lived waves of massacres with factional hostilities.

Consider now combined intents as an explanation, for instance ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN}$ ' or ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ '. Assuming the same cause produces the same effect, since  $H_{IR}$  is not operative for  $W_6$  and  $W_7$ , the least unlikely theories remain  $H_{COIN}$  for  $W_2$ ,  $W_3$  and  $W_6$ , ' $H_{IR} + H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ ' for  $W_1$  and  $W_4$ , and ' $H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ ' for  $W_5$  and  $W_7$ .

#### 4.2. Weekly Fluctuations of the Massacres at Election Times

Ait-Larbi *et al.* calculated the weekly variations of the selective and random mass killing activities around the 28 November 1996 constitutional referendum, the 5 June 1997 parliamentary election, and the 23 October 1997 local elections. This is shown in figure 4. They also computed the corresponding numbers of victims in SMV and RMV events, as shown in figure 5. In both cases one observes homologous trends. Election days correspond to lulls in between massacre waves. Prior to the elections the mass killings start about four weeks earlier, peak one to two weeks later, and then subside one week before the poll. One week after the elections, the mass killings rise again.




Figure 4: Weekly Fluctuations of SMV and RMV Events at Election Times.




Figure 5: Weekly Fluctuations of Deaths from SMV and RMV Events at Election Times.

What are the bearings of these observations on the acceptability of  $H_{IR}$  and/or  $H_{COIN}$  and/or  $H_{FW}$ ?

Consider  $H_{IR}$ . Suppose the participation of the population in the elections is regarded as a defection to the regime by the Islamist insurgents. Why would they modulate their punishment campaign to prevent the population switching loyalty in the way shown in figures 4 and 5? In other words, why would they increase the mass killings four weeks before the elections, then start reducing them about two weeks prior to the poll, further reduce or stop them on election day, and then increase them again after the poll?

If anything one would expect the insurgents to seek to disrupt the elections rather than reduce or stop their killings just before, during, and just after the poll. To save  $H_{IR}$  it can be argued that the subsiding of the mass victimisation at election times is simply due to some vast deployment of security forces to protect the voters and voting. This however would be an ad-hoc move because, as we saw earlier, the wave character of the massacres is a structure that modulates the killings from 1996 to 1998. These can hardly be explained in terms of an alternating deployment of troops. Furthermore, if the deployment of troops is effective at some times, e.g. elections, why is it not effective at *all* times?

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The proposition that the massacre waves at elections times are consequences of  $H_{IR}$  is undermined by the fact that the 23 October 1997 local elections were held at a time when insurgents were observing a unilateral truce. The October 1997 wave is not only homologous to the waves registered around previous elections, but it is also higher in intensity. It would be logical to infer that the data refute  $H_{IR}$  as an explanation for this sub-set of massacres, unless, of course, one calls upon some extra-assumption to make  $H_{IR}$  applicable only to the two earlier elections.

Let us now look at  $H_{COIN}$ . Participation in the elections would, in this case, be regarded both as conferring legitimacy to the regime by default, and a counter-mobilisation of the people against the insurgents. But why would the COIN war managers modulate their mass killings as shown in figures 4 and 5? One could argue that, according to Merloo's work on the misuse of psychology by political agencies, collective control of a population can most effectively be obtained by using waves of terror with lulls in between: 'the intervals of relative freedom and lack of overt tensions can be used to much better advantage for political persuasion and mass hypnosis provided some new wave of terror is anticipated.'<sup>219</sup> The data do not therefore exclude  $H_{COIN}$ .

One may raise the question of what accounts for the fact that the massacre wave of the October 1997 local elections is more intense than those observed in earlier polls. The wave shown in figure 4 is actually a constituent of the larger wave  $W_5$  shown in figure 2. Since the factional hostilities are strongly correlated to  $W_5$ , one might reasonably take the view that the increased intensity of the massacre wave of October 1997 is engendered by ' $H_{COIN} + H_{FW}$ '.

### 4.3. Political Geography of the Massacres

From among the wide range of geographic macro-indicators generated by Ait-Larbi *et al.*, we restrict this analysis to the political geography macro-indicators of the mass killings.

They distinguished the political identities of the victimised districts, and examined the relation between the identities of these districts and their respective degree of victimisation. This was achieved using the results of the local elections of June 1990 and the parliamentary poll of December 1991 as indicators of political identity.<sup>F</sup> They further argued that since these elections took place before the military coup of January 1992, and were reportedly free of rigging and intimidation, they were more reliable political indicators.

<sup>F</sup> The same analysis was made with the results of the June 1997 and October 1997 elections and the authors presented convincing evidence that the conclusions drawn out of these indicators are flawed because these elections were rigged.

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For both the local elections of June 1990 and the legislative elections of December 1991, they found a striking pattern. The stronger a constituency allegiance to the FIS, the greater is its degree of victimisation. The stronger a constituency allegiance to the FLN, the smaller is its degree of victimisation.

These patterns held true for most but not all the districts in the territory. Ait-Larbi *et al.* showed that these two generalisations broke down for some districts. They argued that some of the exceptions could be explained because the victimisation data were distorted but, more importantly, suggested that political allegiance to the FIS and the regime was only one determinant of the victimisation in competition with other variables such as population density, military geography and economic geography.

In order to present the dominant trend (however not exclusive), they examined the relation between constituency allegiance to the FIS/FLN and victimisation at the level of *classes* of districts, as opposed to the level of *individual* districts, of comparable victimisation. This should be regarded as some kind of averaging process.

Figure 6 shows the percentage of FIS, and FLN and RCD, municipalities against the corresponding degree of victimisation. This was obtained by partitioning the districts into 6 zones. Zone 1 comprises the districts with more than 50 massacres, i.e. Algiers, Blida, and Médéa. Zone 2 consists of districts with more than 20 and less than 50 massacres, i.e. Tipaza, Ain-Defla, Tlemcen, Tiaret, and Saida. Zone 3 covers the districts with more than 10 and less than 20 massacres, i.e. Relizane, Sidi Bel Abbes, Tizi-Ouzou, Boumerdes,




Figure 6: Percentage of Municipalities by Degree of Victimisation (June 90 Local Elections)

and Msila. Zone 4 includes the districts with more than 5 and less than 10 massacres, zone 5 involves those with at least 1 and less than 5 massacres. Zone 6 covers the non-victimised districts.

Each of these zones is ascribed an average district victimisation value calculated by dividing the total number of massacres in the zone by the number of constituent districts in the zone. For example Ait-Larbi *et al.* found that zone 1 suffered an average of 100 massacres per constituent district. The average district victimisation values for the zones are shown as the abscissas in figure 6.

These six zones are also assigned political identity indicators: in this case, the total number of municipalities gained by the party of interest over the total number of municipalities competed for in the constituencies within the zone. These were calculated for the FIS, and the FLN and RCD, and are shown as ordinates in figure 6.

The two sets of indicators in figure 6 show that the stronger a zone's allegiance to the FIS, the greater is its degree of victimisation, and that the stronger a zone's allegiance to the FLN and RCD, the smaller is the degree of its victimisation. Ait-Larbi *et al.* did the same analysis using the results of the legislative elections of December 1991. The results are shown in figure 7: the same relation between political allegiance and degree of victimisation is found. They pointed out that it suggests 'electoral cleansing'.




Figure 7: Percentage of Parliamentary seats by Degree of Victimization (December 91 Local Elections)

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Since  $H_{IR}$  postulates that the massacres are Islamist retributions intended to prevent the population defecting to the incumbent regime, one would reasonably infer that the areas with the weakest loyalty to the FIS would be singled out for higher victimisation. There would be no need for the insurgents to resort to retributive punishment in zones strongly loyal to them. This however is simply falsified by the evidence of figures 6 and 7. Unless some ad-hoc assumption is made to save  $H_{IR}$ , it is refuted by the facts.

As regards  $H_{COIN}$ , it is supported by the evidence of figures 6 and 7. The stronger a zone's political allegiance to the FIS, the harder it would be to counter-mobilise it, and hence the larger is the volume of terror required to reverse its political behaviour (destruction by terror, followed by construction). The zones with a strong allegiance to the FLN would not need counter-mobilisation as the FLN is itself a counter-organisation serving the military. Hence, no terror is needed to alter the political behaviour of the corresponding constituencies.

These data are neutral to  $H_{FW}$  and  $H_{LP}$ .  $H_{FW}$  is contingent on  $H_{COIN}$  in any case, and while the timings of the massacres may be easily related to factional hostilities, it is not clear how the latter might show up in geographic indicators of victimisation. The same holds for  $H_{LP}$  which would probably be more sensitive to economic geography indicators.

## 5. Summary and Conclusion

This paper surveyed the literature on the massacres that have recently terrorised the Algerian people. The review focused exclusively on the question of responsibility for the killings.

Five clusters of explanations were identified. The massacres were suggested to be

- (1) an Islamist retributive campaign,
- (2) a counterinsurgency military tactics,
- (3) an expedient tool in factional hostilities within the army,
- (4) an eviction tactics for land privatisation,
- (5) a generalised settling of family and tribal scores.

Each of these putative intents was reviewed, with greater space devoted to those with less media exposure. In each case, an attempt was made to clarify the structure of the explanatory claim and delineate some of its pre-suppositions.

To examine the explanatory scopes of these alleged intents, the paper tested their logical consequences against victimisation macro-indicators obtained by aggregating data about individual mass killings. These were ob-

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tained in the study of Ait-Larbi *et al.* This examination focused only on the monthly fluctuations of the mass killings, their weekly fluctuations at election times and their political geography.

The monthly fluctuations showed that it was untenable to defend the 'barbarian cycle' thesis and narrowed considerably the explanatory scopes of the remaining explanations without excluding totally any of them. Both the weekly fluctuations of the mass killings around the time of elections and their political geography undermined the Islamist retribution thesis and lent strong support to the mixed 'H<sub>COIN</sub> + H<sub>FW</sub>' intent. In short they support the theory of massacres as both counter-mobilisation goads *and* eradicator pressure means to undermine the conciliator faction of the military.

This analysis is however not conclusive. The comparison with the data is incomplete. One needs to test the logical consequences of the five putative intents against *all* the empirical macro-indicators available. This is a large research project; Ait-Larbi *et al.* generated a large number of such indicators. We intend to present more comparisons with their data in forthcoming publications.

Although we believe this research effort is important in maintaining rational views on the matter, especially that the manufacturers of consent have been peddling a facile propaganda for far too long, our belief is that, ultimately, a conclusive identification of the responsibilities can only come from an independent, impartial, expert and international investigation.

### **Acknowledgement**

I gratefully acknowledge the editorial assistance of Malcolm Summerell and Zahid Nawaz.

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## NOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> *Associated Press*, 3 January 1998.
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- <sup>6</sup> A. Ali-Yahia, 'Algeria, October 1988 to October 1998: A Ten Year Crisis', Lecture at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 5 October 1998.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid*; Le Comité Algérien des Militants Libres de la Dignité Humaine et des Droits de l'Homme, *Le Livre Blanc*, Volume 1, 2, and Supplément, Hoggar, Geneva 1994, 1995; The Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights estimates the number of disappeared to be 12,000 (R. Fisk, 'One man's heroic fight against a regime with a taste for torture', *The Independent*, 10 October 1997).
- <sup>8</sup> *Associated Press*, 23 January 1998; *La Tribune de Genève*, 11 December 1996, *Agence France Presse*, 18 May 1999.
- <sup>9</sup> See M. Bendriss, *Responses of Islamic Political Parties and Insurgent Groups*, paper No. 11 in part III of this book.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid*.
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- <sup>21</sup> *Le Monde*, 26-27 Janvier 1997.
- <sup>22</sup> *Agence France Presse*, 7 November 1997; *Liberté*, 5 August 1996; *L'Authentique*, 30 August 1997.
- <sup>23</sup> *Le Monde*, 5 January 1998.
- <sup>24</sup> *L'Authentique*, 30 August 1997.
- <sup>25</sup> *Le Monde*, 5 January 1998.

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<sup>26</sup> See for instance *Le Matin*, 27 August 1997.

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<sup>28</sup> *L'Express*, 22 January 1998, p.41.

<sup>29</sup> *Libération*, 30-31 August 1997.

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<sup>32</sup> See note 19.

<sup>33</sup> R. Malek, 'Face au terrorisme, l'alternative patriotique et republicaine', in J-P. Chagnollaud, *Confluences Méditerranée*, L'Harmattan, Paris 1998, pp. 93-97.

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> H. Cherif, 'La lumière et les ténèbres', in J-P. Chagnollaud, *Confluences Méditerranée*, L'Harmattan, Paris 1998, pp. 83-92.

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<sup>43</sup> Ximenes, 'La guerre révolutionnaire', *Revue Militaire d'Information*, No 281, February-March 1957, pp. 9-22. Ximenes is a pseudonym for Maurice Prestat and Saint Macary. See also J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*, op. cit., pp. 30-73.

<sup>44</sup> The French counter-organised various section of Algerian society: youth, women, farmers, sheperds, religious orders etc. using psychological operations such as the so-called civic action and civil training programmes. See J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*, op. cit., pp. 98-152; M. Deen, *L'Armée d'Algérie et la Pacification*, Plon, Paris 1959, pp.130-132, 138-140, 146; R. Girardet,

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>58</sup> L. Martinez, *La guerre civile en Algérie*, Khartala, Paris 1998; F. Zemmouri, 'La sanglante saga des milices d'Etat', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, June 1998; T. Oberlé, 'L'Algérie: l'Armée des "patriotes"', *Le Figaro*, 20 February 1998; N. Lamine, 'Comment Alger rétribue les miliciens', *Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace*, 26 February 1998.

<sup>59</sup> T. Ighilès, 'milishiya am tan-miyya ijtima-'iya?' (Militia or Social Development?), *rissala Ikkbariya lil-munta-da al jaz'a-iri* (The Algerian Forum Newsletter), October 1997, p.7.

<sup>60</sup> Y. Amer, 'al jamaa al islamiyya wal stratijiyya al mudhada lithawra' (The GIA and Counter-Revolutionary Strategy), in *rissala Ikkbariya lil-munta-da al jaz'a-iri*, February 1998, p.2.

<sup>61</sup> Y. Amer, op. cit, p. 3.

<sup>62</sup> Y. Amer, op. cit, p. 7

<sup>63</sup> Y. Amer, op. cit., p. 9

<sup>64</sup> Y. Amer, op. cit., p.13

<sup>65</sup> Amer also says: 'In rural areas with high guerrilla activity, acting on orders from the psy-ops department of the DRS, the GIA also targets families of SDG militias, not just the families and supporters of the guerrillas. The psycho-political response from the direct identification group (militias) is increased cohesiveness and heightened aggressiveness. In particular these operations prompt retaliatory massacres against families and supporters of the genuine Muslim guerrillas. The choice of targets is

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made by the psychological action and information service within the psy-ops department, which exploits homogeneities in family and clan divisions.' Y. Amer, op. cit., p.22.

<sup>66</sup> Y. Amer, op. cit., 25.

<sup>67</sup> J. Sweeney, 'We know how to deal with the bully of Baghdad (just follow Clinton). It's Algeria that will really test Cook's ethical policy', *The Observer*, 18 January 1998, p. 19.

<sup>68</sup> J. Sweeney, op. cit.

<sup>69</sup> J-P. Mari, 'Ces Algériens qui prennent les armes', *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 6-12 February 1998, p. 30.

<sup>70</sup> Y. Amer, op. cit., p.29.

<sup>71</sup> B. H. Mohamed, 'La reconquête du terrain perdu', *El Watan*, No 2199, 1 February 1998, p.1.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> M. Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1997; A. Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, Yale University Press, Yale 1977; A. Perlmutter and V. Bennett (eds.), *The Political Influence of the Military*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1980; K. Fidel (ed.), *Militarism in Developing Countries*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick 1975; H. Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes*, Russel Sage Foundation, New York 1968; Odetola, *Military Regimes and Development: A Comparative Analysis in African Societies*, George Allen and Unwin Publishers, London 1982.

<sup>74</sup> A. Rouadjia, 'L'Etat Algérien et le probleme du droit', in *Politique Etrangère*, No 2, Summer 1995, pp. 351-363.

<sup>75</sup> A Rouadji, op. cit; A. Yefsah, 'L'armée et le pouvoir en Algérie: 1962-1992', *La RMMM*, No 65, 1993; A. Yefsah, 'Vers une armée de tontons macoutes', *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 19 Janvier 1995, p. 33; K. Ait-Oumeziane, 'Les corrompus se portent bien', *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 19 Janvier 1995, p 39.

<sup>76</sup> J.-J. Lavenue, *Algérie: la démocratie interdite*, L'Harmattan, Paris 1995; A. Yefsah, 'Armée et politique depuis les événements d'octobre 1988: l'armée sans hidjab', in *Les Temps Modernes*, No 580, January 1995, pp. 154-176; M. Hamza, 'Au coeur de la crise Algérienne, la hierarchie militaire', in *Peuples Méditerranéens: L'Algérie en contrechamp*, No 70 and 71, 1995, pp-259-272; M. Hamza, 'Trois ans de coup d'Etat militaire en Algérie, leçons d'histoire', op. cit, pp. 273-276.

<sup>77</sup> J.P. Entelis, *Algeria, the Revolution Institutionalised*, Westview Press, Boulder 1986; Conseil de Coordination du FIS, *Manifeste du FIS pour la Justice et la Paix en Algérie*, January 1999.

<sup>78</sup> Lahouari Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne confisque le pouvoir', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 527, February 1998, p.1. For general works on factionalism within the military see M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, The Free Press of Glencoe, Glencoe 1960; N. Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, Basic Books, New York 1976; B. W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military*, Praeger, Wesport 1996.

<sup>79</sup> *Algérie Confidentiel*, No 76, July 1996, No 77, August 1996; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 187, 19 May 1994, No 202, 29 September 1994, No 207, 3 November 1994, No 214, 22 December 1994, No 256, 23 November 1995, No 282, 6 June 1996, No 283, 13 June 1996, No 287, 11 July 1996, No 380, 16 July 1998; F. Zemmouri, 'Epreuve de forces entre les clans militaires', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 98, November 1997, p. 32; F. Zemmouri, 'Bras de fer entre la présidence et l'Etat major', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 106 & 107, July & August 1998, p. 56; F. Zemmouri, 'Jeux de serail et grande pagaille', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 114, March 1999, p. 25; Algerian Movement of Free Officers, <http://www.anp.org>.

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<sup>80</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 181, 31 March 1994, No 187, 19 May 1994, No 202, 29 September 1994, No 207, 3 November 1994, No 224, 9 March 1995, No 254, 9 November 1995, No 279, 16 May 1996, No 293, 19 September 1996, No 299, 30 October 1996, No 380, 16 July 1998, No 385, 17 September 1998; A. Kadi, 'La hiérarchie militaire fait du general Bey son bouc émissaire', *La Croix*, 17 September 1997; N. Amine, *La Croix*, 17 September 1997; *Le Figaro*, 4 June 1993; *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 106 & 107, July & August 1998; S. Boulares, 'La grande muette livre ses secrets', in *Cahiers de L'Orient*, Numero Special, 1995.

<sup>81</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 181, 31 March 1994, No 214, 22 December 1994, No 256, 23 November 1995; S. Boulares, 'La grande muette livre ses secrets', op. cit.; Mohamed Larbi Zitout, private communication.

<sup>82</sup> I.W. Zartman, 'The Algerian Army in Politics', in C.E. Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, pp.224-251.

<sup>83</sup> E. Ihsane, 'Il y a 30 ans le putsch manqué de Zbiri', *El Watan*, 17 December 1997; S. Lokmane, 'El Khatib-Bouteflika: La guerre des wilayas', *Liberté* 14 and 15 December 1998; J. Garçon, 'A Alger le FLN joue la carte Bouteflika', *Libération*, 18 December 1998; A. Brahim, 'Pourquoi Nezzar s'est il senti visé?', *Le Jeune Indépendant*, No 245, 17 February 1999. The pasts of the two groupings of generals shows that most of the conciliators are from the guerrillas of the interior ALN while most of the eradicators are members of the external ALN or former officers in the French colonial army.

<sup>84</sup> Military speciality provides a sense of shared social background, and interests and ties that cluster the officers by branch of service.

<sup>85</sup> See notes 79 and 80, and L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne se divise', in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 540, March 1999, p.1.

<sup>86</sup> S. Boulares, 'La grande muette livre ses secrets', op. cit.; *Le Figaro*, 4 June 1993; M. Ait-Embark, *L'Algérie en Murmure*, Hoggar, Geneva 1995; see notes 79 and 80.

<sup>87</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Epreuve de forces entre les clans militaires', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 98, November 1997, p. 32; H. Barrada, 'Quand Betchine communique', *Jeune Afrique*, No 1973, October 1998; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 388, 8 October 1998; *Libération*, 24 September 1997.

<sup>88</sup> *Algérie Confidentiel*, No 75, June 1996, No 76, July 1996; D. Hadjadj, 'A l'écriture des cadres emprisonnés', *El Watan*, 20 September 1998; J. Garçon, 'La guerre des clans reboucle au sein du pouvoir', *Libération*, 7 August 1998; J. Garçon, 'La fin du consensus militaire', *Libération*, 7 April 1999.

<sup>89</sup> Ali-Yahia Abdenour put it: 'the *décideurs* [narrow core of military decision-makers] tear themselves to pieces but stick together and hunt as a pack of wolves when one of their flanks is attacked.' See A. Ali-Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, L'Harmattan, Paris 1996, p.150.

<sup>90</sup> The state of balance between the factions is not clearly apparent but some observers use factional affiliations in the command positions of the forces and branches of service, the cabinet, the opposition and parapolitical organisations, and the media to infer the relative strength of the factions.

<sup>91</sup> A. Ali-Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, op. cit., p.155.

<sup>92</sup> L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne confisque le pouvoir', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 527, February 1998, p.1

<sup>93</sup> L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne se divise', in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 540, March 1999, p.1.

<sup>94</sup> A. Ali-Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, op. cit., p.150.

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<sup>95</sup> L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne confisque le pouvoir', op. cit.

<sup>96</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 335, 24 July 1997.

<sup>97</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 187, 19 May 1994.

<sup>98</sup> General Mohamed Lamari was promoted to a rank created especially for him (*general de corps d'armée*) and Boughaba, Bekkouche, Ghodbane and Qadri were promoted to the rank of major-general (*Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 207, 3 Novembre 1994).

<sup>99</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 242, 20 July 1995.

<sup>100</sup> J. Garçon, 'La fin de consensus militaire', *Libération*, 7 April 1999; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 385, 17 September 1998.

<sup>101</sup> Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, *Affaires des généraux*, 4 July 1999, <http://www.anp.org>.

<sup>102</sup> *Algérie Confidentiel*, No 76, July 1996; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 283, 13 June 1996.

<sup>103</sup> Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, *Affaires des généraux*, op. cit.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 311, 30 January 1997; *La Tribune*, 29 November 1995.

<sup>106</sup> His real name is Aissa Jaghloul. *Al Quds al Arabi*, 29 June 1998.

<sup>107</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 306, 19 December 1996, No 311, 30 January 1997.

<sup>108</sup> Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, *Affaires des généraux*, op. cit.

<sup>109</sup> 'Qa-id ad-darak al watani al jaza-I-ri yan-ju min mhawalla ightiyal' (Gendarmerie Chief escapes assassination attempt), *Al Quds al arabi*, 27 May 1999.

<sup>110</sup> *El Watan*, 15 February 1993.

<sup>111</sup> The Boudiaf Affair, *Exxaman* (in the UK), No 272, 11 March 1999; F. Zemmouri, 'Boudiaf, la verite', in *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 117, June 1999, p. 28; Y. Benmiloud, *L'Explication*, J.-C. Lattes, Paris 1999.

<sup>112</sup> *The Observer*, 14 June 1998; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, 12 March 1998; Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, <http://www.anp.org>.

<sup>113</sup> *Libération*, 22 September 1997.

<sup>114</sup> R. Cohen, 'Algerian Massacres: A Hidden Meaning?', *The New York Times*, 11 September 1997.

<sup>115</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Epreuve de force entre les clans militaires', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 98, November 1997, p.32.

<sup>116</sup> *La Croix*, 15 September 1998; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 387, 1 October 1998; M. Duteille, 'Pourquoi Zeroual s'en va?', *Le Point*, No 1357, 19 September 1998, p. 24; S.M., 'Trois Coups d'Etat contre Zeroual', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 116, May 1999, p.10; D. Lagarde and M. Baki, 'Zeroual sonne la retraite', *L'Express*, 17 September 1998; AMFO, <http://www.anp.org>.

<sup>117</sup> A. Ali-Yahia, 'Algeria, October 1988 to October 1998: A Ten Year Crisis', Lecture at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 5 October 1998.

<sup>118</sup> S.M., 'Washington se range aux côtés de Zeroual', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 109, October 1998, p. 27.

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<sup>119</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Les clans redoublent de férocité', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 108, September 1998, pp. 30-32; F. Aubenas, 'La presse au coeur de la crise Algérienne', *Libération*, 28 October 1998; M. Baki and D. Lagarde, 'Une ténébreuse affaire', *L'Express*, 13 August 1998.

<sup>120</sup> M. Duteille, op. cit.; J. Garçon, 'La fin du consensus militaire', *Libération*, 7 April 1999; J.-P. Tuquoi, 'Les luttes à la tête de l'Etat vont encore s'exacerber', *Le Monde*, 17 September 1998; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 385, 17 September 1998.

<sup>121</sup> 'Algeria's power struggle flares into the open', *Reuters*, 20 October 1998.

<sup>122</sup> L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne confisque le pouvoir', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 527, February 1998, p.1

<sup>123</sup> A. Ali-Yahia, op. cit.

<sup>124</sup> F. Ait-Mehdi, 'Une anatomie des prolongements civils des casernes', private communication, January 1999, p. 17. The Senate is a parallel military legislative body. It can legislate by decree, with an authority over-riding that of parliament, on issues related to security, financial law and information. It is the president of the Senate, not the parliament (national assembly), who becomes interim president should the latter position become vacant.

<sup>125</sup> F. Aubenas, 'La presse au coeur de la crise Algérienne', *Libération*, 28 October 1998; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 255, 16 November 1995.

<sup>126</sup> Ali-Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, op.cit., p.151; *Algérie Confidentiel*, No 75, June 1996, No 76, July 1996.

<sup>127</sup> *Le Monde*, 28-29 October 1997.

<sup>128</sup> J. Garçon, 'Alger remet de l'ordre dans les milices', *Libération*, 14 March 1997.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 357, 29 January 1998; J. Garçon, *Libération*, 24 September 1997.

<sup>131</sup> A.M., 'Comment les services spéciaux ont 'contré' le president', *Courrier International*, No 361, 2-8 October 1997, p. 10.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> *Liberté* 14 April 1998; *El Watan*, 15 April 1998; *Al Khabar*, 15 April 1998.

<sup>134</sup> I.W. Zartman, op. cit.

<sup>135</sup> Ali-Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, op. cit., p.152.

<sup>136</sup> *US Policy Toward Algeria*, Statement by R.H. Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, before the sub-committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 16 April 1996; Interview with R. Pelletreau, 'L'Algérie n'est pas une priorité américaine', *L'Express*, 22 January 1998, p. 59; US Department of State, Daily Briefings of January 1998; J. Garçon, 'L'Algérie si loin de Washington', in Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), *Le Maghreb à l'épreuve de l'Algérie*, *Politique Etrangère*, No 2, 1995, pp. 427-434; 'Que pense Washington de cette crise?', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 98, November 1997, p. 33; 'Quelle lune de miel avec Washington?', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 101, February 1998, p.10; J. Richter, 'Washington n'est pas satisfait', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 104, May 1998, p. 24; J. Girardon, 'Le jeu de Washington', *L'Express*, 26 May 1994; D. Lagarde, 'L'ami américain', *L'Express*, 25 September 1997.

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<sup>137</sup> L. Provost, *La deuxième guerre d'Algérie*, Flammarion, Paris 1996; L. Provost, 'Paris et Alger entre Brouille et Complicité', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1996, p.4; A. Chenal, 'La France rattrapée par le drame Algérien', in IFRI, *Politique Etrangère*, No 2, 1995, pp. 415-425; O. Mongin, 'Le sale avenir de la guerre civile en Algérie', in *Esprit*, No 230-231, March-April 1997, pp. 16-26; R. Messaoudi, 'Algerian-French Relations: 1830-1991', in R. Shah-Kazemi (ed.), *Algeria: Revolution Revisited*, Islamic World Report, London 1997, pp.6-46; *Le Monde*, 29 April 1995, 23 August 1995, 3 October 1995, 11 October 1995, 31 July 1996, 26 December 1996; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 173, 3 February 1994, No 254, 9 November 1995, No 260, 21 December 1995, No 321, 10 April 1997, No 349, 27 November 1997.

<sup>138</sup> A. Ali-Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, op. cit., pp.151-156; M. Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A political history*, Ithaca, London 1996; P.M. de la Gorce, 'Peuvent-ils s'entendre?', *Jeune Afrique*, No 1758, 15 September 1994, p. 11; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 202, 29 September 1994; *Le Monde*, 5 September 1997; *Le Figaro*, 12 September 1997, 29 September 1997; *Libération*, 22 September 1997.

<sup>139</sup> *L'Express*, 25 September 1997.

<sup>140</sup> *Le Monde*, 21 October 1997.

<sup>141</sup> A.M., 'Comment les services ont 'contré' le président', *Courrier International*, op. cit.; *Libération*, 24 September 1997; B. C. de Salies, 'Les luttes de clans exacerbent la guerre civile', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1997.

<sup>142</sup> L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne se divise', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 540, March 1999, p. 1.

<sup>143</sup> Ali Yahia, *Raisons et déraison d'une guerre*, p. 151.

<sup>144</sup> J. Garçon, *Libération*, 22 September 1997.

<sup>145</sup> C. Amari, 'La presse sous l'éteignoir à l'heure des grandes manoeuvres', in *Courrier International*, No 440, 8-14 April 1999.

<sup>146</sup> *L'Express*, 25 September 1997.

<sup>147</sup> R. Cohen, *The New York Times*, 11 September 1997.

<sup>148</sup> 'Algeria's power struggle flares into the open', *Reuters*, 20 October 1998; 'Lettre ouverte à Monsieur Betchine', *El Watan*, 13 October 1998; J. Garçon, 'Betchine poussé à la sortie', *Libération*, 20 October 1998.

<sup>149</sup> J.P. Tuquoi, 'Les luttes à la tête de l'Etat vont encore s'exacerber', *Le Monde*, 17 September 1998.

<sup>150</sup> *Demain l'Algérie*, 7 September 1998; H. Larbi, 'Le pays otage des clans', *Libre Algérie*, No 1, 14 September 1998.

<sup>151</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Bras de fer entre la présidence et l'Etat major', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, July-August 1998, p. 56.

<sup>152</sup> G. Joffé, 'Algeria in Crisis', in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Middle East Programme, *Briefing Paper* No 48, June 1998.

<sup>153</sup> T. E. Skidmore, 'Brazil's Slow Road to Democratisation: 1974-1985', in A. Stepan (ed.), *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, Oxford University Press, New York 1989.

<sup>154</sup> B. W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit, p. 101

<sup>155</sup> B. W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit, p. 129.

<sup>156</sup> M. Willis, *The Observer*, 11 January 1998.

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- <sup>157</sup> A. Joxe, 'Repentons nous sur l'Algérie et parlons vrai', *Le Monde*, 11 November 1997, p.12.
- <sup>158</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Les généraux optent pour le profil bas', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 101, February 1998.
- <sup>159</sup> J. Garçon, *Libération*, 2 January 1998.
- <sup>160</sup> H. Khalden, *Journal de Genève*, 14 February 1998.
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>162</sup> F. Zemmouri, *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 101, op. cit.; J. Garçon, *Libération*, op. cit.; H. Khalden, *Journal de Genève*, 14 February 1998.
- <sup>163</sup> Ibid
- <sup>164</sup> L. Hanoune, Interview, *Le Soir de Belgique*, 29 Janvier 97.
- <sup>165</sup> P. Forestier, *Paris-Match*, 9 October 1997.
- <sup>166</sup> F. Karabadj, 'L'économie Algérienne menacée par la mafia politico-financière', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1998, p.20.
- <sup>167</sup> D. Hadjadj, 'Cette corruption partout présente', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1998, p.21.
- <sup>168</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 362, 5 March 1998. General Kamal Abderrahim, a commander of land forces up to 1989, is alleged to have appropriated state funds to set up a pharmaceutical company that produces consumables for hospitals; he is also said to own a restaurant and a hotel in France.
- <sup>169</sup> *Algérie Presse Service*, 13 January 1997; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 367, 9 April 1998, No 389, 15 October 1998, No 397, 10 December 1998, No 399, 31 December 1998, No 408, 4 March 1999.
- <sup>170</sup> L. Martinez, 'A qui profite la guerre?', *Politique Internationale*, No 79, Spring 1998; L. Martinez, *La Guerre Civile en Algérie*, Editions Karthala, Paris 1998, pp.189-228.
- <sup>171</sup> F. Karabadj, 'L'économie Algérienne menacée par la mafia politico-financière', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1998, p.20.
- <sup>172</sup> J. Ziegler, 'Des généraux sanguinaires d'Alger ou les nababs du Lac Léman', *L'Hebdo* (Switzerland), 1 October 1997.
- <sup>173</sup> *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 103, April 1998, p. 26.
- <sup>174</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 362, 5 March 1998; No 352, 18 December 1998; Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, *Affaires des généraux*, op. cit.
- <sup>175</sup> *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 103, April 1998, p. 26.
- <sup>176</sup> Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, *Affaires des généraux*, op. cit.
- <sup>177</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>178</sup> *Algérie Confidentiel*, No 121, 30 June 1998; *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 362, 5 March 1998;
- <sup>179</sup> H Bellami, 'qira-a iqtissadiyya fil el 'ounf al mou-assassati' (Economic readings of Algeria's institutional violence), in *rissala Ikbbariya lil-muntada al jaz'a-iri*, December 1997, p.12
- <sup>180</sup> H Bellami, *rissala Ikbbariya lil-muntada al jaz'a-iri*, op. cit., p. 15
- <sup>181</sup> J. Garçon, *Libération* 11 August 1997.
- <sup>182</sup> G. Grandguillaume, *Le Monde*, 5 September 1997.
- <sup>183</sup> D. Leconte, *L'Express*, 22 January 1998.

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- <sup>185</sup> D. Hirst, *The Guardian*, 25 September 1997.
- <sup>186</sup> G. Grandguillaume, *Le Monde*, 5 September 1997.
- <sup>187</sup> G. Grandguillaume, *Le Monde*, 5 September 1997.
- <sup>188</sup> J. Garçon, *Libération*, 11 August 1997.
- <sup>189</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Epreuve de force entre les clans militaires', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 98, Novembre 1997, p. 34.
- <sup>190</sup> N. Abdi, *Libération*, 24 September 1997.
- <sup>191</sup> *Le Monde*, 5 August 1997.
- <sup>192</sup> L. Hanoune, 'Pour nombre d'Algériens la guerre civile est devenue un moyen de subsistance', *Le Monde*, 20 January 1997.
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- <sup>197</sup> D. Leconte, *L'Express*, 22 January 1998.
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- <sup>200</sup> L. Marlowe, 'Why conflicts in Egypt and Algeria now differ', *The Irish Times*, 17 March 1997.
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- <sup>202</sup> A. Horne, op. cit.
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- <sup>205</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>206</sup> A. Adler, *L'Express*, 22 January 1998.
- <sup>207</sup> G. Grandguillaume (ed.), *Les violences en Algérie*, op. cit., p. 50.
- <sup>208</sup> See note 5.
- <sup>209</sup> J. A. M. Merloo, 'Brainwashing and Menticide: Some Implications of Conscious and Unconscious Thought Control', in M.S. Stein, *Identity and Anxiety*, Free Press, New York 1967, p.506.
- <sup>210</sup> *Le Monde*, 5 January 1998.
- <sup>211</sup> *Le Vrai Journal*, Canal +, France, 22 November 1998; *Le Monde*, 8 June 1998; J-P. Chagnollaud, *Confluences Méditerranée*, No 25, Spring 1998, p. 233.
- <sup>212</sup> R. Malek, 'Face au terrorisme, l'alternative patriotique et républicaine', op. cit; H. Cherif, 'La lumière et les ténèbres', op. cit; K. Messaoudi, *Regard*, op. cit. Ramadan is the ninth month of the Muslim year, during which strict fasting is observed from sunrise to sunset. The belief of Malek, Cherif and Messaoudi has no theological grounds.
- <sup>213</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 306, 19 December 1996; No 311, 30 January 1997.

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<sup>214</sup> Ait-Larbi *et al.*, 'An anatomy of the massacres', op. cit.; *Libération*, 14 March 1997.

<sup>215</sup> *Maghreb Confidentiel*, No 311, 30 January 1997; Ait-Larbi *et al.*, 'An anatomy of the massacres', op. cit.

<sup>216</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'Epreuve de force entre les clans militaires', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, No 98, November 1997, p. 32.

<sup>217</sup> A.M., 'Comment les services ont 'contré' le président', *Courrier International*, op. cit.; *Libération*, 24 September 1997; B. C. de Salies, 'Les luttes de clans exacerbent la guerre civile', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1997; L. Addi, 'L'armée Algérienne se divise', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No 540, March 1999, p. 1.

<sup>218</sup> *El Watan*, 14 July 1998; *El Watan*, 13 October 1998.

<sup>219</sup> J. A. M. Merloo, 'Brainwashing and Menticide: Some Implications of Conscious and Unconscious Thought Control', in M.S. Stein, *Identity and Anxiety*, op. cit., p.506.

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