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## AN ANATOMY OF THE MASSACRES

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## 1. Introduction

Algeria is entering its seventh year of internal war ignited by the military coup of January 92 and the ensuing halt of the electoral process. Large scale arrests met the widespread protests that followed, and an escalating cycle of violence between the military regime and Muslim armed insurgents was set in motion. Seven years on, Algeria is in a state of terror; credible sources such as the Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LADDH – Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights) speak of about 20 000 political prisoners, thousands of victims of torture, and at least 18 000 'disappeared' people. The second semesters of 1996 and 1997 were particularly violent years as almost every single week brought yet more wanton mass slaughters and bombings. It is estimated that between 80 000 and 120 000 of Algeria's 28 million people have died in this largely forgotten war.

Condemnation of these abuses is necessary but not enough. Each kind of the gross human rights violations in this war deserves more careful scrutiny if one is to understand their nature and extent better, identify more closely the victimised groups, make progress towards clarifying the responsibilities, and bring increased respect of human rights in Algeria. As part of the larger effort needed to advance towards these normative aims, this paper will focus on only one kind of the ongoing victimisations: the massacres.

All of the mainly journalistic literature written on the massacres report and analyse them as individual victimisation events. Within this framework the focus is on the details of each massacre, and on the victimisation of *individuals* therein. But in this study, they will be approached at a macro-level, that is to say by constructing and analysing various indicators obtained by aggregating data about individual massacres. The focus here is therefore on the patterns observable when considering the whole set of massacres, and on the victimisation of *groups*.

As the Algerian massacres have not been examined within such an approach, the research aim of this work is mainly exploratory and descriptive. Other than presuming there may be discoverable regularities in the aggregated data, this work does not start by framing a formal theory, or even a limited hypothesis, to test. The paper is limited to exploring various self-evident indicators constructed from the collective data and examining some of the regularities that emerge. In addition to providing a beginning of familiarity and insight, this work has a descriptive purpose in that it documents quantitatively and graphically much of what is known about the massacres. The problem of trying to explain the

observed regularities in terms of alternative causal agents and war strategies is outside the scope of this work.

The data used in this research has been extracted and developed from the raw data available in a variety of sources. The bulk of the raw data is from international and national news media accounts but other data from national and international human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are also included. In section 2 we shall discuss in detail these sources and the problems of suppression, distortion, reliability, and accuracy of the data with respect to their victimisation-event information, victim information, and alleged perpetrator information.

This work focuses on three distinct units of analysis alternately.

The first units of analysis we consider are massacre events. Massacres are taken to be victimisation episodes where a number of unresisting civilians are killed indiscriminately. This analysis will distinguish between two types of such events. The first type consists of random victimisations within selective sub-groups of the civilian population, as for instance in the case of the indiscriminate slaughter of all members of selective families within a given village. These episodes will be referred to as selective mass victimisation (SMV) events. The second type of massacres concerns the random mass killing of people belonging to random sub-groups of the population, as occurs, for example, in bombings in public places. These episodes will be referred to as random mass victimisation (RMV) events. The psycho-political intents and consequences of the SMV events and RMV events are obviously quite distinct. For each of these two kinds of events we study indicators such as the numbers of occurrences, their respective time evolutions and cross-comparisons between them, and their national distribution, political, military and economic geographies. Furthermore, we explore various other crime scene regularities in the sample of the massacre event data. All these analyses are reported in section 3.

Section 4 is devoted to our second units of analysis: the population of victims of the massacres. We construct and analyse indicators such as the numbers of victims of SMV events and RMV events, their trends over time, geographical distributions at national and district levels and their political allegiances. We also look at other relevant victim status and behaviour regularities extracted from the victim information data base.

The third units of analysis we consider are the samples of alleged perpetrators. Given the unreliability of the alleged-perpetrator information content in the available data we do not have much quantifiable information about the alleged perpetrators. We do, however, extract and present some qualitative regu-

larities about the population of alleged perpetrators. This is discussed in section 5.

We summarise our main findings and conclude in section 6.

The appendix in section 7 contains two tables which sum up the SMV and RMV events we have recorded. The third table lists some of the mass graves found recently and the fourth table records mass killing events of foreign nationals since 1992.

## 2. The Data

The raw data for this research comes from a variety of sources: from international and national news media, human rights NGO reports, and directly from a few victims. Civil records and mortality statistics would have been extremely useful but are not publicly accessible.

International media sources used here include agencies such as *ABC News*, *Agence France Presse*, *Associated Press*, *CNN*, and *Reuters*, newspapers such as *The Irish Times*, *Les Dernières Nouvelles D'Alsace*, *Le Soir de Belgique*, *The Washington Post*, *La Tribune de Genève*, *The Boston Globe*, and *Arabic News*. National media sources used are mainly *El Watan*, *La Tribune*, *Liberté* and *Algérie Presse Service*. These sources were accessed through the Internet; their archives were all searched on-line. We also made use of the *Internet Troubles*<sup>1</sup> records published by a Swiss-based journal of the Socialist Commission of International Solidarity (CSSI) which compiles, albeit erratically, a chronology of the violence in Algeria from the French language sources listed above.

We have also used data from the reports of Amnesty International,<sup>2</sup> Human Rights Watch,<sup>3</sup> the LADDH and the reports of the Comité Algérien pour la Dignité Humaine et les Droits de l'Homme (CADHHDH – Algerian Committee for Human Dignity and Rights).<sup>4</sup>

The use of a variety of sources served to correct for the lack of a comprehensive means to collect systematically the relevant data. For instance, regarding the first years of the war, from 1992 up to 1994, not much mass killings data exist in the news media; the only sketchy reports available can be found in *Le Livre Blanc sur la repression en Algérie*. We did not find much data about the massacres in 1995 and in the first semester of 1996. From May 1996 up to December 1998, one finds more reports about the massacres in the international and national news media and human rights NGO reports, but these sources are not systematic enough in their coverage so that one needs to draw from all of them and integrate their data.

Of course, however comprehensively this data integration were done, there would still be gaps. It is generally the case that data about atrocities in repressive regimes that are party to international human rights covenants are deliberately suppressed. For instance, an expert claimed that in the first months of 1995 there were about 250 to 500 deaths per week,<sup>5</sup> but we found no source to document the killings during this period. Victimisation events about which information has been suppressed also include, for example, the mass-grave with about 200 bodies discovered in Meftah,<sup>6</sup> in Larbaa in the district of Blida, on 25 November 1998, and napalm attacks against villagers in Texana (district of Jijel), Chrea (district of Blida), Sid-Ali Bounab (district of Tizi Ouzou) and in the mountains of Ain-Defla and the Ouarsenis.<sup>7</sup> These events are not included in our data set as the information that has emerged is not detailed enough; for instance their occurrences are not dated precisely. These events and the ‘unconventional’ nature of the war are enough grounds to suspect that there are other yet undisclosed massacres.

The Direction des Renseignements et de la Sécurité (DRS – Intelligence and Security Directorate) of Algeria’s military has the monopoly in the manufacture, package, release as well as dissemination of security related news. The public sector media and the private press, with the latter sponsored and serving as an arm of the former, can only act as conveyor belts for the DRS packaged news. The various instruments and mechanisms – that is the legislative arsenal, the monopoly on the printing presses, paper supplies and advertising, suspensions, censorship, harassment and alleged murders – which police this set-up and censor or repress any investigative or dissenting press have been thoroughly documented and analysed elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, in today’s Algeria one cannot access all the information pertinent to human rights atrocities. The gaps in the data we used are inevitable.

The data used in this work have another flaw: they are distorted. The bulk of the data is from international media sources. Although these sources sometimes quote the figures given by residents, hospital sources or massacre survivors, they mainly rely on the numbers provided by Algerian officials or army-controlled media reports. For example, for the massacre of Sidi-Rais, in the Blida district, on 29 August 1997, government officials<sup>9</sup> announced 98 dead and 120 wounded whereas hospital sources, reported by *Le Monde*<sup>10</sup> and *CNN*<sup>11</sup>, quoted at least 200 dead, ‘perhaps as many as 400’. Seven weeks later, *The Washington Post*,<sup>12</sup> recounting the testimony of a survivor of the Sidi-Rais massacre, Mr Bensalah, claimed there had been 514 dead. Another example: asked if the official death tolls given by the government were reliable, Louisa Hanoune, leader of the labour party, told *Le Soir de Belgique*

The government death tolls are wrong. I was only a minute away from the site of the bombing in *Boulevard des Martyrs* on 21 January 1997. I saw with my own eyes 19 ambulances drive many times to Bacha Hospital. In the hospital, there were bodies piled up. But the official figures were 6 deaths and 40 injured.<sup>13</sup>

More often than not the number of injured victims is not given and press reports rarely revise the number of dead as the injured succumb to their wounds. Consider also the conflicting claims about the total number of victims since January 1992. On 21 January 1998 prime-minister Ouyahia quoted 26 536 as the total number of victims,<sup>14</sup> a figure smaller than the 30 000 dead officially announced three years earlier.<sup>15</sup> At the sixty third session of the UN human rights committee, on 20 July 1998 in Geneva, Mohamed-Salah Dembri, the head of the Algerian delegation said:

Some people have gone so far as quoting a figure of 120 000 dead. But the official figure announced in the National Popular Assembly [parliament] in March 1998 was 26 536. In this respect, the registers of deaths, in which details including death and autopsy reports are officially recorded, are absolutely reliable and there is no reason to doubt their truth.<sup>16</sup>

In spring 1998, an army general speaking anonymously as General X (*Le Monde* of 7 May 1998 identified him as the army chief of staff, major-general Mohamed Lamari) claimed there had been only 40 000 victims.<sup>17</sup> President Bouteflika said on 26 June 1999, in the economic summit of Crans Montana, that there had been 100 000 dead since the beginning of the conflict.<sup>18</sup> Ten days later, some say under pressure from the military, he seemed to cast doubt on the figure he had given:

I must say honestly that I am not aware of any information source in Algeria that can tell me with great precision, with a mathematical precision, if there are 30 000, 100 000, or 80 000 or 50 000 victims. I took responsibility for saying 100 000 victims because I took into account every drop of Algerian blood, that is to say all the victims of the national tragedy. I do not think I am taking it too far in estimating that my figure is close to the actual magnitude [...]. 30 000 would probably be sound only if we assumed that the others are not really Algerians.<sup>19</sup>

In January 1998, Western media estimates gave a figure three times higher (75 000 casualties) than the official figures announced at the time.<sup>20</sup> Amnesty International, on the other hand, gave an estimate of 80 000 casualties on 18 November 1997.<sup>21</sup> Yet, about one year earlier, Me Ali Yahia Abdenmour, president of the LADDH, had announced an estimate of 190 000 dead since the beginning of the conflict.<sup>22</sup> This figure is close to that given by the dissident military, the Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres (MAOL – Algerian

Movement of Free officers), which estimated, in May 1999, that the total casualty figure since the beginning of the conflict was 173 000.<sup>23</sup> Still Darcourt claimed, in April 1996, there had been 300 000 dead according to his sources in unnamed Western intelligence agencies.<sup>24</sup> It therefore follows that quantitative data released by government agencies are under-estimates of the actual figures. It would also be justified to suspect that qualitative data about the victims and alleged perpetrators are also selectively released and distorted.

Given the incompleteness and unreliability of the available data, it might then be legitimate to deny that the indicators we constructed from the aggregated data capture any reality or structure of the terror. One might also doubt the validity and significance of the generalisations inferred from the data.

In our view this position would be too pessimistic and rather unrealistic in terms of accuracy standards and expectations of human rights violation data. Given that complete and precise human rights violation data are notoriously unavailable,<sup>25</sup> we believe our data are good enough, especially since this work is exploratory and does not seek to test stringently a formal theory or even a limited hypothesis. It is also the case that the censoring and counterfeiting propagate into the indicators which can disclose meaningful patterns if supported with proper auxiliary assumptions. As Samuelson and Spierer put it:

Suppression and distortion leave their own evidence in the data – complementary and concomitant. These incomplete or distorted data can be as revealing as what has been suppressed or distorted when viewed within the larger framework of considered inference.<sup>26</sup>

One can further argue that the incompleteness of the data would not jeopardise the public education aim of this work if proper care is taken to point out doubts where appropriate. Samuelson and Spierer suggest that ‘incomplete or distorted data can be the basis for a suspicion of human rights violations, or it can be objective support for unconfirmable or unconfirmed reports.’<sup>27</sup>

A more differentiated evaluation of the data distortion provides more specific reasons to justify this exercise. One can discriminate the data about the massacres into three categories: event information, victim information, and alleged perpetrator information. The event information encompasses data about the type of event, the reported date, duration and location of its occurrence, the body count and number of injured, and other crime scene details. The victim information includes details such as names, age, sex, family, socio-economic background, employment, organisational affiliations and political allegiances. The alleged perpetrator information is about the reported appearance of the attackers, their number, means of transport, weapons, modus operandi,



conversations between them and with their victims, and details like their arrest data if any etc. Once these distinctions are made, one sees that qualifying the data as distorted does not entail that these three information domains are equally affected. For instance the event information is less problematic than the alleged perpetrator data which have significantly higher propaganda utility. Despite its incompleteness and distortion, our event information does not involve situations where massacres are included when none are present. Spurious artefacts do not contaminate this data and the uncertainty has a boundary and a specific direction. Such is not the case for the alleged perpetrator information where, for instance, the identities of the perpetrators vary substantially, and often contradict each other, depending on the nature of the source of information.

It follows that if one does not imply greater precision than actually exists in the quantitative event data and provided that one interprets the corresponding indicators with careful attention to the context, this exercise would be meaningful. For the alleged perpetrator data, no statistical analysis will therefore be attempted and we shall restrict ourselves to the less ambitious but still useful task of reporting all the conflicting allegations and their sources.

Of course, we did make sure that all the data presented were transcribed and tabulated correctly. The reader will find two comprehensive tables in the appendix to verify that such is the case. These summary tables are also made public to submit our statistics to scrutiny and demonstrate their reproducibility.

### **3.The Anatomy of the Massacres**

The units of analysis we focus on here are the massacre events. Massacres are defined here as victimisation episodes where a number of unresisting civilians are killed randomly.<sup>A</sup>

We distinguish between two types of massacres. Massacres of the SMV type are random victimisations within selective sub-groups of the civilian population as in the wanton killing of all the male, female, young and old members of selected families in a particular village or in the indiscriminate slaughter of all the inhabitants of a village singled out in a given area. Here the degree of discrimination in the selection of the target is high. In addition to the elimina-

<sup>A</sup> There are conflicting etymologies for this word. Various Latin words have been suggested as possible origins: 'macele' or 'macrece' (slaughter-house), 'mattenculare' (instance of killing by blows), 'macellum' (butcher-shop) and 'scramasaxus' (large knife). Some French dictionaries suggest massacre (in French) derives from the German words 'metzger' (to slaughter cattle) and 'metzger' (butcher).

tion of the victims, they produce terror and influence the political behaviour of the direct identification groups of the victims, i.e. their closely related groups. In this case these are specific sub-groups of the population. The list of such episodes where at least 5 unresisting civilians were killed in a single event is given in table A in the appendix. The events are listed in geographic and chronological orders. For the massacres for which the reports quantify the deaths as 'more than Nvictims', where Nvictims is the given number of victims reported, we write '>Nvictims' in the deaths column of the table but use the value 'Nvictims+1' in the calculations.

Massacres of the RMV kind refer to the random mass killings of people belonging to random sub-groups of the population as in the bombings of public places or in the indiscriminate machine-gunning or slaughter of car or bus passengers at roadblocks. These involve a low degree of discrimination in the selection of the human targets. They produce anxiety, disorientation, and shifts in political attitudes in a wider direct identification group of the victims which, in this case, includes any member of the public. The list of such events in which at least 1 person is killed is given in table B in the appendix. The killings are listed in geographic and chronological orders. The reason why we also included events involving only one death is because the public location of the bombing aimed at killing more than one person and it is the case that often the injured succumb to their wounds but the figures are never updated in the news reports. We did not include bombing events where no death occurred. For instance two bombings in Médéa, one on 5 November 1998 and the other on 25 November of the same year, were reported to have caused 21 and 42 injured, respectively, but no deaths; we did not include such events in our sample.

Table C in the appendix lists mass graves recently reported, and table D gives cases of selective mass killings of foreign nationals. The events in both tables are for the record only and will not be included in the calculations and analysis.

Section 3.1 discusses the magnitudes of the massacres and their frequencies. In section 3.2 we examine the time fluctuations of the number of occurrences of massacres of the SMV and RMV types. Section 3.3 is devoted to a study of the geography of the massacres; we look at the district and borough distributions, at the political, military, and economic geographies, and zoom onto the micro-geographies of a few SMV massacre sites.

### 3.1. Magnitudes and Frequencies of the Massacres

Figure 1 displays the numbers of SMV events by death group at a national level for the period 1992-1998. The numbers are calculated from table A in the appendix. We find that there are altogether 339 mass killings with at least 5 deaths per event.




Figure 1: Frequencies of SMV Events by Death Group.

For example there are 12 mass killing episodes causing more than 100 deaths per massacre and 101 atrocities with more than 20 deaths per event. The frequencies of the massacres change with their magnitudes as indicated in the figure. For death groups of up to 80 deaths per event, the frequencies of the massacres decrease with increasing death group. Beyond this kill-ratio, this proportional relation breaks down. For example there are more atrocities with at least 100 deaths per episode than massacres with a 81-100 kill-ratio per event.

The frequencies of the random mass killings by death group nationally, for the same period, are given in figure 2. The frequencies are obtained from table B in the appendix. We count a total of 283 such atrocities. For instance there are 66 RMV events with more than 10 people murdered per atrocity.




Figure 2: Frequencies of RMV Events by Death Group.

### 3.2. Time Evolution of the Massacres

We first look at the changes in the number of the SMV events over time to find out about the frequencies of their occurrence and search for trends. The fluctuations of the RMV events are discussed next, in section 3.2.2. A cross-comparison of the trends of the two types of massacres concludes our analysis of their time structure, in section 3.2.3.

#### 3.2.1. Time Fluctuation of the SMV Episodes

Figure 3 shows the annual fluctuation of the number of SMV massacres nationally from 1992 to 1998. The year 1997 stands out as the year of the greatest mass terror. Both 1994 and 1997 appear as peaks in terror preceded and followed with a lower massacre activity.

The peak of 1994 could be spurious because of the uncertainties due to the incompleteness of the data up to 1995 but the 1997 peak is so prominent that it seems unlikely to disappear if the data were corrected for incompleteness and distortion. Figure 4 gives the annual fluctuation of the number of selective mass killings nationally, from 1992 to 1998, for various groups of the number of deaths per episode. The double peak structure around 1994 and 1997 does occur for all the death groups.




Figure 3: Annual Fluctuations of SMV Events 1992-1998.




Figure 4: Annual Fluctuations of SMV Events by Death Group.

We checked that these structures are not some spurious additive effects by also looking at the annual fluctuations at a district, rather than national, level. Figure 5 gives the annual fluctuations of the selective mass killings in the Algiers, Blida and Médéa districts. They are chosen for being the most affected districts. An analogous structure results in the three cases.




Figure 5: Annual Fluctuations of SMV Events in Algiers, Blida and Médéa.

In order to analyse more finely the time structure of the massacre activity, we focus on its monthly fluctuations around these two peaks. Figure 6 displays the monthly variations of the massacres from November 93 up to January 95 and figure 7 covers the period from April 96 to December 98, both at a national level.

Figure 6 reveals a fluctuating massacre activity with 3 peaks centred around March and April 94, September 94, and November 94, respectively.

One can suggest some of the concomitant political events that may have significance in interpreting these features. The criteria we used to select the relevant political events are basic. We chose the publicly accessible events indicative of i) political or military processes associated with the military as an institution prosecuting a low intensity war and as an unstable coalition of two rival factions, the ‘conciliators’ and ‘eradicators’ groupings of officers strug-




Figure 6: Monthly Fluctuations of SMV Events Nov.93-Jan.95.

gling for domination of the military institution and the political system<sup>B</sup>; ii) political or military processes associated with the competing armed insurgent groups carrying a guerrilla war against the incumbent regime; iii) significant institutional and opposition political activities; iv) statements and positions of France and the US for their strongest influence and involvement in the crisis, and, to a lesser extent, of the UN and Europe. Only poorly disseminated facts were referred to their sources. All the remaining facts and statements will be found in the rich chronology of political events and statements available in the *Troubles* Internet journal.<sup>28</sup>

November 93 saw the Haut Comité d'Etat<sup>29</sup> announce the holding of a 'National Reconciliation Conference' in January 94 to achieve a consensus, with all opposition parties, on the nature of the governing body to succeed it at the end of its mandate. A large repressive operation against Islamists in France

<sup>B</sup> In the Algerian context, the 'conciliators' refers to the officers who believe in a more political approach to the conflict whereas the 'eradicators' denotes the body of officers who have a total war approach to the conflict and who seek the complete elimination of the insurgents. Even though this distinction between the factions is unsound, because the factional divisions date back to the war of liberation and are determined by other causes (orientation of training, regional ties and competition for appropriation of the oil rent), these terms will be used for simplicity. Algerians also term political parties and newspapers 'eradicator'/'conciliators' depending on their approach to the conflict and on the military faction they act as clients for.

(88 arrests) and ten death sentences by the 'special' courts of Algiers also take place in this month. The 'National Reconciliation Conference' is held on 25 and 26 January 94. The Islamic Salvation Front (often known by its French acronym FIS) is not invited and the major political parties consecrated at the December 91 legislative elections boycott the event for its lack of representativeness and inclusiveness. General Zeroual, appointed defence minister earlier in July 93, is decreed president of the state on January 31. Alain Juppé, the French foreign minister, declares that the 'FIS access to power' is not 'in the interest of Algeria nor that of France'.

The first peak in the massacre activity is preceded by president-general Zeroual's announcement of his intention to pursue a policy of dialogue inclusive of the FIS, and the release of two members of the FIS leadership in February 94. During this month the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) claims the killing of 70 members of its rival Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA) guerrilla group and its leader, Sid Ahmed Mourad, is killed. In March 94, 'eradicator' newspapers (*El Watan*, *Le Matin*, *Liberté*, *Al-Khabar*) campaign against the release of the two FIS leaders, and 'eradicator' political figures and parties (Redha Malek, the RCD<sup>30</sup> and Ettahadi<sup>31</sup> etc.) organise marches and demonstrations calling for a halt to contacts with the FIS. About 1000 Islamist political prisoners escape from the Tazoult prison. General Lamari, one of the most hawkish generals in the 'eradicator' faction of the army, launches the 'total war' policy through a wide offensive in urban and rural areas sympathetic to the FIS. Another significant event is the holding of a conclave of senior military officers from both the 'eradicator' and 'conciliator' factions.<sup>32</sup> At the end of this month, Zeroual's dialogue initiative founders.

A reordering of personnel in government and the army takes place in April and May 94. The 'conciliator' faction of the army is strengthened in government; the overall balance of power in the army is still in favour of the 'eradicator' faction but the 'conciliator' faction gains the control of many military districts including Oran and Constantine. On the insurgent scene, a number of armed groups and some political figures of the FIS unite under the GIA on May 13. In July 94, the creation of the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), an armed wing loyal to the FIS, is officially announced.

Foregoing the next increase in massacre activity, Ali Belhadj, deputy leader of FIS, sends a letter about dialogue to general Zeroual, in July 94. Generals from both factions sit in an acrimonious conclave to discuss the war policy to pursue, and Zeroual announces a new initiative for a national dialogue inclusive of FIS. In August 94, Mokdad Sifi – Zeroual's prime-minister – reiterates the government search for dialogue and Abbassi Madani, the FIS leader, sends



two letters to Zeroual. The GIA assaults a residence of the French embassy in Algiers and, in a statement seeking to thwart the FIS initiative for dialogue, announces the creation of 'an Islamic Caliphate'; Said Mekhloufi, who had united with the GIA in May 94, responds by withdrawing from the shura council of the GIA. French foreign minister Juppé visits Algeria.

The September 94 rise in massacres concurs with i) the release of Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, from prison to house arrest, and their meeting with government negotiators; ii) the resignation of minister Mrs Aslaoui in protest at these releases; iii) the 'eradicator' press and parties attacks on the dialogue initiative as 'unilateral concessions', a 'deal against democracy' with a party with 'no control over the armed groups'; iv) the GIA condemnation of the initiative, re-statement of its 'neither reconciliation, nor truce, nor dialogue' motto, and the killing of its leader, Cherif Gousmi. Alain Juppé declares that 'Algeria needs a dialogue between all political forces which renounce violence'.

In October 94 the number of massacres subsides. At the end of October general Zeroual announces the cessation of the dialogue initiative. In November 94, a conference for national dialogue, hosted by the catholic community of Sant'Egidio, gathers the main opposition parties (the FIS, FLN<sup>33</sup>, FFS<sup>34</sup>, MDA<sup>35</sup>, PT<sup>36</sup> and MN<sup>37</sup>) and the president of the LADDH. The event draws strong criticism from the regime. The massacre activity increases during this month.

We now turn to the monthly variations in the number of SMV events from April 1996 to December 1998. This is shown in figure 7. The prominent feature of this massacre activity is its wave character. We observe *waves* of massacres with periods of reduced activity in between.

From August 96 up to July 97 the peaks in the massacre activity increase gradually in intensity, from 2 to 21 massacres per month. In August and October 97 their intensity suddenly rises to more than twice the intensities registered earlier in the year. In the year 1998 the highest peak occurs in January and is of similar intensity to that found in August 97. These are the three most intense eruptions of terror throughout this period. The amplitudes of the oscillations and the peaks in the massacre waves of 1998 are on average smaller than those found in 1997. It is not just the peak intensities that distinguish the regime of atrocities between June 97 and March 98 from the terror waves that precede and follow this span. The duration of the two most intense waves of terror are longer than those observed in the earlier and subsequent cycles of massacres. One way of quantifying the duration of the waves is to use the concept of 'lifetime'. If one defines the lifetime of a massacre wave as the full




Figure 7: Monthly Fluctuation of SMV Events Apr.96-Dec.98.

width at half maximum of the massacre activity peak, the lifetime of the one in the autumn of 1997 is about 4 months while that of the terror wave which peaked in January 1998 is about 2.5 months. The massacre waves that peaked in January 1997 and August 1998 had the same lifetime of about 2 months while the trains of atrocities that peaked in August and November 1996, and April 1997 had a similar lifetime of about one month.

Figure 8 presents now these monthly fluctuations for various death groups. The sum of all these curves yields the profile in figure 7.

The purpose of analysing the massacre activity into components of differing magnitudes is to look for similarities and distinctions in their regimes of perpetration. We observe that the massacre activities have a wave character for all death groups. Another striking feature is that the highest peaks in the activities occur between June 97 and March 98 for all the magnitudes of the massacres. Note also that the lifetimes of the bursts of terror in this period are longer (by a factor ranging from 1.5 to 3) than those of the waves of massacres registered preceding, and subsequent to, the June 1997-March 1998 period. Except in January, April and December 97 and in December 1998 where all the maxima are synchronous, the maxima of the waves of massacres in figure 8 are not always all synchronous. The activities register a drop simultaneously in March, May and November 97 and in February 98. It should also be noted that




Figure 8: Monthly Fluctuations of SMV Events by Death Group Apr.96-Dec.98.

for massacres with more than 40 deaths per episode the activity goes to zero during lulls whereas for massacres with less than 40 deaths per event there is an uninterrupted background of mass killings.

This salient wave character observed in the massacre activity may well not be just some spurious property. In a study of the ways in which political agencies misuse psychological knowledge, Merloo identifies ‘well-applied waves of terror’ as ‘the best recipes for terrorising people into co-operation and collaboration’. He writes:

Totalitarian strategy in its tactical description of the techniques of mass intimidation and collective control discovered that the arousing of simple panic, fear and terror do not suffice. Too great a mental pressure exerted over a long period of time loses its frightening impact and often stirs rebellion and critical resistance in the people, militating against the final aim of producing obedient automatic thought machines out of human beings.

In order to better reach its goals, the more scientific strategy makes use of *waves of terror* ‘with in-between periods of relative calm and freedom’ – the so-called ‘*breathing spell*’, (*peredishka*). These intervals of relative freedom and lack of overt tensions can be used to much better advantage for political persuasion and mass hypnosis provided some new wave of terror is anticipated. It is completely comparable with the patient in hypnotherapy who becomes easier to hypnotise at every session. The alternation of terror and breathing spell, for example, the alternation of a cold war of hatred with the opposite propaganda for harmonious, peaceful coexistence, can gradually cause confusion and increased anxious anticipation in people.<sup>38</sup>

Another reason to believe that the wave character shown in figure 7 is not some spurious artefact is that the monthly fluctuations of the number of victims of selective mass killings present the same wave structure. The timing, intensities and lifetimes of the peaks (see figure 31 in section 4.2) coincide with those found in figure 7. The RMV activity also displays the same phenomenon; this will be shown in section 3.2.2.

We now list some of the concurrent political events and statements which may be relevant in the interpretation of these structures in the massacre activity.

April 96 sees the effective dismantlement of the then main armed opposition force (GIA) as companies and squads break away from it when they realise the movement has been taken over and turned into a fully fledged counter-guerrilla force by the DRS, and run ostensibly by Djamel Zitouni.<sup>C</sup> The GIA

<sup>C</sup> From November 1995 till April 1996, a large number of defecting companies, platoons and sections issued communiqués denouncing the take-over of the GIA by Djamel Zitouni (described as a double agent), and other intelligence and army officers, the ‘treacherous killings of hundreds of the best political and military cadres’ of the armed movement by the new leadership, and the policy of ‘oppression and killings of civilians’ pursued by ‘the putschist leaders’.

fell under the total control of the army in November 95, the same month in which Zeroual was elected president, in a special take-over operation involving the killings of hundreds of its political and military leaders and cadres.<sup>D</sup>

At the end of this month the seven Trappist monks at the Tibherine monastery are kidnapped by the GIA and murdered later in May 96; protest demonstrations are organised in Paris. During this month the government announces its plan of holding legislative elections in the first semester of 97.

In June 96, General Fodhil Saidi, an *éminence grise* of the 'conciliator' faction, is killed a day before his appointment as head of Zeroual's defence cabinet. In July 96 a new armed opposition group, the Mouvement Islamique de la Dawa et du Djihad (MIDD) announces its creation and declares its 'rejection of any compromise with the regime in place'. It 'condemns the massacres' and 'denounces the GIA as a group under the control of the military intelligence'. Djamel Zitouni, leader of the GIA, is reportedly killed and replaced by Antar Zouabri. At the end of this month, a G7 ministerial conference on terrorism is held in Paris and calls for a 'total war' against terrorism and 'reinforcing international co-operation to fight against terrorism'; a day later Pierre Claverie, the bishop of Oran, is murdered in a remote control car-bombing. French foreign minister Hervé de Charette makes an official visit to Algeria.

The August 96 increase in massacres coincides with president Zeroual's intensification of cross-party consultations, started in mid-July, for preparing a national conference and dialogue. In September 96 president Zeroual leads a three-day conference on 'national understanding' that excludes the FIS and the FFS, and in October he declares that 'the FIS case is closed'. The AIS issues a communiqué declaring its 'will to pursue the armed struggle', its 'disposition to negotiate' and denounces the GIA as 'criminal and deviant groups in the pay of the eradicators in the military'.

These events precede the November 1996 peak in the massacre activity. It concurs with the holding of a national referendum on a new constitution that grants wider and greater powers to the president, and a conference of the opposition (FIS, FFS, MDA, PT and the LADDH) in Brussels denouncing it as 'institutionalisation of dictatorship' and 'incapable of bringing peace'. This conference initiates a 'call for peace' campaign.

In December 96 the number of massacres diminishes by 3 units; opposition parties denounce the fraud in the referendum and the government bans a

<sup>D</sup> In October 1995, a month before the multi-candidate presidential election, the GIA had stepped up attacks against the AIS and claimed responsibility for two bombings (October 6 and 17) in the Paris metro.

protest demonstration called for by the FFS. The European parliament calls for a true democratic pluralism, and a more political approach, respect for the rule of law and freedom of expression in combating fundamentalism. The Algerian regime denounces the resolution as 'unacceptable interference' in its internal affairs. Paris is the target of an unclaimed bomb attack alleged to be the work of the GIA according to the Algerian paper *Le Matin*. French president Chirac defends France's policy of support to the Algerian regime: 'If Algeria were to be isolated the worst should be feared, chaos would lie in wait for this country, and this would be an irresponsible attitude'.

In January 97 the mass killings intensify again. General Zeroual blames the massacres on 'terrorists' (the official denotation of Islamist insurgents) who, 'because of their defeat, pour all their hatred out today and commit criminal acts against innocent civilians.'<sup>39</sup> Madani Mezerag, the commander-in-chief of the AIS, issues a statement declaring that 'the regime and its militias from the wretched bandits commit massacres inflicted on unarmed innocent people and accuse the mujahideen.'<sup>40</sup> A conclave of senior military officers from the 'eradicator' and 'conciliator' factions debates the choice of a political party to act as the main vehicle of the army at the next legislative elections. Abdelhaq Benhamouda, a labour union leader under the patronage of the 'conciliator' faction of the army, announces his intention of creating a 'centrist party' and criticises the anti-dialogist positions of parties (RCD, ANR<sup>41</sup> and Ettahadi) allied to the 'eradicator' faction of the army. He is assassinated some days later.<sup>42</sup> President Zeroual escapes an assassination attempt.<sup>43</sup> The FFS criticises France's policy of support of the eradicators as hostage to commercial and intelligence lobbies and calls on the US to mediate in the conflict. A spokesman for the French ministry of foreign affairs responds by condemning 'violence from all sides whatever its motivations' and rejecting the idea of American mediation: 'the problems of Algeria are Algerian problems that must be solved by Algerians with Algerian solutions'. Communist party leader Francis Wurtz calls for 'a stronger commitment of France' to fight 'fundamentalist terrorism'. Socialist Lionel Jospin declares that 'no one acts in Europe because France does not act' and 'France must break the taboo' and says 'we are not ready to support the Algerian power [*le pouvoir*] whatever it does'. Former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing calls for 'a democratic and peaceful solution' and the participation of 'all Algerian political forces' at the next legislative elections. Security forces prevent the holding of a rally for peace and dialogue.

February 97 registers a relative drop in the massacre activity. The National Rally for Democracy (RND), regarded as a political vehicle of the army, is created. A new Islamic armed organisation, La Ligue Islamique de la Dawa et

Djihad (LIDD) announces its creation and publishes its charter of principles. Hervé de Charette reasserts that 'the orientations of France's policy towards Algeria are unchanged'.

In March 97 there is a further decrease in the number of massacres, new electoral laws are decreed by the army-appointed Conseil National de Transition (CNT) and Zeroual announces the holding of legislative elections for June 97. Ahmed Abou El Fida, leader of the urban-based Front Islamique du Djihad Armé (FIDA), is killed. New regulations are decreed to control the more than 100 000-strong armed militia force. The FFS and FIS call for a negotiated solution to the conflict.

April 97 records another intense wave of massacres. Government spokesmen and media condemn the perpetrators whom they identify as 'terrorists', 'Islamist rebels' and 'rabid beasts'. The banned FIS issues a communiqué that condemns 'these inhuman acts', puts 'responsibility for these massacres on the shoulders of the putschists', and asks 'the international human rights organisations to send urgently a commission of inquiry to establish those responsible for these crimes'.<sup>744</sup>

Opposition parties (FIS, FFS, PT and MN) meet in Madrid at a conference organised by Spanish NGOs and call for dialogue and peace in Algeria. The new French ambassador to Algeria, Gaillardin, declares his wish is to establish 'an atmosphere of confidence and friendship' between 'Algeria and France'.

In May 97 the mass terror subsides slightly. Zeroual dissolves the CNT and promises the elimination of armed opposition groups and tight security in the June legislative elections.

The massacre activity increases by 3 units in June 97. During this month the legislative elections are held and largely won by the three month-old RND party. The FFS, PT, MN and MSP<sup>45</sup> parties denounce the 'massive rigging of the elections'. The RND-dominated government is formed and Abdelkader Hachani, the third senior leader of FIS, is released from detention after his arrest in January 92. Lionel Jospin becomes the new prime-minister of France.

In July 97 the number of massacres rises sharply. The onset of this wave of massacres with the largest lifetime (about 4 months) occurs in parallel with the conditional release of Abbassi Madani, a move welcomed by 'conciliator' parties and strongly criticised by the 'eradicator' parties and press as a 'unilateral concession' and 'compromise'. Zeroual dismisses 'eradicator' general Abbas Ghezaiel from the command of the Gendarmerie Nationale and replaces him with 'conciliator' general Tayeb Derradji. No promotions to the rank of gen-



eral and general-major are announced on the anniversary of independence as the 'eradicator' and 'conciliator' factions are reportedly deadlocked over the joint list of promotions. The new government announces local elections for 23 October 1997. Hubert Védrine, the new foreign minister of France, visits Algeria.

August 97 registers a further exacerbation in the massacre activity which captures international attention. International condemnations of the massacres get louder and Kofi Annan asks the Algerian government and the opposition to pursue political dialogue. Abbassi Madani responds willingly and gets reprimanded and warned by the interior minister. Zeroual calls the nation to wage a 'relentless struggle against terrorism'.

In September 97 the cycle of massacres continues with a slight drop in intensity. The massacre activity is the same as that reported in August. Abbassi Madani is re-assigned to house arrest. The AIS declares a unilateral truce effective from October 1 'to expose the real perpetrators of the massacres to the world'. On the army scene, 'eradicator' general Khaled Nezzar returns abruptly from medical treatment in the US to attend a stormy conclave of senior military officers from both rival factions. The reported issues of contention are peace negotiations with the FIS and the command and control of the now 200 000 strong militia force. A first and unusual public statement of support to Zeroual by US ambassador Ronald Neuman is widely read as staving off a coup attempt by the chief of staff, general-major Lamari, because the US is regarded as the foreign patron of the 'conciliator' faction and France is seen as the foreign patron of the 'eradicator' faction. Hubert Védrine declares that 'the upsurge of violence seems to be the response of Islamists to any compromise with the Algerian government' and likens it to the 'extremely cruel war' of the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) in 1962. He also states that an international action to stop the violence is 'difficult to conceive except if it is wished or demanded by this or that party in the conflict'. Prime-minister Lionel Jospin declares that France cannot intervene in a 'conflict where it is extremely difficult to identify what goes on' and 'where a fanatical and violent opposition [struggles] against *un pouvoir* which uses violence and the power of the state in a certain way'. The European Union condemns the wave of massacres and Madeleine Albright and Hubert Védrine 'discuss' the Algerian crisis. Prime-minister Ouyahia restates the impossibility of dialogue with FIS.

Figures 7 and 8 show that the massacres in October 1997 are structurally part of the *same* train of atrocities ignited in July 97 (figure 31 in section 4.2 shows it more clearly). Prime-minister Ahmed Ouyahia reiterates his usual de-



scription of the massacres as 'desperate acts' of 'criminals, traitors and mercenaries' against 'a population which has stood up to terrorism.'<sup>46</sup> The FIS blames the atrocities on 'the military junta' and alleges that 'the massacres constitute another conspiracy to eradicate families from working class districts who voted for the FIS, and to spread terror in the ranks of undecided people in preparation for the next electoral masquerade.'<sup>47</sup> This month records a further aggravation in the massacre activity. Zeroual denies the existence of secret negotiations with the FIS and divisions within the army. Many reports explain Zeroual's statement as indicating that the 'eradicator' faction outmanoeuvred its 'conciliator' rival by negotiating a truce directly with the AIS instead of the FIS political leadership. The LIDD and FIDA armed organisations announce their rallying around the unilateral truce decreed by the AIS. General Fodhil Cherif, head of the anti-terrorist special forces, takes the unprecedented step of publicly criticising the incompetence of the Gendarmerie Nationale, now controlled by 'conciliator' general Tayeb Derradji. General Said Bey, an 'eradicator' general in control of the 1st military district where most of the massacres are taking place, is dismissed and replaced by 'conciliator' general Rabah Boughaba. Local elections are held and won overwhelmingly by the presidential party, the RND. Political parties denounce 'massive riggings of the elections'. The FIS and the FFS appeal to the international community to exert pressure on the Algeria regime. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch call on the United Nations to act on the human rights situation in Algeria. Foreign minister Ahmed Attaf declares that Algeria rejects 'in a categorical and definitive way' France's position aimed at 'inciting and encouraging interference' in its internal affairs. *Le Nouvel Observateur*, a French weekly, reveals that France had tested chemical weapons in a secret base (B2-Namous) in Algeria until 1978 in accordance with a secret clause in the Evian agreements. This is denied by Ahmed Attaf who denounces France's new attempt 'to sow doubt about the personality of Boumediene, the symbol of patriotism and national unity.'

November 97 registers a diminution in the massacre activity. All parties with the exception of the RND continue denouncing the 'massive rigging' of the ballots and organise protest rallies. The movement of protest breaks down and the government announces the holding of elections for the Senate on 25 December 1997.

In December 97 the number of massacres shoots up again to more than twice its November level. This coincides with the holding of elections to the Senate for two thirds of the seats, the remaining seats being directly appointed by Zeroual. 80 out of the 96 seats in the Senate are held by RND affiliated Senators.

In January 98 the population sustains a further intensification in the atrocities. The activity rises to its highest level in the mass terror campaign. Ex-minister Aslaoui imputes the massacres to the 'logic of despair' of the 'Islamist terrorists'.<sup>248</sup> Government and French media blame them on 'Islamist terrorism' and highlight the concomitance of this upsurge in mass killings with 'the start of the month of Ramadhan' as evidence. The FIS condemns the atrocities it ascribes to 'the military regime' and calls for 'an international commission of inquiry and a credible and independent national one to get at the truth of the massacres being committed for so many long months'.<sup>249</sup> World wide condemnations (Europe, the US, some Arab countries, the UN and the OIC) and some calls for an international inquiry into the killings respond in unison and loudly to this latest wave of atrocities. The US State Department first calls for 'an international inquiry to shed lights' on the massacres but, later in the month, alleges that the GIA is responsible for 'most of the atrocities' and reminds the Algerian government of its obligation to protect the civilian population. The European Union demands the sending of a mission to Algeria to find a way of stopping the massacres and to persuade the government to accept the visit of the UN special rapporteur on human rights. Government spokesmen initially reject these international statements as 'interference in Algeria's sovereignty' and 'an enterprise to absolve terrorism' and call on European countries to cease their 'duplicitous politics towards terrorist networks identified in Europe.' The government later agrees to the visit of the European troika delegation of ministers from Austria, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. Abdelkader Hachani, the FIS number three man, is arrested following an interview on the subject of the responsibility for the massacres with *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*; he is released later.

February 98 registers a two-third-drop in the massacre activity. A nine member, French-dominated, European parliamentary delegation visits Algeria and declares that 'there is no need for an international commission of inquiry', 'governmental forces are not implicated in the massacres but they are ill-trained and ill-equipped to deal with the mutating forms of terrorism'. It proposes the creation of a 'commission of inquiry on fund raising and support networks of Islamist terrorism in Europe'. The FIS publishes a copy of a letter that was secretly conveyed to the European delegation during the visit; a French delegation member tore it to pieces in a news conference. The letter condemns the massacres, calls for an independent inquiry into the atrocities and questions the role of Europe in its support for a regime of 'shedders of blood and transgressors of honour' to gain 'petty oil and gas concessions'.<sup>250</sup> The government bans a demonstration for 'peace and national reconciliation' called for by the

FFS. The interior ministry summons the political parties to convene conferences to adjust their status and internal regulations with the new laws on the constitution of political parties. A conference on 'French nuclear tests in Algeria' is held and Abdelaziz Sebaa, Foreign ministry spokesman, declares that Algeria is 'entirely disposed to improve and normalise' its relations with France.

In March, April and May 98 the massacre activity decreases successively. Martin Indyk, the deputy US State Secretary for Middle Eastern affairs, visits Algeria, condemns 'the extremists' he holds responsible 'for large scale killings' and calls the government 'to protect its citizens within the rule of law'. Jack Lang, the president of the commission of foreign affairs of the French National Assembly, visits Algeria in March and, referring to the massacres, denounces 'the doubt that has sometimes been entertained about the origins of the criminal acts'. He calls for 'an inquiry commission to be set up at the initiative of European institutions' to establish 'a country by country radiography of the headquarters linked to the GIA, arms trafficking and the transfer of funds to the killers' in order 'to destroy the rear-bases of terrorism'. During this month a large business delegation led by François Perigot, the president of Le Conseil National du Patronat Français, visits Algeria; another commission, this time from the French chamber of commerce, does the same in May. At the G-15 meeting in Cairo and at the meeting of the interior ministers of the Western Mediterranean in Naples, the regime calls for 'international co-operation to fight terrorism'. Concomitant events at the national level include the reduction of the number of parties from over 50 to about 20 as new laws take effect. The FFS holds a national conference in which it denounces the regime attempt to subvert it from within, 'the parallel attempts of the government to incite the population to arm itself and organise 20 man groups led by security officers' and 'France diplomatic protectorate over Algeria' in international affairs. In mid-April, two 'eradicator' papers, *Liberté* and *El Watan*, publish a series of articles revealing that the militias of Relizane and Jdioua perpetrated massacres and racketeered the local populations. Two militia leaders, Hadj Abed, maire of Jdioua, and Hadj Fergane, maire of Relizane, are personally implicated and arrested. The national TV, under the control of the 'conciliator' faction, responds by a documentary lauding the arrested militia leaders and running militia recruitment adverts. The suspects are released from detention on orders of the justice minister, Mohamed Adami, a client of the 'conciliator' faction. Observers interpret these events as reflecting a power struggle between the 'conciliator' and 'eradicator' factions over the control of the militia forces estimated to number more than 200 000. On May 15 'conciliator' general Mohamed Betchine is elected to the political bureau of the RND, a move

widely regarded as a preliminary step towards announcing his candidacy for the year 2000 presidential elections.

June 98 registers a one-unit increment in the massacre activity. Nourredine Boukrouh, leader of the PRA<sup>51</sup> and client of the military 'eradicators', opens a campaign of attacks published in *El Watan* and *Liberté* on general Mohamed Betchine and president Zeroual describing them as 'corrupt, ignorant and ruthless leaders'. He is summoned before the police 'to substantiate his allegations' and released.

The 'eradicator' press steps up attacks against the arabisation laws coming into effect on July 5. Berber singer Maatoub Lounes, a radical opponent of arabisation and islamisation of Algeria, is assassinated sparking violent riots in *Kabyle* cities and towns. Demonstrators attack government, RND and FLN buildings and many casualties are reported in the clashes with security forces. Large demonstrations are held against the arabisation law and to pay homage to Lounes. President Chirac denounces the 'vile murder' of a man 'who raised high and loudly the voice of Algeria' while Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine condemns the 'terrorist violence which plunges Algeria into mourning once again'.

In July 98 the number of massacres increases by one more unit. On 5 July, *Kabyle* areas observe a 'dead towns' strike instigated by the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB). A group called the Berber Armed Movement (MAB) announces its creation and threatens 'to kill all those who will apply the arabisation laws'. FFS leader Ait-Ahmed imputes the creation of the MAB to the military intelligence (DRS) and alleges that 'following the example of many army-controlled GIAs', it is with 'a Berber GIA' that 'some among the highest authorities are seeking to suppress political life'. A delegation from the commission of Foreign Affairs of the French National Assembly visits Algeria and declares on its return to France that 'Algeria is evolving', 'nothing is simple' and 'any Manichaeism or caricature is a mistake against truth'. A six-member UN delegation arrives in Algeria with a mandate to collect information about the situation in the country.

The massacre intensity exacerbates by 4 units in August 98. This is the highest activity since January 98. The UN delegation leaves Algeria. There are reports of a resumption of army contacts with FIS leader Abbassi Madani.<sup>52</sup> Redha Malek, leader of the ANR and an 'eradicator' advocate and ally, renews attacks on general Betchine condemning 'the anti-constitutional campaign linking general Betchine with national unity and other symbols of the nation'. All the 'eradicator' private press highlights the Ali Bensaad affair, a communist

journalist (now in Germany) wrongfully condemned to death in July 98 for ‘complicity with terrorism’ allegedly under the instigation of general Betchine. A virulent media war subsequently erupts between the ‘eradicator’ private press and that owned by the rival ‘conciliator’ military faction (*L’Authentique*, *Demain l’Algérie*, *El Acil*).<sup>E</sup> The RND party retaliates by orchestrating a campaign of messages of support to general Betchine and declaring him ‘an authentic *mujahid*’ and ‘the best possible candidat for the 2000 presidential election’. President Zeroual makes a televised speech in which he restates his will ‘to eradicate terrorism’ and explains that the arabisation law does not intend ‘to isolate Algeria from the rest of the world or to sacrifice the *Amazigh* [Berber] component of the Algerian identity’. This speech is regarded as an appeasement of the ‘eradicators’ and France. Zeroual later makes an African tour and attends the conference of non-aligned countries in South Africa where he makes proposals for an international convention to fight terrorism.

September 98 records a sharp drop in the number of massacres. *Demain L’Algérie* alleges that ‘eradicator’ general Larbi Belkheir created 300 death squads in the early 90s and had been acting as ‘an informer of president François Mitterand’, and makes damaging insinuations about ‘eradicator’ general Khaled Nezzar’s role in the repression. A stormy six-hour conclave is held and the ‘eradicator’ generals are reported to have accused Zeroual of ‘allowing widespread Islamist penetration of state institutions’ and demanded that he sacks general Mohamed Betchine.<sup>53</sup> The UGTA labour union, a para-political body controlled by the military, threatens a national strike. President Zeroual resigns and announces early presidential elections for which he will not stand. The FIS, FFS and LADDH describe the shortening of the presidential mandate as yet another military coup. The chief of staff, ‘eradicator’ general Mohamed Lamari, declares that the early presidential elections in April 1999 will ‘reassert the continuity of democracy and the rule of law’ in Algeria. The UN delegation that visited Algeria in July and August makes the findings of its information mission public. The report is widely regarded as favourable to the regime.<sup>54</sup> Its results are lauded by foreign minister Attaf. Amnesty International and the Federation Internationale des Droits de l’Homme criticise its partiality. Ali Yahia Abdenour, president of the LADDH, condemns it as ‘quietus for the past [state crimes], free rein for the present and a blank cheque for the future’. Former French minister Simone Veil, a member of the UN panel, calls for supporting Algeria ‘against terrorism, fanaticism and a hateful Islamism that

<sup>E</sup> For instance *L’Authentique* of August 10 writes that the chief editor of *Le Matin* has ‘a face washed with urine’. *Le Matin* on August 11 answers that *L’Authentique* newspaper acts as ‘the favourite in the harem of Betchine’ and writes: ‘keep your dogs Mr Betchine’.

seeks to impose its law' through 'completely gratuitous terrorist acts' that cannot be compared with 'what can be done' by governmental forces. At the 53rd session of the UN general assembly, Foreign minister Attaf calls for an international conference to agree on an international convention against terrorism.

In October 98, the massacre activity remains at its September level. On October 5, in a television debate on the 5 October 1988 army killings of demonstrators, 'eradicator' generals Larbi Belkheir and Khaled Nezzar exonerate themselves in response to general Betchine's allegations last September and shift the blame on him. The 'eradicator' press launches a new campaign against general Betchine this time, through his imprisoned brother in law and former business associate, Reda Benboulia, and his former private secretary, intelligence officer Hichem Aboud. He is accused of corruption, embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, and of ordering and practising torture in the bloody October 1988 events. The press campaign also targets the justice minister, Mohamed Adami, a client of the 'conciliator' faction, accusing him of 'ordering the transfer of 32 political prisoners all killed by suffocation during the transfer', 'dissolute morals' and 'interference in the legal prerogatives of magistrates'. Adami resigns. Nine people, some say relatives of general Betchine, are slaughtered in the massacre of Hamma Bouziane, the native hamlet of Betchine, in the district of Constantine, on 17 October.<sup>55</sup> General Betchine resigns from his position as advisor to the president and is reportedly disembarked from a plane as he is about to leave the country. During this month, the Algerian navy, under the command of 'conciliator' general Chaabane Ghodhbane, holds its first bilateral naval military exercise with the US, an operation interpreted as a US projection of support to the 'conciliator' military faction. Bernard Stasi, the moderator of the French republic, visits Algeria and declares that Algeria is engaged 'in democracy in an irreversible way', 'political pluralism is evident' and 'the Islamist threat has been dealt with'.

November 98 registers a one-unit increase in the massacre activity. General Betchine resigns again, this time from the political bureau of the RND. Louisa Hanoune, leader of the PT, reports that during her talks with Zeroual about the conditions of the coming presidential elections he expressed the view that 'one cannot exclude the existence of secret groups' behind the massacres. The parliamentary commission investigating the fraud during the June 97 legislative elections eventually publishes its results establishing that state administration had rigged the elections. This event has been read as a further progress of the 'eradicator' faction in taking over or destroying this army fabricated political vehicle in preparation for the next presidential elections.



December 98 sees a strong rise in the perpetration of massacres. A new government led by prime-minister Smail Hamdani is formed. The race for the next presidential elections starts with many candidates announcing their participation.

After this brief account of some of the political events that may be relevant for interpreting the structures observed in the monthly fluctuations of the SMV events shown in figure 7 we conclude this section by looking at the same fluctuations at a district level. The patterns of the SMV monthly fluctuations in figure 7 are calculated at a national level and so should not be extrapolated uniformly throughout the national territory. For example Algiers, Blida and Médéa, three of the most affected districts, have suffered different monthly fluctuations in the massacre activity. Figure 9 overleaf displays the monthly variations in the number of massacres, in these three districts, for the period between April 1996 and December 1998.

We observe the same phenomenon of waves of massacres with spells of reduced activity in between for these 3 contiguous districts. The most intense peaks are recorded from July to October 1997. However there are significant differences in the timings, frequencies, intensities and lifetimes of the massacre waves. A detailed comparison and explanation of these differences is outside the scope of this work.

### *3.2.2. Time Fluctuation of the RMV Events*

Figure 10 reports the annual variations in the number of random mass killings at a national level. From 1994 to 1996 the RMV activity increases successively and in 1997 the activity amounts to twice the number of massacres in 1996. Unlike the SMV activity, 1997 does not appear here as a peak in mass terror preceded and followed by lower massacre intensities. 1998 records the same number of events. This distinction between the SMV and RMV activities will be explored further below.

Figure 11 now represents the annual fluctuation of RMV events by death group. Summing all the differential activities in figure 11 yields the profile in figure 10. We split the annual activities into their components of increasing extents of deaths per atrocity to probe for possible patterns in the perpetration of these random mass killings of differing magnitudes.

We observe that for the massacres leading to the smallest death group (up to five deaths per event) the activity, in fact, increases linearly since 1995. The other four death groups have indeed their peak activity in 1997 preceded and followed by lower intensities. This suggests that random mass killings leading




Figure 9: Monthly Fluctuations of SMV Events in Algiers, Blida and Médéa, Apr.96-Dec.96.




Figure 10: Annual Fluctuations of RMV Events 1992-1998.






Figure 11: Annual Fluctuations of RMV Events by Death Group.

up to 5 deaths per incident obey a different perpetration logic than the rest. Secondly, the RMV activity resulting in more than 5 deaths per event has the same pattern as the SMV activity hence suggesting possible correlations in their perpetration.

Figure 12 shows that the peaked structure centred around 1997 is also present in the annual fluctuations in the number of RMV events in the districts of Algiers and Blida but for Médéa one observes a linear increase for 1996 onwards.

Figure 13 now displays the monthly changes in the RMV activity at a national level between April 96 and December 98. Here we also find alternations of terror, that is to say periods of intense random mass killing activity spliced by regular lulls.

From April 96 to February 1998 there are 7 peaks in the RMV activity. The peaks occur in July and September 1996, January, May, August and October 1997, and in January 1998, respectively. The peaks increase gradually in intensity and reach their maximum value of 32 events in January 98. The average lifetime of these alternating eruptions of mass terror is 1.5 months. The time structure of the waves of atrocities up to February 1998 appears different from that starting from March 98. There one observes the onset of a massacre activity whose alternating nature is less marked – it is a low frequency RMV regime. It appears as a single RMV campaign, lasting from April to November, increasing in intensity gradually over a three-month period and then decaying




Figure 12: Annual Fluctuations of RMV Events in Algiers, Blida, and Médéa.




Figure 13: Monthly Fluctuations of RMV Events Apr.96-Dec.98.

faster. The peak in this RMV campaign occurs in September 1998 and is of about the same intensity as that registered in the October 1997 terror wave. The terror upsurge of November 98 appears as the onset of a different train of victimisation. Of course, we have made sure that all the structures in figure 13 are not spurious, i.e. invariant under indicator change, by looking at the monthly fluctuations in the number of victims of RMV. The nature, timings, intensities and lifetimes (see figure 32 in section 4.2) coincide exactly with those found in figure 13.

We now decompose the profile in figure 13 into its constituent components to search for patterns in the various perpetration regimes. Figure 14 displays the monthly changes in RMV activities, at a national level, for various death groups.

We find that the massacre activities have a wave character for all death groups. The RMV events with the smallest kill-ratio occur more frequently than those with more than 5 deaths per incident. Note that the January 98 peak shown in figure 13 is composed mainly of massacres with kill-ratios of up to 5 deaths per incident. For massacres with up to 5 deaths per event kill-ratio the peaks coincide with those of the total RMV activity except for November 96, January and August 1997 and April 1998. This type of mass killing peaks when the activities of the two other types of mass killings subside (November 1996 and November 1997). For the larger massacres (more than 10 deaths per episode) the intensity peaks occur synchronously with those of the total activity. The same pattern is found for the massacres with intermediate kill-ratio (6 to 10 deaths per event) except for September 1996, and January and May 1997.

Two remarks can be made about the time correlations of these waves. The three types of massacres erupt simultaneously in July 1996, October 1997 and January 1998 while they subside simultaneously in February 1997 and March 1998. The massacres with the smallest and largest death groups fluctuate synchronously from June 1996 to July 1997, December 1997 to February 1998, and November to December 1998. On the other hand they rise and subside out of phase from August to September 1997 and between July and September 1998. The massacres with 6 to 10 deaths per event and those with a kill-ratio greater than 10 exacerbate and abate in concert from July 1997 to December 1998 and fluctuate anti-synchronously from August to December 1996.

Figure 15 represents the monthly fluctuations in the number of RMV events in the districts of Algiers and Blida. The cyclical structure in the application of this form of mass terror is salient in both situations.

In Algiers we observe 5 prominent RMV campaigns: in July 1996, January,



Figure 14. Monthly Fluctuations of RMV Events by Death Group, Apr.96-Dec.98.




Figure 15: Monthly Fluctuations of RMV Events in Algiers, Blida, and Médéa, Apr.96-Dec.98.

March and May to July 1997, in January 98 and July 98. The lifetimes of the eruptions of terror in 1997 are at least twice longer than those of the two campaigns in 1998. In Blida the two most intense RMV waves occur in January and September 1997 and January 1998. Médéa suffers a less frequent terror campaign than Algiers and Blida but the most intense RMV campaign it sustained was in 1998.

Comparing the RMV activities in Algiers and Blida, we find that they rise and subside in concert from May to August 1996, December 1996 to February 1997, December 1997 to March 1998, and October to December 1998. We also observe that they exacerbate and abate in opposite regimes from August to October and in December 1996, March 1997, and from August to November 1998.

### 3.2.3. Comparison between the SMV and RMV Fluctuations

In order to investigate whether there are correlations in the monthly fluctuations of the SMV and RMV activities, we display in figure 16 their respective profiles, and the curve for their addition.

The intensities of the SMV waves are on the whole larger than those of the RMV type, from November 1996 to April 1998. On the other hand the RMV activity is larger than the SMV from May to October 1996 and from May to




Figure 16: Monthly Fluctuations of SMV and RMV Events Apr:96-Dec:98.

December 1998. We find that the total terror activity (SMV and RMV) has 7 prominent peaks. The first eruption occurs in July 1996 and is denoted P1. This is followed by 3 medium intensity terror waves, in November 1996 (P2), and in January (P3) and April 1997 (P4). The two most intense explosions of terror are in the autumn of 1997 (P5) and in January 1998 (P6). The last atrocity peak spans the June to September 1998 (P7) period.

If we choose the lifetime of a massacre wave as a discriminative criterion, then these seven terror cycles can be classified into 3 categories. P5 and P7 have a similar lifetime, about 4 months, and are the longest massacre outbursts in the campaign. P2, P3 and P6 appear as the most transient cycles of atrocities with a comparable lifetime of about 2 months. The P1 and P4 trains of massacres appear with intermediate lifetimes between those found for the above limiting classes of terror waves.

Another important observation to make is that for the long lived outbursts of atrocities (P5, P7 and P4) the perpetrators of the selective and random mass killings exacerbate and abate their campaigns out of phase. In the case of the most transient ones (P2, P3 and P6) they do so synchronously. In other words we find a correspondence between the lifetimes of the terror waves and the regimes of perpetration of the two types of mass killings. This correspondence is not spurious as it manifests itself also in the monthly fluctuations of the numbers of victims (see figure 33 in section 4.2).

Such highly structured correlations between the SMV and RMV activities raise many intriguing questions about the nature of the perpetrators and strategies that are likely to have caused them; these issues are outside the scope of this paper.

Note that we also looked at the correlations between the monthly fluctuations of the SMV and RMV activities by death group. We considered all possible cross-combinations between the activities for small, medium and large magnitude massacres of the SMV type and those of different magnitudes of the RMV type. The main findings agree with the above results; since a detailed discussion would be rather lengthy it will not be presented here.

### **3.3. Geography of the Massacres**

We consider first the district and borough distributions of both types of massacres. The political geography of the massacres is discussed next (3.3.2). Brief comments about the military and economic geographies are made in section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. We devote section 3.3.5 to presenting a 'radiography' of a few notorious massacre sites.

*3.3.1. District and Borough Distributions*

We present the national distribution of SMV episodes in figure 17 and that of RMV events in figure 18. In each case, we cover the span from 1992 to 1998 and report only the 13 most targeted out of 33 affected districts included in tables A and B in the appendix.

The highest SMV and RMV massacre activities appear localised in the three central districts of Algiers, Blida and Médéa. These central districts sustained 42.7 % of the national SMV activity and 54.7 % of the national RMV activity, from 1992 to 1998. There are however qualitative differences in the application of these two types of mass terror. Médéa, a mainly rural district, sustained more SMV activity than Algiers but the least number of random mass killings. Algiers, the capital and an urban centre, suffered the most intense RMV campaign and the least number of selective mass killings. Blida, an intermediate district lying geographically between the two, bore the second most intense RMV activity but the highest selective mass killings.

The contiguous westward districts of Tipaza and Ain Defla and the far Western district of Tlemcen underwent a smaller terror activity roughly of about the same size. The remaining mass victimisation events perpetrated in the past 7 years are fragmented among the remaining 27 districts.

The pie chart in figure 19 depicts now the distribution of the total SMV plus RMV events registered over 33 districts from 1992 to 1998.

Adding both types of mass terror one finds that, apart from a reordering in the degrees of total victimisation, one reaches the same conclusion as that reached from figures 17 and 18: Algiers, Blida and Médéa are the worst affected districts, suffering about 50 % of the total national massacre activity.

We display on map 1 the district distribution of the total SMV and RMV activities reported from 1992 to 1998. Clearly the central and Western districts went through most of the terror. The Eastern districts, with the exception of Bouira, appear safe. The South of the country is untouched by the terror. Map 1 does not give any indication as to when the mass terror appeared and how it diffused into different parts of the territory. The profile of the displacement of the terror can be constructed by looking at the annual fluctuations of the mass killings by district. The main trends are as follows.

In 1996 the bulk of the SMV activity was concentrated in the central districts in the north. In 1997 it exacerbated in this region and diffused westwards. In 1998 the SMV activity ebbed away throughout the affected areas except in Bouira, East of Algiers, Ain-Defla, West of Médéa, and in two pockets in the west (Relizane and Tlemcen).






Figure 17: District Distribution of SMV Events.




Figure 18: District Distribution of RMV Events.





Figure 19: District Distribution of SMV and RMV Events.

In 1995 and 1996 the RMV activity was localised in the centre–north of the country. In 1997 the activity shot up in Algiers, Blida, Médéa, Ain-Defla and in Tlemcen, in the west. Oran, Mascara and Saida went through an increase of 3 units respectively. Tipaza on the other hand registered a drop in random mass killings. The overall trend is a displacement westward. In 1998 the terror receded in Algiers, Blida, Oran and Tlemcen but it diffused further to the contiguous districts of Médéa, Ain-Defla and Mascara.

We now seek to analyse more finely the space distribution of the SMV and RMV massacres in the central districts. The borough distributions of the total SMV and RMV activities in the Algiers district are displayed in figure 20. Again, we integrated the activities over the 1992 to 1998 span.

El-Harrach and Algiers city centre are the two most affected boroughs in this district as they record the highest SMV plus RMV activity. Except for El-Harrach, the boroughs sustain higher RMV than SMV activities. El Harrach is a large borough that includes sub-urban and rural zones; it suffers equal selective and random mass victimisations. The borough of Algiers, which includes the city centre, undergoes a mainly RMV campaign.

Except for Bir-Mourad-Rais, we do not have accurate enough maps to probe the massacre distributions within the boroughs. In the case of Bir-Mourad-Rais, both types of terror targeted mainly the poor and middle-class sub-urban areas of Bouzareah, Beni-Messous El-Biar and Birkhadem. The more affluent



Map 1: National Distribution of Selective plus Random Mass Killings.




Figure 20: Borough Distributions of SMV and RMV Events in Algiers.

shopping and residential areas of Hydra, and Le Golf, where leading members of the government and state administration live, were not targeted by either form of terror.

Figure 21 now shows the analogous borough distributions of the SMV and RMV massacres in the district of Blida.<sup>F</sup> Blida, Larbaa and Boufarik are the most targeted districts. The borough of Larbaa, which has a predominantly sub-urban and rural character, sustains the largest number of SMV massacres and a relatively small number of random mass killings, mainly in the Larbaa town. Blida town and Boufarik sustain the inverse kind of mass-terror assault.

### *3.3.2. Political Geography of the Massacres*

By 'political geography' of the massacres we refer to the analysis of political identity as an important determinant of the geographical distribution of the massacres over the national territory. Here we seek to determine the political identities of the victimised districts and find out whether there are correlations between these identities and the district distribution of the massacres.

To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive, valid and reliable survey of political opinion at a national level, if published at all, is publicly accessible.

<sup>F</sup> There are seven spots of massacres that we were not able to assign to specific boroughs partly because of ever shifting borough borders and conflicting information about their distribution. These massacres occurred at Ouled Chebel, Yemma Mghite, Ouled Benaissa, Bouirat, Bensalah and Mactaa Lazrag (see table A in the appendix for more details).




Figure 21: Borough Distributions of SMV and RMV Events in Blida.

Short of this means, we shall use the results of recent local and parliamentary elections as indicators of political identity. Assuming an election is free, it is a form of consultation of opinion, albeit constitutionally binding, on the values, ends and means of political life. Since a constituency is a group of people identified in terms of an existing socio-political and territorial relation, the elected members of local councils and the parliament may be regarded as personal embodiments of the political identity and unity of constituencies. Of course, the validity and reliability of election results as quantifiable surrogates of political identity very much depend on the representativeness, the methods of management, voting and counting, and on the morality of such elections.

Two sets of election results are used here. We take the local election of 12 June 1990 and the parliamentary election of 26 December 1991, i.e. the most recent results before the military coup of 12 January 1992 and the ensuing civil war and phenomenon of massacres. The second set includes the parliamentary elections of 5 June 1997 and the local elections of 23 October 1997, the only polls since the coup and in the midst of the most intense campaign of massacres so far. The political geography of the massacres is analysed first using the results of local elections and then those of the parliamentary elections.

### **3.3.2a. Analysis using Local Election Results**

To determine the political identities of the victimised districts and explore correlations between victimisation and political identity we construct tables that list all districts in decreasing degree of mass victimisation against the corresponding results at the local elections of 12 June 1990 and 23 October 1997.

Table 1A lists the election results for the districts that have suffered more than 5 massacres while table 1B shows the remaining districts, including those for which no massacre has been reported.

For the local elections of 12 June 1990, the tables have two entries as political identity indicators. For any given district, one column gives the number of municipalities gained by the FIS out of the total number of municipalities competed for while the other reports the corresponding fraction gained by the FLN and the RCD. This selection is grounded on the fact that the FIS, the FLN and the RCD won 853, 487 and 87 municipalities, respectively, out of the 1 539 competed for. The remaining 106 municipalities were gained by independent candidates.<sup>56</sup>

Table 1A: Results of Local Elections versus Degree of Victimisation.

District	Massacres	Deaths	June 1990 Local Elections		October 1997 Local Elections	
			FIS	FLN+RCD	MSP+MN	RND+FLN
Blida	113	2476	29/29	0/29	57/257	110/257
Algiers	106	1495	33/33	0/33	118/675	118/675
Medea	81	1643	46/64	14/64	23/500	456/500
Tipaza	40	381	28/42	10/42	13/236	117/236
Ain-Defla	38	631	30/36	3/36	23/316	279/316
Tlemcen	35	353	46/53	7/53	28/445	398/445
Tiaret	24	393	17/42	22/42	16/350	298/350
Saida	24	305	9/16	7/16	13/134	116/134
Bouira	17	267	25/45	16/45	15/367	254/367
Chlef	16	356	31/35	3/35	46/335	260/335
Mascara	14	116	36/47	8/47	18/379	344/379
Djelfa	13	218	14/36	16/36	16/300	259/300
Laghouat	12	138	6/24	16/24	31/182	137/182
Oran	11	144	24/26	0/26	36/244	187/244
Relizane	10	1113	38/38	0/38	0/328	328/328
Bel Abbes	9	89	38/52	11/52	15/394	352/394
Tizi-Ouzou	9	54	2/67	61/67	1/579	66/579
Boumerdes	7	103	36/38	2/38	23/280	207/280
Msila	7	90	22/47	18/47	51/385	316/385

Table 1B: Results of Local Elections versus Degree of Victimization (contd).

District	Massacres	Deaths	June 1990 Local Elections		October 1997 Local Elections	
			FIS	FLN+RCD	MSP+MN	RND+FLN
Tissemsilt	4	43	15/22	7/22	1/174	159/174
Mostaghanem	4	78	28/32	3/32	18/284	247/284
Constantine	4	21	12/12	0/12	20/137	110/137
Batna	3	109	35/61	25/61	14/483	461/483
Bejaia	3	13	1/52	48/52	2/446	54/446
Tebessa	3	13	5/28	16/28	35/240	185/240
El-Oued	2	18	11/30	13/30	49/250	153/250
Setif	2	9	38/60	17/60	34/532	433/532
Annaba	2	9	8/12	3/12	11/131	116/131
Jijel	2	6	28/28	0/28	32/254	216/254
El Tarf	1	18	8/24	16/24	0/184	180/184
Ghardaia	1	12	0/13	8/13	11/117	74/117
Bordj Bou-Areridj	1	11	15/34	18/34	36/277	231/277
Bechar	1	11	2/21	19/21	28/165	126/165
Guelma	1	8	13/34	17/34	48/252	181/252
Adrar	1	7	2/28	25/28	24/210	172/210
Oum-Bouaghi	1	7	16/29	9/29	14/239	216/239
Mila	0	0	30/32	1/32	42/278	228/278
Skikda	0	0	27/38	7/38	54/323	265/323
Biskra	0	0	11/33	19/33	33/222	178/222
Naama	0	0	4/12	5/12	16/92	65/92
Khenchela	0	0	5/21	13/21	15/160	143/160
Ouargla	0	0	4/21	17/21	42/175	124/175
Souk Ahras	0	0	4/26	17/26	32/201	154/201
Tindouf	0	0	0/2	0/2	4/16	11/16
Tamenrasset	0	0	0/10	9/10	5/80	72/80
Illizi	0	0	0/6	6/6	3/42	37/42

To what extent are the results of these local elections valid and reliable as political identity indicators? Algeria's system of local government involves a system of communal councils known as Communal Popular Assembly (*baladiyat*) which are responsible for local administration, economy, finance, social and cultural affairs, and planning. In the June 1990 elections the number of seats in communal councils was determined by proportional representation. The average national turnout was 65.15%.<sup>57</sup> Regarding the morality of this election, it was widely reported free from mass intimidation and corrupt practices. For instance, Stone comments that

It was notable as the first occasion on which Algerian civil society had become apparent and for the unprecedented freedom of expression allowed in the media: it was the first time, too, that Algerians were able to vote for political parties other than the FLN. After repeated delays to allow the newly established parties to prepare, the government adopted a system of proportional representation, a clear attempt to protect the in-built advantage enjoyed by the FLN.<sup>58</sup>

Now with regards to the local elections of 23 October 1997 the tables have two entries for each district. One entry is for the sum of municipal seats gained by the MSP and the MN over the total number of allocated seats. The other entry stands for the corresponding fraction gained by the RND and the FLN. This choice is motivated by the fact that these 4 parties won 86 % of the total number of municipal seats: the RND, FLN, MSP and MN gained 7 242, 2 864, 890 and 290 seats, respectively, out of the 13 123 municipal seats in competition.<sup>6</sup> The MSP and the MN results are aggregated together because a) they share Islamist political values and ends, b) the FIS being banned following the military coup, it seems plausible that part of the FIS electorate would express its political opinions and interests through these two parties. The RND and the FLN results are combined together owing to a) the congruence of their conservative political orientations and b) their being widely regarded as unrepresentative, state-sponsored corporate political vehicles of the military establishment. The FFS and RCD results are not included in the table as these parties are circumscribed to only a few districts, in the *Kabyle* area, and, as will be clear in a moment, their inclusion or omission in the analysis does not affect the conclusions anyway.

What are the validity and reliability of these local election results as measures of the political identities of the respective constituencies? The number of seats per communal council of the 23 October 1997 elections was determined

<sup>6</sup> The results were officially published in number of seats. The FFS, the RCD and the independent candidates gained 645, 508 and 444 seats respectively. The remaining 240 seats were fragmented among 28 tiny parties.



by proportional representation. The official figure for the average national turnout was 66.19 %. The electoral morality of this poll was reported to be questionable. Interior minister Mostefa Benmansour declared that the poll had been conducted in 'normal conditions' and the 'voters elected freely' their representatives while the government television, radio and press commended its 'perfect organisation', 'good conditions' and 'perfect security conditions'. This account was contested by the MSP, the MN, the FFS, the RCD, the PT and the PRA. They denounced 'electoral gangsterism', 'massive fraud' and organised protest demonstrations.<sup>H</sup> Mass intimidation of the voters was also a contentious issue as the FFS had denounced the aggravation of the mass terror earlier in October (see corresponding SMV and RMV activities in figures 7, 8 and 13) and the MSP objected to the visibility of the armed militias, a 200 000 strong force mostly affiliated to, or closely identified with, the RND, during the poll.

Having clarified the meaning, scope and limit of these election results as political identity indicators, we are now in a position to explore how they correlate with the degree of victimisation of districts.

Consider the relations with the June 1990 results first. A quick glance at the top of table 1A and at the bottom of table 1B shows that the most victimised districts have a high proportion of FIS municipalities whereas the least victimised districts tend to have a small fraction of FIS municipalities. Except for Ghardaia, none of the victimised district has a zero proportion of FIS municipalities. This suggests the stronger a constituency's allegiance to the FIS, the greater the degree of its victimisation. Similarly, the top of table 1A and the bottom of table 1B indicate that the districts with a high number of massacres have a small fraction of FLN and RCD municipalities whereas those with a small number of massacres or no massacres tend to have a higher proportion of FLN and RCD municipalities. This suggests the stronger a constituency's allegiance to the FLN and the RCD, the smaller the degree of its victimisation.

On closer scrutiny these generalisations break down for some districts. For example, the constituencies of Relizane (in table 1A) and Jijel (in table 1B) voted FIS in all the municipalities yet they have suffered less massacres than, say, the district of Tipaza which had a smaller fraction of FIS municipalities. The districts of Skikda and Mila (in table 1B) have not been victimised yet their proportions of FIS municipalities are larger than that of Saida, for instance, which has born the brunt of 22 massacres. The general inference that constitu-

<sup>H</sup> These parties objected to 'the "stuffing" of the ballot boxes, the misappropriation of proxies, the counting of votes after the expulsion of scrutineers, the bias of the administration, the defects in the electoral reports, and the threats, pressures and assaults against candidates'. See *Le Monde* 28 October 1997.

ency allegiance to the FLN and RCD is inversely proportional to the degree of victimisation is also contradicted for some districts. For example, the constituency of Tiaret had a stronger allegiance to the FLN than that, say, of Oran or Jijel, yet it suffered a higher degree of victimisation.

In the case of the district of Jijel, we know that the degree of victimisation indicated in table 1B does not correspond to the actual one. As was pointed out earlier in section 2, several credible sources reported napalm attacks against villagers in this district and historian Harbi reported that 'hundreds' had been massacred in Oued Askar in 1992 but no accurate enough data have been published yet.<sup>59</sup> It seems unlikely though that the exceptions to the two approximate generalisations stem from incompleteness of the data. A more plausible interpretation of these odd cases is that political allegiance to the FIS is just one determinant of victimisation, albeit important, in competition with other likely factors such as the population density and distribution, the military geography and the economic geography of the victimised districts. Some of these issues are discussed in section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4.

One way of summarising the main trend shown by the tables is to look at the relation between constituency allegiance to the FIS, on the one hand, and victimisation by classes of districts of comparable degree of victimisation, rather than by individual district, on the other. Let the districts in table 1A and 1B be partitioned into 6 classes of districts (called henceforth zones) this way: 1) Blida, Algiers and Médéa (more than 50 massacres), 2) Tipaza, Ain-Defla, Tlemcen, Tiaret and Saida (more than 20 and less than 50 massacres), 3) Bouira, Chlef, Mascara, Bouira, Djelfa, Laghouat and Oran (more than 10 and less than 20 massacres), 4) Relizane, Sidi Bel-Abbes, Tizi-Ouzou, Boumerdes and Msila (more than 5 and less than 10 massacres), 5) the districts with at least one and less than 5 massacres, and finally 6) the districts with no massacre. Each of these 6 zones can be assigned a victimisation indicator, say the average number of massacres per constituent district calculated by dividing the total number of massacres in the zone by the number of constituent districts. The average number of massacres per constituent district is 100 in zone 1, 32 in zone 2, 14 in zone 3, 8 in zone 4, 2 in zone 5 and 0 in zone 6. These zones can also be ascribed a political indicator, for example the total number of municipalities gained by FIS over the total number of contested municipalities in the zone, or the corresponding fraction gained by the FLN and the RCD in the zone. In zone 1, the fraction of FIS municipalities is 108/126 while that of the FLN and the RCD is 14/126, in zone 2 they are 130/189 and 49/189, respectively, and so on for the remaining zones. Figure 22 shows how the degree of victimisation of the zones varies with the corresponding percentage of FIS municipi-




Figure 22: Percentage of Municipalities by Degree of Victimization (June 1990 Local Elections).

palities per zone and that of the FLN and the RCD per zone. The two sets of indicators show that a) the stronger a zone's allegiance to the FIS, the greater the degree of its victimisation and b) the stronger a zone's allegiance to the FLN and the RCD, the smaller the degree of its victimisation.

This correlation between political allegiance and victimisation corroborates the same observations made by a few human rights monitors such as Amnesty International which pointed out that 'there is little protection for the population in the areas where the massacres have taken place, areas where large numbers had voted for the now banned Islamic Salvation Front in the 1990 and 1991 elections.'<sup>60</sup> It is also perhaps the intuitive recognition of this political geography of the mass killings that motivates some Algerian social scientists terming the massacre 'electoral cleansing'. In an open letter to French intellectuals supporting Algeria's regime, sociologist Addi, historian Harbi and economist Talahite wrote:

That Bernard-Henri Lévy and André Glucksman get involved in the Algerian conflict is a good thing. The only problem is that they aligned themselves with the Algerian eradicators and this will not help end the conflict. In Algeria, the eradicators are very much a minority trend despite promotions in the media that are inversely proportional

to their rootlessness in society. They support unconditionally the most hardline faction of the army and are masters in the manipulation of the language of democracy to be acceptable to the Parisian editorial rooms they use as resonators. On the basis of a false assessment of the political and ideological situation of the country, they choose the military option regardless of its consequences.

The question they have always been asked and for which they have no answer is: to solve the problem, should we eradicate totally the Islamist electorate, that is to say advocate what is called electoral genocide or electoral cleansing in Algeria? The strategy of demonization leads us straight to it and legitimises the worst human rights violations and other denials of justice.<sup>61</sup>

We now turn to the political geography of the massacres on the basis of the October 1997 local election results. In order to have a global perspective of the situation we also plot in figure 23 the degrees of victimisation of the 6 zones against their respective percentages of MSP and MN municipal seats per zone as well as against the corresponding percentages gained by the RND and the FLN. First, if one regards these election results as valid, then figure 23 indicates that a large proportion of the FIS constituencies have reversed their political identities in between the local elections since, instead of expressing their Islamist political opinions and interests through legal Islamist parties (the MSP and the MN), they gave allegiance to the pro-military and conservative parties (RND and FLN). The case of Relizane is the most striking. As shown in table




Figure 23: Percentage of Municipalities by Degree of Victimisation (October 1997 Elections).

1A and 1B, there is no single district, victimised or not, that has a percentage of MSP plus MN municipal seats higher than the corresponding one for the RND plus the FLN. Figure 23 also implies that the relations of proportionality between degree of victimisation and party political allegiance is not borne by figure 22. The percentages of MSP and MN municipal seats per zone are always smaller than those for the RND and the FLN regardless of the average number of massacres per constituent district.

Clearly the correlations between the victimisation of districts and their political identities are radically different depending on whether they are inferred from the local elections of June 1990 or those of October 1997. Taking the view that the results of the October 1997 poll are valid and reliable incurs the burden of reconciling the two contradictory political geographies of the massacres. If one regards the latter as invalid, as warranted by its dubious morality record, no contradiction occurs since the results are not indicators of actual political identities of constituencies. A complete account, within this view, would however also require some explanation of these results as prescriptions of a wider political and military counter-insurgency strategy of the incumbent authorities. Although we take the view that the October 97 poll is invalid, we shall not deal with these questions here.

### ***3.3.2b. Analysis using Parliamentary Election Results***

Tables 2A and 2B report all the districts in decreasing degree of victimisation against their respective results at the parliamentary elections of 26 December 1991 and 5 June 1997.

The election results for the districts that have sustained more than 5 massacres are given in table 2A. The remainders are reported in table 2B.

The political identity indicators based on the December 91 poll are, for any given district, the number of seats won by the FIS over the total number of seats decided outright in the first round and the respective fraction captured by the FLN and FFS. Empty entries in the tables, say for the district of Tissemsilt for example, correspond to cases where no single seat was decided in the first round. This presentation rests on the facts that the second round was cancelled and the FIS, FFS and FLN won 188, 26 and 15 seats, respectively, out of a total of 231 decided outright at the first round.<sup>62</sup> On the basis of the relative proportions of the votes of the undecided seats, the FIS, FLN and FFS were in favourable positions in 144, 44 and 4 constituencies, respectively, out of the 199 seats left for the second round.<sup>63</sup>

Table 2A: Results of Parliamentary Elections versus Degree of Victimisation.

District	Massacres	Deaths	Dec. 1991 Legislative Elections		Jun. 1997 Legislative Elections	
			FIS	FLN+RCD	MSP+MN	RND+FLN
Blida	113	2476	9/9	0/9	4/11	7/11
Algiers	106	1495	16/16	0/16	7/24	9/24
Medea	81	1643	9/9	0/9	3/10	6/10
Tipaza	40	381	3/3	0/3	2/10	6/10
Ain-Defla	38	631	8/8	0/8	2/8	5/8
Tlemcen	35	353	7/8	1/8	3/11	6/11
Tiaret	24	393	4/4	0/4	2/9	7/9
Saida	24	305	1/2	1/2	1/4	3/4
Bouira	17	267	6/7	1/7	1/8	5/8
Chlef	16	356	9/9	0/9	4/10	6/10
Mascara	14	116	7/7	0/7	3/9	5/9
Djelfa	13	218	5/5	0/5	1/8	7/8
Laghouat	12	138	1/2	1/2	1/4	3/4
Oran	11	144	11/11	0/11	6/14	6/14
Relizane	10	1113	8/8	0/8	0/9	9/9
Bel Abbes	9	89	2/2	0/2	2/7	5/7
Tizi-Ouzou	9	54	0/12	12/12	0/8	0/8
Boumerdes	7	103	6/6	0/6	3/11	6/11
Msila	7	90	9/10	1/10	4/10	6/10

What are the validity and reliability parameters of these data? The voting system was a single-member majority election in two rounds to choose 430 members for *al-majlis al-Watani al-shaabi* (the National Popular Assembly). The distribution of constituencies was prescribed by a law that favoured the geographic representation over the demographic one. Referring to this law, human rights lawyer Ali-Yahia observed that

The number of seats has been increased in Kabylia and the South because the FIS did not obtain a favourable score [there] in the poll of 12 June 1990. The urban areas dominated by the FIS are under-represented and those of the South are over-represented because, according to the government, one needs to bring the voters closer to

Table 2B: Results of Parliamentary Elections versus Degree of Victimization (contd).

District	Massacres	Deaths	Dec. 1991 Legislative Elections		Jun. 1997 Legislative Elections	
			FIS	FLN+RCD	MSP+MN	RND+FLN
Tissemsilt	4	43			0/4	3/4
Mostaghanem	4	78	1/1	0/1	2/8	6/8
Constantine	4	21	8/8	0/8	3/10	7/10
Batna	3	109	8/8	0/8	2/12	10/12
Bejaia	3	13	0/11	11/11	1/11	0/11
Tebessa	3	13			3/6	3/6
El-Oued	2	18	3/4	1/4	0/6	6/6
Setif	2	9	13/14	1/14	5/16	10/16
Annaba	2	9			4/7	3/7
Jijel	2	6	7/7	0/7	2/7	5/7
El Tarf	1	18	0/1	1/1	1/4	3/4
Ghardaia	1	12	1/5	1/5	1/4	2/4
Bordj Bou-Areridj	1	11	4/4	0/4	3/7	4/7
Bechar	1	11			1/4	3/4
Guelma	1	8			2/5	3/5
Adrar	1	7	0/3	3/3	1/4	3/4
Oum-Bouaghi	1	7	4/4	0/4	1/6	5/6
Mila	0	0	8/8	0/8	4/8	4/8
Skikda	0	0	1/1	0/1	4/9	5/9
Biskra	0	0	4/4	0/4	1/4	3/4
Naama	0	0	1/1	0/1	2/4	2/4
Khenchela	0	0	0/1	1/1	1/4	3/4
Ouargla	0	0	4/4	0/4	2/5	3/5
Souk Ahras	0	0			2/4	2/4
Tindouf	0	0			0/4	3/4
Tamenrasset	0	0	0/2	2/2	1/4	3/4
Illizi	0	0	0/3	3/3	1/4	2/4

the representatives. Depending on the constituencies, a member of the national assembly may represent from 6 800 up to 85 000 inhabitants.<sup>64</sup>

The average national turnout was 58.55 %.<sup>65</sup> The elections were regarded as largely free from corrupt practices. A few political parties and newspapers did report complaints of electoral irregularities. Ali-Yahia however contended that

the parties and associations which threw doubt upon the transparency of the poll and claimed it had been marred by massive fraud were not able to present any tangible evidence or documents testifying to the truth of their allegations to the Constitutional Court which they had asked to invalidate the election. Press disinformation had led public opinion to expect a large number of invalidation. The Constitutional Court did not however publish its adjudication on the complaints because there were only a few of them.<sup>66</sup>

These elections were also reported free from violence and mass intimidation.<sup>67</sup>

Tables 2A and 2B have two entries for the parliamentary election of 5 June 1997. For each district, the first entry is for the sum of seats won by the MSP and MN over the total number of allocated seats while the second entry shows the corresponding fraction gained by the RND and FLN. These parties are picked out because altogether they won 84.5 % of the total number of parliamentary seats: the RND, FLN, MSP and MN gained 156, 62, 69 and 34 seats, respectively, out of the 380 contested seats.<sup>68</sup> The reasons for aggregating the MSP results with those of the MN and doing the same for the RND and FLN are the same as those discussed for the 1997 local elections.

The facts that gauge the validity and reliability of these election results as quantifiable surrogates of the political identities of constituencies are as follows. The method of voting was based on proportional representation. This was prescribed by a new electoral law introduced on 16 February 1997 by the army-appointed Conseil National de Transition. It decreed a distribution of constituencies taking into account demographic proportionality. The average national turnout was 65.6 %. The morality of this election was contentious. The interior minister declared that the poll 'had not been stained by any irregularity' and was 'a big progress in the consecration of democracy and the rule of law'; he rejected the allegations of fraud as 'politicking'.<sup>69</sup> The FFS, RCD, MN, and the MSP in particular, denounced 'generalised fraud', the 'suspect inflation of the number of itinerant polling stations', the impossibility to scrutinise the votes in the barracks of the army, police and firemen, and the 'expulsion of scrutineers during the counting of votes'.<sup>70</sup> The Arab League observers commended the 'transparency' of the poll but the UN observers cancelled the



press conference they had planned and issued a statement denouncing the same irregularities and the 'lack of independence and freedom of movement' they had encountered in performing their task.<sup>71</sup> Several parties objected to the intimidating visibility of the armed militias. To gauge the mass terror in the months preceding the election one may look up the SMV and RMV activities in figures 7, 8 and 13.

Given these two sets of political identity indicators, how do they correlate with the victimisation of districts? In the case of the December 1991 poll, the top of table 2A and the bottom of table 2B suggest that the most victimised districts have a high fraction of FIS parliamentary seats while for the least victimised districts this fraction tends to be small. The FLN and FFS entry at the top of table 2A and the bottom of table 2B indicates that the districts with a high number of massacres have a small proportion of FLN and FFS seats while those with lower victimisation or no massacre tend to have a higher proportion of FLN and FFS seats.

In between these limits, these inferences do not strictly hold. Relizane and Jijel voted FIS in all constituencies yet they registered less massacres than, for instance, the district of Bouira which has a smaller proportion of FIS seats. Ouargla and Mila (in table 2B) have not been victimised yet their fractions of FIS seats are larger than that of Saida, which suffered 22 massacres. The earlier suggestion that constituency allegiance to FLN and FFS is inversely proportional to the number of massacres is also contradicted in some districts. For example, the district of Saida has a stronger allegiance to the FLN than that of Oran or Jijel yet it sustained a higher number of mass killings. As was pointed out in section 3.3.2a, political allegiance to the FIS should be regarded as a determinant of victimisation in competition with other factors related to the demography, military geography and economic geography of the victimised districts.

To summarise this trend which holds for classes of districts (and not strictly for every district) the districts in table 2A and 2b are partitioned into 5 zones: 1) Blida, Algiers and Médéa (more than 50 massacres), 2) Tipaza, Ain-Defla, Tlemcen, Tiaret and Saida (more than 20 and less than 50 massacres), 3) the districts with at least 5 and less than 20 massacres, 4) the districts with at least 2 and less than 5 massacres, and 5) the districts with less than 2 massacres. The average number of massacres per constituent district is 100 in zone 1, 32 in zone 2, 11 in zone 3, 3 in zone 4 and 0.4 in zone 5. The proportion of FIS seats is 34/34 in zone 1, 23/25 in zone 2, 64/79 in zone 3, 40/53 in zone 4 and 27/41 in zone 5. The fraction of FLN and FFS seats is 0/34 in zone 1, 2/25 in zone 2, 15/79 in zone 3, 13/53 in zone 4 and 11/41 in zone 5.

Figure 24 displays the variation of the degree of victimisation of zones with their percentages of FIS parliamentary seats per zone and the respective fractions of FLN and RCD seats per zone. The two sets of average indicators show that a) the stronger a zone's allegiance to the FIS, the greater the degree of its victimisation and b) the stronger a zone's allegiance to the FLN or the FFS, the smaller the degree of its victimisation.




Figure 24: Percentage of Parliamentary Seats by Degree of Victimisation (December 1991 Elections)

Consider now the political identity of the victimised districts on the basis of the June 1997 election results. We report in figure 25 the average number of massacres per constituent district of the 5 zones against their respective percentages of 1) MSP and MN parliamentary seats per zone and 2) RND and the FLN parliamentary seats per zone. Allowing for the different mathematics of representation (compared with the December 1991 elections) and the most favourable assumption in terms of participation, this summary does suggest that a large fraction of the FIS constituencies have reversed their allegiance in between the parliamentary elections. The reversal in the district of Relizane is most dramatic. Except for the district of Bejaia dominated by the FFS and RCD, there is no single district, victimised or otherwise, that has a percentage of MSP plus MN parliamentary seats higher than the respective one for the RND plus FLN. Figure 25 also shows that the relations of proportionality




Figure 25: Percentage of Parliamentary Seats by Degree of Victimization  
(June 1997 Elections)


between the victimisation of classes of districts and party political allegiance shown in figure 24 do not emerge here. The percentages of MSP and MN parliamentary seats per zone is systematically smaller than those of the RND and the FLN, independently of the average number of massacres per constituent district.

The way one resolves the inconsistencies between figures 24 and 25 depends on one's views about the validity of the June 1997 election results.

### 3.3.3. Military Geography of the Massacres

Territorially, Algeria is divided into six numbered military regions. The headquarters of each military district (MD) is located in a principal city as shown on map 2. This division was originally laid down by the revolutionary leaders of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN – Army of National Liberation) in 1954; they subdivided each region (*wilaya*) into zones, areas and sectors. This territorial organisation was maintained after independence to prevent and counter popular insurgencies centred in the six districts.

The map shows that the largest volume of mass terror is perpetrated in the



Map 2: Distribution of Massacres by Military District.

1st MD: 468 selective and random mass killings, that is 75.2 % of the total victimisation events. This MD includes the districts of Blida, Algiers, Médéa, Tipaza, Ain-Defla which, as indicated on map 1, have suffered the most active campaigns of massacres. The populations living within the borders of the 2nd MD, such as those of Tlemcen, Saida, Oran, Relizane and Sidi Bel-Abbas, bear the next degree of victimisation: 107 mass killings or 17.2 % of the total victimisation incidents. The numbers of massacres for the other MDs is given at the bottom of map 2. The civilians living within the borders of the 3rd MD, in the South-West, and the 6th MD, in the South, have been rather spared from the mass terror.

The current military commander of the 1st MD is major general Rabah Boughaba. Boughaba is said to be affiliated to the 'conciliator' faction. Boughaba was appointed to this post in October 1997 in the midst of one of the worst waves of massacres (see the SMV activity in figure 7). He had been the com-

mander of the 5th MD at the time and was transferred to the 1st MD after general-president Zeroual and his faction demanded that major general Said Bey, the commander of the 1st MD then, be relieved of his command. Major general Bey, reported to be a 'most hawkish eradicator' very close to chief of staff Mohamed Lamari, had commanded the 1st MD since May 1994; earlier he had been in charge of the 3<sup>rd</sup> MD. Before May 1994 the commander of the 1st MD was major general Mohamed Djenouhate. Djenouhate had been appointed to this position in December 1988 as part of the promotions, transfers and purges that followed the 'disproportionate' response of the army to the October 1988 civilian unrest.<sup>1</sup> Djenouhate was a colonel at the time and was promoted to the rank of major general few months after the military coup of 1992.

The current commander of the 2nd MD is major general Kamal Abderahmane. Abderahmane has been reported to be an affiliate of the 'conciliator' faction and a close confidant of Zeroual. He had been the director of the security of the armies and was appointed to this command in June 1996. He took over from major general Mohamed Bekkouche who had been in command since 1995. Up to 1995, major general Khelifa Rahim was the commander of the 2nd MD. The factional affiliation of the latter two generals, if any, is not known.

The present commander of the 4th MD is major general Abdelmajid Sahheb. He took over the command of this region in June 1996. 'Conciliator' major general Fodhil Saidi had been its commander since 1995; he was reportedly murdered on 7 June 1996, as he was about to take office of principal private defence secretary of general-president Zeroual. Up to 1995, the commander of the 4th MD was general Mohamed Bekkouche.

The current commander of the 5th MD is major general Abdelhamid Djouadi. Djouadi is a cadet of the French army reported to be a staunch 'eradicator'. He was appointed to this command in October 1997 after it was vacated by the transfer of major general Rabah Boughaba to the command of the 1st MD. This appointment was a resumption of his earlier command as Djouadi had been in charge of the 5th MD up to 1995.

<sup>1</sup> On the evening of 4 October 1988 thousands of youths went on rampage in Bab-el-Oued, an under-privileged suburb of Algiers. The unrest spread to other cities and continued for 3 days after which the state of siege was declared. Estimates of victims range from 300 to 500. On 10 October the army fired indiscriminately on a gathering of youths, in Bab-el-Oued, killing 40 people in a single incident. There were 3 500 arrests, many of them children; a large number of the detainees were brutally tortured. See Collectif Suisse de Solidarité avec le Peuple Algérien, *Contre les Violences de l'Etat: Les Droits de l'Homme*, CSSPA, Lausanne 1988, chapters 4-7.

The current commander of the 3rd MD is major general Zoubir Ghedaïdia. Ghedaïdia is affiliated to the 'eradicator' faction. He took over the command of this region in May 1995 from 'conciliator' major general Benhadid who had been its earlier commander. At the moment the 6th MD is under the command of major general Belkacem Qadri who has been in charge since 1995.

Referring to the extent of military concentration in the targeted areas, Amnesty International stated that 'most of the massacres took place near the capital, Algiers, and in the Blida and Médéa regions, in the most militarised part of the country.'<sup>72</sup> Most of the counter-insurgency combat units are concentrated in the 1st MD, 2nd MD and 5th MD. The backbone of this regular force is an elite anti-guerrilla corps, advised and trained by French, South-African and American advisors and mercenaries.<sup>73</sup> This corps was estimated to be 60 000 strong in 1995.<sup>74</sup> It is commanded by major-general Fodhil Cherif. The Co-ordination of the Security of the Territory (Coordination de la Sécurité du Territoire) co-ordinates their operations with other regular forces such as the 140 000 strong Army, the Air-force, the Gendarmerie Nationale, military intelligence (DRS) and the Sureté Nationale. Not much has been reported about the concentrations of the normal combat units of the Army but its priorities are combating the insurgency (1st, 2nd and 5th MDs), protecting the oil and gas fields and pipelines (6th, 2nd and 5th), and watching the Moroccan borders (2nd and 3rd MDs). In addition to these regular forces, the regime fields three types of paramilitary forces. The first type involves death squads such as the OJAL (the organisation of free Algerian youths) and the OSRA (organisation for the safeguard of the Algerian republic).

The current number of these death squads is unknown but major general Betchine disclosed in September 1997 that in 1992 major general Larbi Belkhair and Khaled Nezzar had already created 300 covert death squads.<sup>75</sup> The second type of irregular proxies is a 200 000 army-trained and sponsored militia force that divides into self-defence groups (Groupes d'Auto-Défense – GAD) for territorial surveillance and the 'patriot' militias (Les Patriotes) trained in anti-guerrilla territorial offence and subversion. These irregular forces operate in coordination with the Army and the Gendarmerie Nationale. Their largest concentration is in the 1st MD, and to a lesser extent in the 2nd and 5th MDs. The second type of irregular forces is a counter-guerrilla force called the Armed Islamic Group. It is a few thousand force commanded and operated by military intelligence (DRS) under the direct command of General Mohamed Mediène. This counter-guerrilla force is concentrated mainly in the 1st MD, and, to a lesser extent, in the 2nd MD.

On the insurgent side, the main armed force is the AIS (Islamic Salvation

Army). This military arm of the FIS was created in 1994. Its interim commander-in-chief has been Madani Mezerag, also known as Abu Al Haithem, since March 1995. Not much is known about its territorial organisation. It is mainly concentrated in the Eastern and Western districts of the country, i.e. within the 5th and 2nd MDs shown on map 2. Its commander in the eastern region is Madani Mezerag himself while its Western regional commander is Ahmed Benaicha. Following intense contacts with the generals Smain Lamari, Rabah Boughaba and Mohamed Mediene in the summer 1997, it declared a unilateral truce on all its operations in September 1997. This truce is effective to this day.

Next in strength is the Ligue Islamique de la Dawa et du Djihad (LIDD) created in February 1997. The chief commander of this armed organisation is Ali Benhejar. This force is loyal to the political leadership of the FIS. Its core is composed of the battalion of Médéa, which broke away from the GIA after the latter had been appropriated and turned into a counter-guerrilla force by the DRS, and the Islamic Front for Armed Struggle (FIDA), an essentially urban-based insurgent force operating in Algiers. Within the territorial division of the incumbent regime, the thrust of this force is concentrated in the 1st MD. This armed organisation has joined the AIS unilateral truce since October 1997.

There are other smaller, independent armed insurgent groups with no clearly visible political leadership.<sup>76</sup> Various reports locate them mainly in the 1st and 2nd MDs.

### *3.3.4. Economic Geography of the Massacres*

Map 1 and 2 show that the bulk of the mass victimisation is concentrated in the north of the country; the South is safe from massacres. Economically, it is the South of Algeria where all the oil and gas fields lie that generates over 95 % of Algeria's foreign currency earnings.

Pointing to this economic geography of the mass killings, Pierre Sané, Amnesty International general secretary, explained:

We see that there is a 'useful Algeria' at the extreme South of the country. It is that of oil fields and gas installations, that where foreign companies and their employees work in secure conditions. They seem to be very well protected by the State. Should one conclude that the Algeria that resides twenty minutes away from the capital where the massacres and the bombings follow one another is a 'useless Algeria'?<sup>77</sup>

At least 45 000 men are permanently devoted to the protection of the oil



fields.<sup>78</sup> French, American, British and South African security companies and multinational war corporations are also involved in the protection of this oil rich part of the country that has become a large 'exclusion zone'.<sup>79</sup> Algerians residing in any other part of the country cannot enter it without a special authorisation. Algerians residing within this exclusion zone and wishing to travel outside it also need an official authorisation. Algerians working or wishing to work for the national oil-company Sonatrach or foreign oil companies are scrutinised by military intelligence (DRS) and are dependent on its visas.

Whereas the presence of oil/gas excludes massacres in the South, this is not always the case in the north. A well-known example is that of Relizane which sustained a wave of 8 massacres, within a single week, from 30 December 1997 to 6 January 1998, causing 1091 deaths. In its 1999 world report, Human Rights Watch observed that

the massacres in Relizane took place in villages located near a junction of the principal oil and gas pipelines leading from the production areas of the far south to the port of Arzew and the spur pipelines to Algiers. The armed wing of the FIS, the AIS, had reportedly been operating in strategically sensitive area since 1993, and AIS troops reportedly assisted survivors to bury their slain kin in the massacre's aftermath.<sup>80</sup>

In general though, as Amnesty International points out, the geographic proximity to oil and gas related infrastructure secures safety from mass killings:

The security situation is certainly under control in the south, the north-east and north-west of the country, in areas dotted with oil and refineries and outlets, where foreign oil companies are indeed well protected.

But in other parts of Algeria, especially in poor areas where oil and money do not flow, the civilian population, increasingly impoverished, is denied the protection of the state and lives in fear of massacres and attacks.<sup>81</sup>

Regarding the economic geography of the massacres in the north, some analysts think there is a correlation between the concentration of massacres in the Mitidja region and the economic value of its lands. This region lies mainly within the districts of Blida and Algiers, the most victimised districts of the country (see map 1). Its vast plains have high return arable land and high estate value. In 1995 the government decided to privatise 2.8 million hectares of arable land nationally (0.1 million of this surface lies in the Mitidja region). It later passed laws facilitating the acquisition of land by various clients of the regime such as war veterans, retired army officers turned businessmen, militia leaders, army officers and state administration bureaucrats in part-time business.<sup>82</sup> Joxe points to the wave of massacres of the autumn of 1997 and explains



We observe that the recent big massacres, in Algeria, are located in the most populated, accessible, and best patrolled districts of 'useful Algeria': the fertile plains of the Mitidja, the big suburbs of Algiers. They often took place a few hundreds of meters away from barracks or police stations, and from security forces which remained 'neutral' and did not intervene, under orders or otherwise. Any observer of massacres perpetrated in fertile land and areas under urban expansion knows that there cannot be massacres in such types of territory without underlying estate operations. Either they seek to recreate large land-ownership by depopulating the co-operative farms set up at independence. Or they seek to depopulate lands for urban land speculation. To make rural populations flee, it is necessary and sufficient, in a state with no rule of law or a military dictatorship, to massacre some entire villages. The effect of terror generates a multiplicative effect of flight.<sup>83</sup>

Human rights lawyer Ali-Yahia summed up this state of affairs saying Algeria has split into an increasingly rich 'Algeria under high protection' and an increasingly poor 'Algeria under high victimisation'.


### *3.3.5. Topography of Massacre Sites*

A topographic regularity found in a substantial number of massacres is the proximity of barracks of the military, gendarmerie, police or militia forces to the sites of the mass killings. This is systematically the case for all the very high kill-ratio atrocities which occurred in the heavily militarised sub-urban areas of the districts of Algiers and Blida.

Amnesty International observes that

Most massacres have taken place around the capital in the Algerians, Blida and Médéa regions in the most heavily militarised part of the country. In many cases massacres, often lasting several hours, took place only a very short distance, a few kilometres or even a few hundred meters away from army and security forces barracks and outposts. However, in spite of the screams and cries for help of the victims, the sound of gunshots, and the flames and smoke of the burning houses, the security forces have not intervened – neither to come to the rescue of those who were being massacred, nor to arrest those responsible for the massacres, who got away on each occasion. Survivors and neighbours have told of telephoning or running to nearby security posts seeking help, with the security forces there refusing to intervene, claiming that they were not mandated to do so. In at least two cases, several survivors described how people who had tried to escape from villages where a massacre was taking place had actually been turned back by a cordon of members of the security forces who stood by while the villagers were being slaughtered and did not come into the village until after the attackers had left. That army barracks and security forces outposts are located next to the sites of several massacres is an indisputable fact. That the security forces have not intervened during the massacres is also a fact, which is not disputed by the Algerian authorities.<sup>84</sup>

Map 3 sketches the site of the Si-Zerrouk massacre, in the borough of Larbaa. At least 51 people were killed and tens were injured in this massacre which took place on 27 July 1997.<sup>85</sup> Survivors of the carnage told a journalist



Map 3: The Scene of the Sidi-Zerrouk Massacre.

‘the barracks are 50 meters away. From the sentry post you see from here, the guard can see everything but no one moved. [...] Two children were slaughtered at the foot of that sentry box.’<sup>86</sup> This case is typical of villages in the borough of Larbaa (district of Blida), a district Algerians describe as ‘plagued by more barracks and outposts than schools and hospitals’.


Map 4 gives a detailed topography of the site of the Raïs atrocity. Raïs is a very poor village in the borough of Larbaa. On 29 August 1997, in a single episode lasting several hours, about 300 helpless civilians were brutally slaughtered and over 200 people were injured.<sup>87</sup> Amnesty International commented that Raïs is located in close proximity to the army barracks of Sidi Moussa, about three kilometres away, the army barracks of Baraki, about six to seven kilometres away, the security forces outpost of Gaid Kacem, about four kilometres away, and other security forces posts a few hundred meters away. Survivors told Amnesty International that, in addition to the security forces barracks nearby, security forces were also stationed just outside the village, and were aware that the massacre was being committed because those who were able to flee at the beginning of the attack had gone to seek help and refuge with the nearby security forces.<sup>88</sup>

Garçon from *Libération* also wrote that ‘in Raïs, many witnesses reported suspect movements of helicopters three quarters of an hour before the tragedy.’<sup>89</sup>


The map also delineates the security forces units close to the spot of the Bentalha massacre. Bentalha is a poor neighbourhood within the borough of El Harrach (district of Algiers). On 22 September 1997 it suffered a massacre that led to the death of at least 200 defenceless civilians and to the injury of over 100 people.<sup>90</sup> It had been targeted earlier, on 22 November 1996, when at least 16 people had been killed in a single mass killing incident<sup>91</sup> and sustained yet another atrocity on 27 October 1997 when at least 30 people were brutally slaughtered in a single carnage.<sup>92</sup> Amnesty International says that

Bentalha is near five different army and security forces outposts, including the army barracks of Baraki, about three kilometres away, the army barracks of Sidi Moussa, about five kilometres away, the Gaid Kacem security forces post, less than one kilometre away, the communal guard barracks about one kilometre away, and the security forces at the entrance of Bentalha. Survivors told Amnesty International that at the time of the massacres armed forces units with armoured vehicles were stationed outside the village and stopped some of those trying to flee from getting out of the village.<sup>93</sup>

Map 5 represents the positions of security forces around the sites of the Sidi-Hamed and Souhane massacres. Over 400 men, women and children died and about 100 were injured in a single massacre at Sidi-Hamed on 11 January



Map 4: The Scene of the Raïs and Bentalha Massacres.



Map 5: The Scene of the Sidi-Hamed Massacre.

1998.<sup>94</sup> 63 people were slaughtered *en masse* on the night of 20-21 August 1998 in the village of Souhane<sup>95</sup> and 16 people had the same fate, northwards, at Haouch Sahraoui, on 14 June 1997.<sup>96</sup> Larbaa has been the target of a long series of mass killings (see tables A and B in the appendix for the full list).

Map 6 now delineates in detail the spot of the Sidi Youcef massacre, a poor neighbourhood of makeshift houses next to Beni-Messous, in the borough of Bir-Mourad Rais (district of Algiers). This site, described as ‘virtually surrounded by military installations’ by Human Rights Watch, has the largest concentration of troops per kilometre square in the country. On the night of 5 to 6 September 1997, at least 195 defenceless civilians were massacred and more than 100 were injured in a single carnage that lasted several hours.<sup>97</sup> Yet, as indicates Amnesty International,

Beni Messous hosts the largest army barracks and military security centre of the capital, as well as three other gendarmerie and security forces centres from which the site of the massacre is clearly visible. The army barracks of Cheraga is only a few kilometres away. However, as with all the other massacres, there was no intervention by the security forces to stop the massacre and the attackers left undisturbed.<sup>98</sup>


Garcon describes some military buildings on map 6 as follows:

Immediately next to Beni Messous, there are at least 4 military concentrations. The massacre of Friday night took place 200 meters away from the *caserne du train* (military transport centre) and the headquarters of the military intelligence, and 300 meters away from two bases, that of the gendarmerie and the airbase for special paratroopers.<sup>99</sup>

#### 4. Towards a Victimology of the Massacres

We now turn to the second unit of analysis of this study: the population of victims of the massacres. This unit of analysis is the core concern of victimology that studies the distribution and correlates of victimisation in designated populations.<sup>100</sup>

We construct a macro-indicator, the volume of victimisation, and analyse its time evolution, space distribution and socio-political partitions. Aside from this aggregate approach, we use a relational analysis to infer the criteria and processes by which the population is selected for victimisation, to probe the connections between victims and perpetrators and to identify the sociopolitical effects of the massacres on the survivors and the wider population. A report on various other kinds of harms and damages inflicted on the direct victim population will be given elsewhere, in section 5. A complete study would



Map 6: The Scene of the Beni-Messous Massacre.

require biographical analyses, but reliable testimonies are not available in sufficient numbers at the moment.

The volume of victimisation is discussed in section 4.1. Its time evolution and space distribution are considered in sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Section 4.4 is devoted to the social and political identification of the victimised population. Section 4.5 reports the available data about the processes of selection of the target populations. Section 4.6 deals with victim precipitation before, and victim response during, the massacres. The last section looks at some of the socio-political effects of the massacres on the survivors and the wider population (section 4.7).

#### **4.1. Volume of Victimisation**

Based on tables A and B in the appendix we count a total volume of 10,758 victims, 8,675 deaths from SMV episodes and 2,083 from RMV events.

Bearing in mind that this volume does not include the civilians killed in events where less than 5 people lost their lives, it should be compared to the more inclusive figures of 26 536 deaths up to January 1998, according to the Algerian government<sup>101</sup>, 40 000 deaths according to an unnamed Algerian general<sup>102</sup>, over 80 000 deaths up to November 1997 according to Amnesty International<sup>103</sup>, 173 000 deaths up to May 1999 according to the MAOL<sup>104</sup>, 190 000 deaths up to December 1996 according to the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights<sup>105</sup>, and 300 000 deaths up to April 1996 according to Darcourt citing unnamed Western intelligence agencies<sup>106</sup>.

Figure 26 presents the partial selective mass victimisation volumes for various death groups; they are calculated at a national level for the period up to 1998. Table A numbers 1049 deaths in SMV episodes causing between 5 and 10 deaths and counts 4474 deaths in atrocities with more than 40 deaths per event. The number of Algerians massacred in mass killings with a kill-ratio greater than 40 is about four times larger than that of those massacred in mass killings causing between 5 and 10 deaths. Figure 26 clearly shows that the partial SMV volumes increase with increasing death tolls per event. This trend is the reverse of that found for the variation of the frequencies of SMV events with death group (see figure 1) which decrease as the death toll gets larger.

If the proportionality between the volume of victimisation and the death group per event shown in figure 26 can be extrapolated to killings with less than 5 deaths per event, there is no way one would account for any of the conflicting estimates of the total volume of victimisation we just reviewed. If one takes the lowest estimate of 26 536 deaths, assuming the SMV volume for






Figure 26: Selective Mass Victimization Volumes versus Death Group.

killings with less than 5 deaths per event is the same as that for mass killings causing between 5 and 10 deaths, about 15 000 deaths would be unaccounted for. Since both the 26 536 figure and most of the data used in this report originate from the Algerian government, there is a clear inconsistency. If one assumes that the 26 536 figure quoted by the prime-minister originates from offices other than those which release security-related news to the press, then clearly the data available in the press, i.e. the one used in this report, are incomplete and/or severely distorted. Various other auxiliary assumptions can be used to make other quantitative estimates of the data distortion. But since the figure of 26 536 deaths is itself likely to be a serious under-estimate of the actual volume of victimisation (given the figures of Amnesty International and the Algerian League for the Defence of Human Rights), one cannot make controllable and quantitative approximations of the uncertainties.

The partial volumes of random mass victimisation are given for three different death tolls per event in figure 27. They were calculated nationally for the period up to 1998. The number of Algerians massacred in lethal bombings with up to 5 deaths is about the same as of those massacred in bombings causing between 6 and 10 deaths but both are smaller than the volume associated with the highest kill-ratio atrocities. Figure 27 also suggests that the partial RMV volumes increase on average with increasing death group, a pattern opposite to that observed in the corresponding distribution of frequencies of RMV events (see figure 2).




Figure 27: Random Mass Victimization Volumes versus Death Group.

#### 4.2. Time Evolution of the Victimization Volume

Figure 28 represents the annual fluctuations of the SMV and RMV volumes nationally from 1992 to 1998. The year 1997 stands out as the year of the most extensive victimisation. It is forerun and succeeded by years of lower SMV volumes, as is the case for 1994.

Figure 29 shows the annual fluctuations of the partial SMV volumes for various death groups per event while figure 30 displays the analogous variations for the RMV volumes.

The partial SMV volumes have the same time structure as that of the whole volume. This is not the case for the partial RMV volumes. The volume of victims killed in random mass killings causing up to 5 deaths per incident rises continually since 1994.

We now present in figure 31 the monthly variation of the SMV volume, from April 96 to December 1998. As was observed in figure 7, the salient feature of this time profile is its oscillatory behaviour. There is a one to one correspondence between the positions and the lifetimes of the victimisation peaks in figure 31 and those of the massacre activity in figure 7; there is also a proportional correspondence between the magnitudes of the respective peaks. There are two exceptions to this equivalence relation. Regarding the April 1997 terror wave, the profile of the massacre activity (figure 7) indicates that its




Figure 28: Annual Fluctuations of SMV and RMV Volumes.




Figure 29: Annual Fluctuations of SMV Volumes by Death Group.




Figure 30: Annual Fluctuations of RMV Volumes by Death Group.




Figure 31: Monthly Fluctuations of the SMV Volume Apr.96–Dec.98.

intensity is smaller than that of January 1997 whereas the time variation of the victimisation volume (figure 37) shows that the peaks of the waves increase steadily in 1997. For the autumn of 1997 terror wave, the SMV activity increases by 2 units, from September 1997 to October 1997, but the corresponding victimisation volume decreases from 788 to 396 deaths. The political events and statements concomitant with these victimisation waves were discussed in section 3.2.1.

Figure 32 reports the monthly change of the RMV volume, from April 96 to December 1998. The wave structure does appear here too. We also find a relation of correspondence between the positions and lifetimes of the peaks of the terror waves indicated by figure 32 and those prominent in the profile of the RMV activity in figure 13. The variations in the intensities of the peaks also match each other except for the waves of January and August 1997.

The correlations between the SMV and RMV volumes are shown in figure 33. The positions, lifetimes and intensities of the waves of terror are strictly homologous to those displayed by the total massacre activity in figure 16 (see  $P_1, \dots, P_7$ ).




Figure 32: Monthly Fluctuations of the RMV Volume Apr.96–Dec.98.




Figure 33: Monthly Fluctuations of the SMV and RMV Volumes Apr. 96-Dec.98.

### 4.3. Geographical Distribution of the Victimisation Volume

The distribution of the SMV volume over the national territory is given in figure 34 and that of the RMV volume is presented in figure 35. The volumes are calculated for the 1992-1998 period. We show only the 13 districts with the highest victimisation volumes.

The highest SMV volumes are mainly concentrated in the central districts of Blida, Médéa and Algiers. This agrees with the indications from the SMV activities in figure 17. These districts account for 53.3 % of the national SMV volume. Note however that Relizane, a Western district with lower SMV activity than even Djelfa, has a higher SMV death toll than Algiers. In general, the order of districts by decreasing massacre activity does not match that by decreasing SMV volume (compare figures 31 and 17).

It does nevertheless remain the case that the westward districts contiguous to the central region (Tipaza, Chlef, Ain-Defla) have victimisation volumes lower than those of the central districts and higher than those in the far West of Algeria (Saida, Tlemcen, Mascara), a feature we described as diffusion in section 3.3.1.




Figure 34: District Distribution of Deaths from SMV.

Figure 35 shows that the highest RMV volumes are located in the central districts of Algiers and Blida (43.7 % of the total RMV volume). There is a gradual decrease in the victimisation volume per district as one moves westwards.

The pie chart in figure 36 displays the district distribution of the SMV and RMV volumes. The populations of Blida, Médéa and Algiers are the worst affected as they sustain 52.2 % of the total victimisation volume.

Finally, we report on table 3 the distributions of victimisation volumes by military district. We find that the degree of victimisation inferred from the victimisation volumes is homologous to that induced from the massacre activities sketched on map 2. The populations living within the borders of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> military districts are the most affected as they record 74.9 % and 20.4 %, respectively, of the total victimisation volume.




Figure 35: District Distribution of Deaths from RMV.






Figure 36: District Distribution of Deaths from SMV and RMV

Table 3: Distribution of Victimization Volumes by Military District.

	SMV Deaths	RMV Deaths	Total	%
<b>1<sup>st</sup> M.D.</b>	6563	1497	8060	74.9
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> M.D.</b>	1739	459	2198	20.4
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> M.D.</b>	11	0	11	0.1
<b>4<sup>th</sup> M.D.</b>	103	65	168	1.6
<b>5<sup>th</sup> M.D.</b>	252	62	314	2.9
<b>6<sup>th</sup> M.D.</b>	7	0	7	0.06

#### 4.4. Social and Political Identification of the Victimized Population

Every instance of selective or random mass victimisation results in harm to individuals. One may however ask whether the population of such individuals has shared attributes other than joint victimisation. Here we seek to describe some of the social and political characteristics of the *group* of victimised individuals. We first look at the age, gender, and kinship features of sub-samples of the victimised population and then report briefly on its economic status and political identity.

##### 4.4.1. Victimization Dependence on Age

Short of complete, accurate and reliable data about the age details of all the victims, we approximate with a sub-sample of the SMV events for which some

quantitative age details were given in the news reports. Most of the news reports do not give the age details of the victims. Those that do tend to refer to age categories, such as 'children' or 'the elderly', rather than give numbers. Typical reports speak of 'N deaths including children', 'most of the victims were women and children', 'X out of the N casualties were from a single family' and so on. The reports rarely refer to the 'adult' category as if one should assume that all victims are adults unless stated otherwise. Since the reports are explicit only about the children and, to a lesser extent, about the elderly, the analysis is restricted to child victimisation.

Table 4 lists the sub-sample of the events for which the numbers of victimised children or elderly are given. Events reported with details such as 'most of

Table 4: Child Component of the Selective Mass Victimisation.

Date	Location/District	Deaths	Age Details
15 Feb. 92	Batna/Batna	28	7 children
3 Nov. 96	Douaouada /Tipaza	13	3 children
23 Jan. 97	Baba Ali/Algiers	22	1 child
31 Jan. 97	Sidi Kaddour/Blida	8	1 baby aged 13 months
18 Feb. 97	Kerrach/Blida	31	1 child
6 Apr. 97	Amroussa/Blida	17	3 children
11 Apr. 97	Boufarik/Blida	22	5 children
21 Apr. 97	Haouch Khemisti/Blida	135	5 children
22 Apr. 97	El Omania/Medea	42	3 babies
15 May 97	Chebli/Blida	24	2 babies and 15 children
14 Jun. 97	Haouch Sahraoui/Blida	16	6 children
22 Jul. 97	Benachour/Blida	11	1 baby
25 Jul. 97	Hadjout/Tipaza	38	At least 20 children
27 Jul. 97	El Omania/Medea	22	1 baby
27 Jul. 97	Si-Zerrouk/Blida	51	At least 8 children
30 Jul. 97	Matmata/Ain-Defla	41	11 children
3 Aug. 97	Amroussa/Blida	26	8 children
4 Aug. 97	Medroussa/Tiaret	11	One 9 month fetus
5 Aug. 97	Oued Slama/Blida	9	3 children
8 Aug. 97	Oued Zeboudj/Medea	21	2 babies and 3 old men
14 Aug. 97	Douira/Tipaza	15	6 children
1 Sep. 97	Bologhine/Algiers	19	13 children
2 Sep. 97	El Omania/Medea	22	10 children
20 Sep. 97	Beni Slimane/Medea	53	At least 17 children

Table 4: Child Component of the Selective Mass Victimization (Cont'd.).

2 Oct. 97	Ain Boucif/Medea	13	6 children
3 Oct. 97	Ouled Benaissa/Blida	38	22 children
3 Oct. 97	Mellouka/Medea	75	34 children
5 Oct. 97	Bouinan/Blida	16	16 schoolboys
12 Oct. 97	Souidania/Blida	14	1 baby and 2 children
27 Oct. 97	Oued Djer/Medea	16	10 children
8 Nov. 97	Tajmout/Tlemcen	23	1 child
9 Nov. 97	Hmalit/Blida	26	11 children
21 Nov. 97	Oued Zitoune/Medea	8	4 children
27 Nov. 97	Souhane/Blida	25	4 children
8 Dec. 97	Medea/Medea	7	1 baby
18 Dec. 97	Djiboulou/Blida	47	2 babies and 11 children
22 Dec. 97	Sahari/Tiaret	28	1 baby, 25 children, an 88 year old man
23 Dec. 97	Bainem/Algiers	11	5 children
26 Dec. 97	Zouabria/Tiaret	27	12 days old baby decapitated
27 Dec. 97	Ouled-Moussa/Boumerdes	21	11 children aged from 2 to 9 years old
28 Dec. 97	Safsaf/Mascara	38	6 children
28 Dec. 97	El Faoudj/Medea	34	11 children
8 Jan. 98	Sour-el-ghozlen/Bouira	26	11 children
14 Jan. 98	Ouazra/Medea	6	2 children
25 Jan. 98	Frenda/Tiaret	20	1 baby aged 3 months and 6 children
1 Feb. 98	Sabra/Tlemcen	10	1 baby aged 6 months
28 Apr. 98	Chouardia/Medea	43	1 baby aged 10 days and 26 children
16 Jul. 98	Sidi-Ouadah/Tiaret	21	1 baby aged 6 months
25 Jul. 98	Khilil/Tlemcen	12	1 baby
5 Aug. 98	Tagdempt/Tiaret	10	1 baby aged 12 months and 4 children
6 Aug. 98	Ouled Yekhllef/Bouira	9	1 baby aged 5 months and 3 children
30 Aug. 98	Targhout/Ain Defla	10	6 children
12 Nov. 98	Boumedfaa/Ain Defla	18	8 children
2 Dec. 98	Sidi Rached/Tipaza	12	7 children and 1 old woman
8 Dec. 98	Tajena/Chlef	81	8 babies and 15 children
28 Dec. 98	Ain Soltan/AinDefla	19	8 children

the victims were women and children' were not included even though one could make approximations from the total death toll. Note that the onset of child victimisation in a substantial and frequent way seems, from the body of news reports at our disposal, to have taken place in the spring 1996. This is not apparent from table 4 because at that time most of the news reports did not give numbers for the volume of child victimisation.

The list includes only 56 out of the 339 SMV events in table A in the appendix. For each case, the age details can be found in the reference given in the corresponding entry in table A in the appendix. Of course, given the limitations of the age information and the earlier reservations about the incompleteness and distortion of the data, it is clear that the sub-sample in table 4 should be not be regarded as more than a rough pointer.

Table 4 counts 452 children and 5 old individuals out of a total of 1461 victims killed in 56 SMV events. This means that 30.9 % of the victimised population are children, i.e. one in three victims is a child on average. The lowest number of children per total death toll is 1/31 and the largest ones are 26/28 (in the massacre of Sahari/Tiaret on 22 December 1997) and 16/16 (in the massacre of Bouinan/Blida on 5 October 1997).

Figure 37 shows how the percentage of children killed varies with the magnitudes of the massacres. For each death group per event we calculate the number of children killed and divide by the total death toll associated with the group. The largest proportion of victimised children seems to occur for massacres causing 11 to 20 deaths per event and the lowest one arises in the mass killings of large magnitude. The victimisation of children is however not strongly dependent on the magnitude of the massacre; it does not deviate much from the average value of 30 %. If one assumes that the sub-sample in table 4 is representative of the *integral* victim population listed in table A, this average proportion suggests that as many as 2600 children would have been killed out of the 8675 total SMV death toll from 1992 to 1998.

For the sub-sample in table 4, the average number of children killed per SMV event is 8.1. The lowest number of children killed per massacre is 1 and the largest one is 26. We plot in figure 38 the variation of the average number of children killed per SMV event with the death group. For each death group we calculate the number of children killed and divide by the total number of SMV events with death tolls within the given group. There is a clear proportional increase with the death group. The largest magnitude massacres victimise about 5 times more children per incident than the lowest magnitude massacres.




Figure 37: Proportion of Victimised Children by Death Group.




Figure 38: Average Number of Victimised Children per Massacre versus Death Group.

In order to see whether there may be patterns in the time evolution and space distribution of the proportions of children per death toll and in the average number of children killed per massacre, these two parameters were calculated for the period between June 97 and January 98 (see table 5), as this period has the highest massacre activity, and for the 6 most victimised districts (see table 6).

In table 5 we calculate the monthly proportions of children per victimisation volume by dividing the monthly number of children killed by the total monthly death toll; this parameter is denoted  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{child}}$ . The monthly average number of children killed per massacre is obtained by dividing the monthly number of children killed by the total number of SMV events during the month; this parameter is denoted  $\langle N_{\text{child}}/\text{Event} \rangle$ .

Table 5: Monthly Change in Child Victimization Jun.97 - Jan. 98

	Jun. 97	Jul. 97	Aug. 97	Sep. 97	Oct. 97	Nov. 97	Dec. 97	Jan. 98
<b>Ratio<sub>child</sub> in %</b>	37.5	26.3	24.4	43.6	52.9	24.4	34.7	38.5
<b><math>\langle N_{\text{child}}/\text{Event} \rangle</math></b>	6	8.6	4	13.7	15.2	5	9.3	6.7

Apart from the months of September and October that register the highest victimisation of children, there is not a salient departure from the sample averages of 1 child killed for 3 adults and about 8 children killed per atrocity. September and October 97 are months of high massacre activity (see figure 7). Note that although August 97 and January 98 have the most intense terror waves, the child victimisation parameters for these two months are smaller than those calculated for September and October 97. In other words, if one assumes the sub-sample is representative, the times at which the victimisation of children peaks do not always coincide with the periods when the waves of atrocities are maximal in intensity.

In table 6, for each district the percentage of children per death toll is computed by dividing the total number of children killed in the district by the total death toll of the district; this parameter is called  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{child}}$ . The district average

Table 6: District Distribution of Child Victimization

	Blida	Medea	Tiaret	Tipaza	Ain Defla	Algiers
<b>Ratio<sub>child</sub> in %</b>	21.9	35.6	35.0	47.4	37.5	36.5
<b><math>\langle N_{\text{child}}/\text{Event} \rangle</math></b>	6.7	9.9	6.8	9.3	8.3	6.3

number of children killed per massacre is obtained by dividing the number of children killed in the district by the total number of SMV events in the district; this parameter is denoted  $\langle N_{\text{child}}/\text{Event} \rangle$ .

There is not a substantial departure from  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{child}}$  and  $\langle N_{\text{child}}/\text{Event} \rangle$  calculated nationally (30.9 and 8.1 respectively). Although in absolute numbers Blida and Médéa have the highest child victimisation volumes, Tipaza has noticeably high child victimisation indicators.

Nothing has been said about the victimisation of children through bombings in public spaces. The reason is that such events are probably not frequent and, in any case, the quantitative data available are scarce. From the events in table B, one may cite the bombing in Mostaghanem cemetery on 1 November 1994 which killed 6 children and injured 17 (scouts commemorating the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the start of the liberation war). Another case is the bomb in front of a school in Birkhadem, in the district of Algiers, on 10 November 1996, that killed 10 children. Unlike these two bombings that specifically targeted children, the rest of the mass victimisation events affect the children as random users of public spaces or transport. No quantitative data are publicly accessible to evaluate this kind of child victimisation.

Finally, the count of victimised elderly people is only 5, as shown in the data in table 4. However unreliable and unrepresentative this figure may be, it seems plausible that elderly people are overall significantly less victimised than children.

#### *4.4.2. Victimisation Dependence on Gender*

Given the lack of gender victimisation data, we approximate with a sub-sample of the SMV events for which some quantitative gender details were given in the news reports. The news reports typically talk of 'N deaths including women', 'most of the victims were women and children', 'X out of the N casualties were women from a single family' and so on. The reports explicitly refer only to the 'female' gender category suggesting one should take for granted that the victims are males unless stated otherwise.

Table 7 lists the sub-sample of the events for which the numbers of victimised females are given. Death tolls depicted as 'most of the victims were women and children' were not recorded. Although it is not evident from table 7, because at that time most of the news reports did not quantify female victimisation, the beginning of sizeable and repetitive female victimisation appears, from the body of the available news reports, to have taken place in the spring of 1996.

Table 7: Female Component of the Selective Mass Victimization.

Date	Location/District	Deaths	Gender Details
3 Nov. 96	Douaouada /Tipaza	13	10 women
6 Nov. 96	Chrea/Blida	31	12 women
23 Jan. 97	Baba Ali/Algiers	22	10 women
18 Feb. 97	Kerrach/Blida	31	24 women
23 Mar. 97	Ouazra/Medea	7	7 women
6 Apr. 97	Amroussa/Blida	17	7 women
11 Apr. 97	Boufarik/Blida	22	14 women
13 Apr. 97	Boufarik/Blida	30	16 women/5 girls abducted
21 Apr. 97	Haouch Khemisti/Blida	135	43 women
22 Apr. 97	El Omaria/Medea	42	17 women
15 May. 97	Chebli/Blida	24	7 women
29 May. 97	Cherchell/Tipaza	14	8 women
19 Jun. 97	Djouaza/Tissemsilt	15	3 women
22 Jul. 97	Yemma Mghite/Blida	39	11 women
22 Jul. 97	Benachour/Blida	11	4 women
25 Jul. 97	El Omaria/Medea	13	3 women
27 Jul. 97	Si-Zerrouk/Blida	51	11 women abducted
30 Jul. 97	Matmata/Ain-Defla	41	2 women abducted
3 Aug. 97	Amroussa/Blida	26	7 women / 3 girls abducted
4 Aug. 97	Medroussa/Tiaret	11	2 pregnant women
5 Aug. 97	Oued Slama/Blida	9	3 women
8 Aug. 97	Oued Zeboudj/Medea	21	5 women
11 Aug. 97	Ain Defla	29	20 women
14 Aug. 97	Douira/Tipaza	15	2 women
19 Aug. 97	Feid El Botma/Djelfa	20	6 women abducted
21 Aug. 97	Souhane/Blida	63	12 girls abducted
26 Aug. 97	Beni Ali/Blida	64	30 women
29 Aug. 97	Sidi Rais/Blida	300	20 women abducted
29 Aug. 97	Maalba/Djelfa	40	19 women / 2 abducted
1 Sep. 97	Bologhine/Algiers	19	3 women
2 Sep. 97	El Omaria/Medea	22	6 women
20 Sep. 97	Beni Slimane/Medea	53	8 women
22 Sep. 97	Bentalha/Algiers	200	> 30 women abducted
27 Sep. 97	AinAden/S. Bel-Abbas	11	11 women
2 Oct. 97	Ain Boucif/Medea	13	4 women
12 Oct. 97	Souidania/Blida	14	7 women
20 Oct. 97	Bejaia	5	5 women



Table 7: Female Component of the Selective Mass Victimisation (cont'd).

8 Nov. 97	Tajmout/Tlemcen	23	6 women
27 Nov. 97	Souhane/Blida	25	3 women
18 Dec. 97	Aflou/Laghouat	10	3 women abducted
18 Dec. 97	Djiboulou/Blida	47	10 women / 2 girlsabducted
23 Dec. 97	Bainem/Algiers	11	4 women
27 Dec. 97	Ouled-Moussa/Boumerdes	21	3 women
28 Dec. 97	Oued Sly/Chlef	9	2 girls abducted
28 Dec. 97	Safsaf/Mascara	38	3 women
28 Dec. 97	El Faoudj/Medea	34	19 women
4 Jan. 97	Ain Defla	5	1 woman and 4 girls
8 Jan. 98	Sour-el-ghozlen/Bouira	26	4 women
8 Jan. 98	Saida	9	5 women
11 Jan. 98	Sidi Hamed/Blida	> 400	30 women abducted
24 Jan. 98	Ben Larbi/ S. Bel Abbas	11	2 women abducted
25 Jan. 98	Frenda/Tiaret	20	5 women, one pregnant
16 Mar. 98	Tipaza	7	2 women
6 Apr. 98	Boukriba/Mostaganem	27	5 women
15 Jul. 98	Bougherba/Tiaret	13	4 women
25 Jul. 98	S. Abdelmoumen/Saida	8	7 women abducted
25 Jul. 98	Khilil/Tlemcen	12	3 women
5 Aug. 98	Tagdempt/Tiaret	10	5 women
6 Aug. 98	Ouled Yekhllef/Bouira	9	1 pregnant woman abducted
29 Aug. 98	Tipaza	6	2 women
17 Nov. 98	Khemis Meliani/Ain Defla	8	1 girl abducted
12 Nov. 98	Boumedfaa/Ain Defla	18	5 women
2 Dec. 98	Sidi Rached/Tipaza	12	3 women, one pregnant
8 Dec. 98	Tajena/Tipaza	81	13 women / 10 abducted

The 'kidnapped' category is given separately because at the time of the news reports the missing females are not counted among the dead victims. In most cases the kidnapped females are reportedly raped and later killed but the death toll is only rarely revised. For instance on 24 October 1997 'tens of bodies were found at the bottom of a well in Bentalha', a village that had been the target of a large scale massacre earlier on 22 September 1997. 'Most of the bodies were those of women abducted in the Bentalha massacre and later raped and murdered.'<sup>107</sup> The thirteen women kidnapped in the massacre of Tajena, in Tipaza, on 8 December 1998, were found slaughtered three days later.<sup>108</sup> Some reports indicate that a few of the women captives are kept as sex slaves but no numbers are available.

The list contains only 64 out of the 339 SMV events in table A in the appendix. For each case, the gender details can be found in the reference indicated in the respective entry in table A in the appendix. The sub-sample in table 7 should not be considered as more than a rough indicator until more complete, accurate and reliable gender victimisation data are available.

Table 7 numbers 435 females killed and 149 abducted (and probably killed) out of a total of 2394 victims killed in 64 SMV events. This signifies that 18.2 % of the victimised population are women, i.e. about one in five victims counted at the end of any SMV event is a woman on average. If one includes the abducted women in the death toll then 23 % of the victims are women, i.e. about one woman is killed, or abducted and then probably killed, for every 4 victims on average. Note that the 'woman' instead of the 'female' category is used because these numbers do not include female children. If one assumes that half of the victimised children are females, since children account for 30.9 % of the victimisation volume on average, the proportion of victimised females is about 33.7 %, i.e. one in three victims is a female on average. Males are therefore about twice more likely to be victims of massacres.

The lowest number of women per total death toll is 3/25 and the largest ones are 24/31 (in the massacre of Kerrach, in the district of Blida, on 18 February 1997) and 11/11 (in the massacre of Ain-Aden, in the district of Sidi Bel Abbas, on 27 September 1997). The lowest number of women abducted and probably killed per death toll is 2/41 and the largest one are 11/51 (in the massacre of Si Zerrouk, in the district of Blida, on 27 July 1997) and 7/8 (in the massacre of Sidi Abdelmoumen, in the district of Saida, on 25 July 1998).

Figure 39 displays the variation of the percentage of victimised women with the magnitudes of the massacres. For each death group per event the total number of women killed is divided by the total death toll associated with the group. The largest proportion of victimised women eventuates for massacres with 31 to 40 deaths per event and the lowest one is found in large magnitude mass killings. Except in the latter group, the victimisation of women does not fluctuate strongly with the death group; it departs only moderately from the average value of 34 %. If one assumes that the sub-sample in table 4 is representative of the *integral* victim population listed in table A, 1580 women would have been killed out of the 8675 total SMV death toll from 1992 to 1998. This number is 43 % lower than the figure of 3700 women killed in total since 1992 according to the Algerian paper *La Nouvelle République*; the paper gave no source for the figure.<sup>109</sup>

For the sub-sample in table 7, the average number of women killed per SMV event is 6.8. The lowest number of women killed per massacre is 1 and

the largest one is 43. Figure 40 shows the variation of the average number of women killed per SMV event with the death group. For each death group the number of women killed is divided by the total number of SMV events with death tolls within the given group. The figure shows a marked proportional




Figure 39: Proportion of Victimised Women by Death Group.




Figure 40: Average Number of Victimised Women per Massacre versus Death Group.

increase with the death group except for the massacres with the largest magnitudes. SMV events with death tolls between 31 and 40 per atrocity victimise women the most.

One can also look at how the percentage of women abducted and probably killed varies with the magnitudes of the massacres. The largest fractions are found in the massacres with the smallest and largest death tolls per event, i.e. 13.7 % and 7.9 %, respectively.

The average number of women abducted per SMV event is 2.3. The lowest number of women abducted per massacre is 1 and the largest one is 30. The largest number of abducted women per atrocity eventuates in the massacres with the largest death group per event, i.e. 10.6 %; this ratio is about 1 % for the SMV incidents with lower magnitudes.

We now briefly consider the time evolution and space distribution of the proportions of women per death toll and the average number of women killed per massacre. The calculation is for the period between June 97 and January 98 (see table 8) and for the 6 most victimised districts (see table 9).

Table 8 reports the monthly proportions of women per victimisation volume obtained by dividing the monthly number of women killed by the total monthly death toll; this variable is denoted  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{women}}$ . It also shows the monthly average number of women killed per massacre found by dividing the monthly number of women killed by the total number of SMV events during the month (this variable is called  $\langle N_{\text{women}}/\text{Event} \rangle$ ).

Table 8: Monthly Change of Victimization Women Jun. 97 - Jan. 98

	Jun. 97	Jul. 97	Aug. 97	Sep. 97	Oct. 97	Nov. 97	Dec. 97	Jan. 98
<b>Ratio<sub>women</sub> in %</b>	20.0	11.6	14.7	26.7	50.0	18.8	22.9	40.3
<b><math>\langle N_{\text{women}}/\text{Event} \rangle</math></b>	3	3.6	8	7	5.3	4.5	5.6	3.2

October 97 and January 98 register the highest victimisation of women, these peaks coinciding with the periods when the waves of atrocities are maximal in intensity (see figure 7). August 97 is the month with the largest average number of women killed per massacre.

In table 9, the percentage of women per death toll is calculated, for each district, by dividing the total number of women killed in the district by the total death toll of the district (this is denoted  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{women}}$ ). The average number of women killed per massacre ( $\langle N_{\text{women}}/\text{Event} \rangle$ ) for a given district is obtained by dividing the number of women killed in the district by the total number of SMV events in the district.

Table 9: District Distribution of Victimization of Women

	<b>Blida</b>	<b>Medea</b>	<b>Tiaret</b>	<b>Tipaza</b>	<b>Ain Defla</b>	<b>Algiers</b>
<b>Ratio<sub>women</sub> in %</b>	14.8	33.7	29.6	27.0	29.7	32.7
<b>&lt;N<sub>women</sub>/Event&gt;</b>	10.4	8.6	4.0	5.7	6.0	5.7

Except for Blida, Ratio<sub>women</sub> stays around the value of about 30 % throughout the districts and the values of <N<sub>women</sub>/Event> do not spread significantly away from the national average number of women killed per SMV event (6.8). Blida has the highest number of victimised women in absolute terms (198 altogether) but it has the lowest Ratio<sub>women</sub> and the highest <N<sub>women</sub>/Event>.

Regarding the victimisation of women through random mass killings, there is not enough quantitative data to evaluate it. Among the RMV events listed in table B, one can only say the bombings in cemeteries tend to kill a higher proportion of women as they visit them in larger proportions than men. For instance, all the victims of the bombing in Médéa cemetery on 20 June 1998 were women.

#### 4.4.3. *Victimisation Dependence on Kinship*

We now focus on the kinship component of the victimised population. It is often the case that the news reports do not give the kinship details and numbers of the victims. Those that do give such details characteristically say ‘X out of the Y victims were from a single family’, or ‘X deaths from Y different families’ etc. without specifying what is referred to as ‘family’. In the reports that do describe the kinship relation under the category ‘family’ one finds a variety of connections. The term ‘family’ is used to designate ‘many brothers’, ‘a couple and their baby’, ‘a father, his sons, daughters and a boy aged one’, ‘a mother and her daughters’, or ‘several children and their grandmother’. One also finds combinations of these relations: Mohammed Alliche, aged 53, a survivor of the Raïs massacre, told Robert Fox ‘the killers burnt the house and murdered my mother and niece and another 15 of my relatives. From my family of 60 members, we lost 17 in that one night.’<sup>110</sup> ‘Family’ should therefore be understood here as a broad kinship unit inclusive of these situations, i.e. cases where a significant part or the whole of a nuclear or extended family is victimised.<sup>1</sup>

Table 10 lists the sub-sample of events for which the number of victimised families is reported. The list records only 46 out of the 339 SMV events in

<sup>1</sup> See section 2.1 of M. Farouk, T. S. Senhadji and M. Aït-Larbi (eds.), *Voices of the Voiceless*, in part I of this book, for trees of victimised families.

Table 10: Family Component of the Selective Mass Victimisation

Date	Location/District	Deaths	Kinship Details
12 Dec. 93	Bordj El Kiffan/Algiers	13	1 family
13 Aug. 94	Bourbika/Tipaza	11	1 family
7 May 95	Boufarik/Blida	6	3 from 1 family
12 Jan. 97	Tabainat/Blida	19	3 families
23 Jan. 97	Baraki/Algiers	5	1 family
31 Jan. 97	S. Bouhdjar/Blida	33	5 from 1 family
5 Feb. 97	Benchicao/Medea	9	1 family
18 Feb. 97	Kerrach/Blida	31	8 from 1 family
21 Feb. 97	Laghouat	12	5 from 1 family
30 May 97	Medea	5	1 family
12 Jul. 97	Mfetha/Medea	33	5 families
18 Jul. 97	Bousmail/Tipaza	14	1 family
22 Jul. 97	Yemma Mghite/Blida	39	15 from 1 family
27 Jul. 97	Si-Zerrouk/Blida	51	10 from 1 family
3 Aug. 97	Amroussa/Blida	26	2 families
4 Aug. 97	Medroussa/Tiaret	11	1 family
14 Aug. 97	Douira/Tipaza	15	2 families
26 Aug. 97	Zahara/Tlemcen	6	1 family
28 Aug. 97	Beni Moali/Mascara	9	1 family
29 Aug. 97	Rais/Blida	300	At least 17 from 1 family
30 Aug. 97	Chlef	14	2 families
1 Sep. 97	Bologhine/Algiers	19	2 families
29 Sep. 97	Larbaa/Blida	9	1 family
2 Oct. 97	Ain Boucif/Medea	13	1 family
10 Oct. 97	Souagui/Medea	9	1 family
12 Oct. 97	Beni Slimane/Medea	22	4 from 1 family
12 Oct. 97	Souidania/Blida	14	2 families
20 Oct. 97	Bougtoob/Saida	11	2 families
27 Oct. 97	Oued Djer/Medea	16	4 families
22 Nov. 97	Sidi Medjbar/Algiers	7	1 family
8 Dec. 97	Medea/Medea	7	1 family
22 Dec. 97	Moretti/Tipaza	5	1 family
23 Dec. 97	Bainem/Algiers	11	2 families
26 Dec. 97	Zouabria/Tiaret	27	3 families
8 Jan. 98	Saida	9	1 family
10 Jan. 98	Bordj Khriss/Bouira	11	2 families
11 Jan. 98	Sidi Hamed/Blida	>400	21 families

Table 10: Family Component of the Selective Mass Victimization (cont'd).

14 Jan. 98	Ouazra/Medea	6	1 family
25 Jan. 98	Frenda/Tiaret	20	1 family
16 Jul. 98	Sidi-Ouadah/Tiaret	21	3 families
5 Aug 98	Tagdempt/Tiaret	10	1 family
5 Aug. 98	Beni Mester/Tlemcen	7	1 family
6 Aug. 98	Ouled Yekhle/Bouira	9	1 family
17 Nov. 98	Khemis Miliani/Ain Defla	8	5 from 1 family
2 Dec. 98	Sidi Rached/Tipaza	12	1 family
8 Dec. 98	Tajena/Tipaza	81	24 from 1 family/13 from 1 family

table A in the appendix. This list is smaller than that of victimised children. We could have added events from the list of massacres involving a significant number of children (table 4) but we did not as the kinship connections between them are not given or quantified in the reports. We followed the rule that unless the attribute 'family' was explicitly stated in the report the event would not qualify as part of the sub-sample. Note that the occurrence of family victimisation in a significant way dates back to the spring of 1996 but not many quantitative details are available until 1997. For each entry, the kinship details can be found in the reference given in the corresponding entry in table A in the appendix. Since the sub-sample in table 10 is selected on the sole criterion of quantifiability of kinship details, it should not be regarded as more than a rough pointer.

The sub-sample in table 10 counts 88 families contributing 953 related victims out of the 1427 deaths incurred in the 46 SMV events. This suggests 66.8 % of the victimised population are family related, i.e. two in three victims are akin on average.

Figure 41 shows how the percentage of related victims varies with the magnitudes of the massacres. For each death group per event, the total number of related victims is divided by the total death toll associated with the group. The largest proportion of related victims eventuates in massacres causing 11 to 20 deaths per event and the low percentages arise in large magnitude mass killings. A similar dependence was found for the percentages of victimised children by death group, a result that should not be surprising if one assumes that the victimised kinship units comprise a significant proportion of children. If one assumes that the sub-sample in table 10 is representative of the *integral* victim population listed in table A, 5800 related victims who would have been killed out of the 8675 total SMV death toll from 1992 to 1998.




Figure 41: Percentage of Related Victims by Death Group.

For the sub-sample in table 10, the average number of victimised families per SMV event is 1.9; the lowest number of families victimised per massacre is 1 and the largest count is 21 (in the massacre of Sidi Hamed, in the district of Blida, on 11 January 1998). We display in figure 42 the variation of the average number of victimised families per SMV event with the death group. For each




Figure 42: Average Number of Victimised Families per Massacre versus Death Group.



death group the total number of victims akin is divided by the total number of SMV events with death tolls within the given group. The main trend is a proportional increase with the death group. The largest magnitude massacres victimise about 6 times more families than do the lowest magnitude massacres.

The average death toll per victimised family is 10.8 members; the lowest death rate per family per massacre is 3 and the largest one is 24 (in the massacre of Tajena, in the district of Tipaza, on 8 December 1998). Figure 43 reports how the average death toll per victimised family changes with the magnitudes of the massacres. For every death group the average death toll per family is taken to be the total number of related victims divided by the total number of families involved in the chosen group. The size of the victimised families tends to enlarge with increasing death group, except for the group of 31 to 40 deaths per incident.

We now look at the time evolution and geographic dependence of the three parameters of family victimisation considered so far. The percentage of related victims is denoted  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{family}}$ , the average number of victimised families per massacre is designated  $\langle N_{\text{family}}/\text{Event} \rangle$ , and the average death toll per family will be referred to as  $\langle \text{Deaths}/\text{Kin} \rangle$ .

These parameters, calculated on a monthly basis for July, August, October and December 1997 and January 98, are shown in table 11. The months of September and November 1997 have too few events for the averages to be meaningful.




Figure 43: Average Death Toll per Family by Death Group.

Table 11: Monthly Change of Family Victimization Jul.97 - Jan. 98

	Jul. 97	Aug. 97	Oct .97	Dec. 97	Jan. 98
<b>Ratio<sub>family</sub> in %</b>	52.6	25.7	78.8	100	100
<b>&lt;N<sub>family</sub>/Event&gt;</b>	2	1.4	1.8	1.8	5.2
<b>&lt;Deaths/Kin&gt;</b>	9	9.8	6.1	7.1	17.2

Table 12: District Distribution of Family Victimization

	Blida	Medea	Algiers	Tipaza	Tiaret
<b>Ratio<sub>family</sub> in %</b>	56.7	85	100	68.1	100
<b>&lt;N<sub>family</sub>/Event&gt;</b>	3.2	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.8
<b>&lt;Deaths/Kin&gt;</b>	15.1	6.4	7.9	11.8	9.9

January 1998 is the month of the most intense terror wave in the campaign and has the largest family victimisation parameters. They depart significantly from the averages for the whole sub-sample, i.e.  $\text{Ratio}_{\text{family}} = 66.8$ ,  $\langle N_{\text{family}}/\text{Event} \rangle = 1.9$  and  $\langle \text{Deaths}/\text{Kin} \rangle = 10.8$ . This month also recorded the highest child and women victimisation (see tables 5 and 8). The monthly average number of victimised families per massacre does not scatter away from the average value for the whole sub-sample.

Table 12 gives the family victimisation parameters for the districts involving at least 7 families. In Algiers and Tipaza related victims tend to account for the integral death tolls. The average numbers of victimised families per massacre are about the average value of 1.8 except for Blida where on average 3 families are victimised per atrocity. Blida has also the largest average death toll per family.

As regards the victimisation of families through random mass killings, it is probably small on average, though there may be exceptions such as the massacre of Ouled Bey, in Khemis Djouamaa, in the district of Médéa, on 1 July 1998. Four deaths and fourteen casualties from 2 families were reported in this event. In any case there is no quantitative kinship data to evaluate this kind of victimisation.

#### 4.4.4. *Victimisation Dependence on Economic Status and Political Identity*

The news reports occasionally indicate the economic status of the victims with qualitative descriptions such as '*le petit peuple*' [the under-privileged people], 'poor peasants', 'poor villagers', 'suburbs with high unemployment' etc. It is not possible to make a quantitative analysis with such data.

Until such data are available, one can only say that these qualitative reports and the economic geography of the massacres, discussed in section 3.3.4, indicate that a) the economically privileged sections of the population or those residing in areas economically vital to the regime are safe from mass killings whereas b) the economically deprived sections of the population and those residing in areas economically deprived and/or coveted for their estate value are likely to be victimised.<sup>K</sup>

With respect to the political identities of the victims, they can be inferred from the analysis of the political geography of the massacres, in section 3.3.2. No alternative sources of quantitative data about the political allegiances of the victims are available up to now. On the basis of local and parliamentary election results it was shown that the degree of victimisation of a zone is proportional to the strength of the allegiance of its constituencies to the FIS and inversely proportional to the strength of their allegiance to the FLN.

#### 4.5. Selective Criteria for Victimisation

The social, economic and political characteristics observed in the victimised population are not random. The question now is what are the observed discriminative processes, *preceding* the massacres, that lead to them? In other words, what are the selective criteria the perpetrators use to choose their victims as legitimate and blameworthy or appropriate targets for victimisation?

Ascribed or actual 'passive sympathy' with the FIS can be a basis for victimisation as 'many massacres have taken place in areas where a large percentage of the population had voted for the FIS in the 1990 municipal elections and in the 1991 legislative elections.'<sup>111</sup>

Alleged or actual 'active support' for the armed insurgents is a marker for victimisation. A survivor of the Bentalha massacre on 22 September 1997 told Amnesty International 'the terrorists has lists of people to kill, but they also killed at random.'<sup>112</sup> Another example: Salah, a 32 year-old survivor of the Bougara massacre on 21 August 1997 told *Le Soir de Belgique* 'the chief of the group of assailants had a list of people to kill.'<sup>113</sup> The Algerian minister of health, Mr Yahia Guidoum, visited the site of the massacre few hours after it ended and told a survivor, a man who had lost all his family in the massacre and

<sup>K</sup> The contrast between the 'rich Algeria under high protection' and the 'poor Algeria under high victimisation' is most striking when they are in geographic contiguity. Few days after the Beni-Messous massacre a witness from the under-privileged suburban borough of Ain Benian, in the district of Algiers, told a journalist: 'Ain Benian has become a high risk area where insecurity and fear rule. What strikes me above all is that *Le Club des Pins* [a heavily guarded large residential area where part of the nomenklatura of the regime lives] is two kilometres away from here.' (*Le Monde*, 25 September 1997).

had asked him why the security forces did not intervene, 'but it is you who gave food and drink to the terrorists.'<sup>114</sup> A woman survivor told the BBC 'the minister told us you are the roots of terrorism, you feed it, so you must take responsibility.'<sup>115</sup> The International Federation of Human Rights reported a similar testimony from a woman who survived the Sidi-Moussa massacre in 1997. The survivor reported that, while recounting her story in the hospital of El Harrach where she had been taken, her listeners turned out to be security agents in civilian clothes who told her: 'in any case, you deserve it and we hope that after your husbands and children, it will be your turn and that of your dogs and cats because it is you who used to feed them and shelter them.'<sup>116</sup>

These statements may be simple expressions of post-massacre just-world thinking, i.e. the belief that victims have earned their suffering by their actions or character.<sup>117</sup> They do however coincide with some reported statements of legitimisation and guilt attribution by the actual perpetrators *before* the massacres. For example, *Libération* reported a survivor of the 1997 massacre in Baraki saying: 'At 10 p.m. they arrived hooded at my friend's house. They said they were looking for the son of the neighbours whom they accused of feeding the terrorists. His father was there and threatened them with an axe. They killed him. His mother removed the hood of one of the assailants who shot her in the eye after he had shouted "*ar-fet-ni* [she recognised me]". Then they slaughtered everybody except an 8 year-old boy, the son of my friend, who feigned he was dead.'<sup>118</sup>

To be a relative of a member of the armed insurgents has also been reported as selective grounds for victimisation. A large number of reliable testimonies report the fact that the families of members of insurgent groups suffer various kinds of victimisation ranging from harassment, loss of means of livelihood, to torture and to massacres.<sup>119</sup> As an example for the last category, the International Federation of Human Rights reported that on 3 August 1997, following a bomb attack on the militias of Ain El Hamra, in the district of Boumerdes, the communal guards went to the house of a family (the Saadaouis) who had one of its members in the armed insurgent movement, machine-gunned four of them and then went to three other houses of families with a son in the *maquis* and pillaged and destroyed them.<sup>120</sup> Many of the families decimated in the large magnitude massacres have sons in the insurgent movement.<sup>121</sup> Many of the houses of families with sons in the insurgent movement were pre-selected with marks (painted crosses) before the mass killings.<sup>122</sup>

Especially in rural and sub-urban areas, refusal to join in the militia groups has been reported as a discriminative marker used for singling out neighbourhoods, hamlets and villages as legitimate and blameworthy targets. For instance,

in the massacres of Relizane on 30 December 1997 and 4 and 5 January 1998, the victimised villagers had reportedly refused several times to accept the arms offered to them by the incumbent authorities.<sup>123</sup> Some victims perceived their refusal to accept the offer of arms by the authorities as a cause of their victimisation because after the massacres law-enforcement representatives, in charge of protecting them, actually blamed them for refusing to join the militia groups. For example, following the mass killing of Sour El Ghozlane, in the district of Bouira, on 8 January 1998, a spokesman of the military said ‘we asked them to arm themselves but they refused.’<sup>124</sup> After the massacres of Sidi Lantri and Mghila in the district of Tiaret on 24 December 1997, major-general Kamal Abderahmane, commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> MD, said ‘the State cannot put one soldier to each house’ and villagers must ‘arms themselves individually, regroup together and arm their youths, or leave and go to cities.’<sup>125</sup> The victims’ interpretation of refusal to accept arms as blameworthy grounds for victimisation is particularly associated with the notorious reply of a spokesman of the government who, when asked ‘what does the state do to protect its citizens?’, said ‘what does the citizen do for the state? To earn one’s rights, one must assume one’s duties. There should be no neutrality. We thought all Algerians were good patriots but this is not the case. At Rais, for instance, why did the inhabitants wait until they got slaughtered one by one [to ask for arms]?’<sup>126</sup>

These are the main and frequently reported criteria of victimisation for large magnitude massacres. For smaller magnitude massacres, there have been reports of victimisation of families of FIS activists, imams, factory workers, lawyers, policemen and militiamen. For example, six textile factory workers were massacred in Tizi Ouzou on 18 March 1996, 8 family members of a female lawyer were massacred in Bouira on 23 June 1996, five family members of a policeman were massacred in Baraki, in Algiers, on 22 January 1997 and a day earlier an imam and seven members of his family were massacred in Rehal, in the district of Saida.<sup>127</sup>

#### **4.6. Victim Vulnerability**

The victimisation of children and women was found to account for 30.8% and 18.2%, respectively, of the victimised populations of the corresponding sub-samples. If these sub-samples are taken as representative of the whole victimised population then about half of it would be made up of children and women. Children are not able to defend themselves and women are vulnerable to the kind of overwhelming destructive power they are assaulted with. They are purposefully massacred irrespective of the fact that they are harmless to the assailants.

In the testimonial reports about the large magnitude massacres there is evidence that the males are also intentionally massacred regardless of whether they surrender or resist. Part of the male members of the victimised neighbourhoods, hamlets or villages do defend themselves or their families, individually and/or collectively, from being massacred. Their armaments, alarm system, and defence are reportedly rudimentary and inadequate. This is discussed in detail in the next section.

The vulnerability of the victimised population, which from the available evidence appears to be overwhelmingly the social base of the FIS and the armed insurgent movement, has evolved with time. The coup d'Etat of January 1992 was a response to the parliamentary elections of 26 December 1991, the most decisive threat by the FIS and its electorate to the power of the military rulers since independence. Decapitation of the party, its banning and a crackdown on its adherents ensued. Various armed insurgent groups then emerged (AIS, FIDA, GIA, MIA) and the civil war entrenched.

Observers estimate that the armed insurgent movement had been a real military contender to the regime only up to the spring 1995. The main military force then was the GIA, a loose alliance of various armed groups. Once the incumbent regime succeeded in exploding the GIA into splinter groups and turning its remnants into a counter-guerrilla force, in the autumn of 1995, the balance of power shifted decisively in its favour.

At the onset of the campaign of waves of massacres in the spring of 1996, the social base of the FIS and the insurgents was at its most vulnerable on two fronts.

First, the disarray of the splinter groups from the GIA, and the weakness of the AIS were such that there was no credible deterrent force to protect the social base of the FIS from mass victimisation. According to many reports, the AIS had not been able to do more than use its intelligence to warn neighbourhoods or villages of impending victimisation. In any case, it declared a unilateral truce in September 1997, some say partly to conceal its inconsequential weight on the course of events and its impotence to protect even the families of its own members and supporters.

Second, the silence of the most influential members of the international community increased the vulnerability of the target populations. Although the massacre waves of the autumn of 1997 drew some international attention, it was only in January 1998 that effective calls for protecting the victimised populations were made. January 1998 registered the highest massacre activity throughout the campaign. These calls probably reduced the vulnerability of

the victimised population and could be the cause of the sharp drop in terror waves (see figure 7).

#### **4.7. Some Victim Responses during the Massacres**

Here we report some individual and collective responses of the victims during a few of the large magnitude massacres. These brief excerpts of testimonies serve to illustrate the vulnerability of the victims and their various perceptions and responses to the victimisation.

The individual reactions of the victims can be classified into four types: passivity, passive resistance, escape and confrontation. Pointing to the house in which 17 people died, a survivor of the Bentalha massacre told Fisk: 'I stood here at the window and I could hear those poor people screaming and crying. When I looked out of my window, I could see them axing the women on the roof.'<sup>128</sup> There are many cases of men who simply froze from fear and awaited passively their execution.<sup>129</sup> It was reported that in the massacre of Beni-Messous, on 5 September 1997, an old man, Mr Khair, pleaded to be killed by fire rather than being slaughtered.<sup>130</sup> In the massacre of Safsaf in the district of Mascara, on 28 December 1999, the thirty peasants slaughtered in the mosque begged unsuccessfully for mercy.<sup>131</sup>

There are instances of less passive responses. In the massacre of Haouch Khemisti, in the district of Blida, on 21 April 1997, Radia, a 14-year-old girl survived and reportedly said: 'I was shot twice in the back and fell on my face. I feigned death to escape being finished off.'<sup>132</sup> Hocine, a 13 year old survivor of the massacre of Hadjout, in Tipaza, on 24 July 1997, describes his escape:

One of them asked where was the light. They slaughtered all my little sisters and my little brother. I felt the blade of the knife on my neck, there was blood all over my clothes. I escaped and run outside to hide in a flock. There was a bag of manure. I put it on my neck to stop the blood. I stayed all the night with the goats.<sup>133</sup>

Mohamed, a 41 year old survivor of the Rais massacre, in Blida, on 29 August 1997, said: 'We began running to the police station for help when I met one of the terrorists. He tried to kill me with an axe but I wrestled him to the ground and beat him before getting away with family.'<sup>134</sup> *La Croix* reported the testimony of Aissa, a survivor of the Beni Messous massacre:

A blow on his back left him flat on the ground. His ribs were cracked. Three minutes later, events took over; Aissa heard a rattle but not cries. A head rolled next to him. 'I will never know whether it belonged to an adult or to a child,' he murmured. Without moving, Aissa shouted at his own relatives: 'you should not die in the shame of God. You should fight back'. He leapt to his feet. He head-butted the man who had knocked



him down earlier, the latter dropped his Kalachnikov and fell down, but no one else stood up, so Aissa fled. 'Later I asked my uncles and cousins who survived why they did not budge. Mabrouk, Ali, Abbas were among them. All of them were tough men but fear had paralysed them.'<sup>135</sup>

Various *collective* responses can be noted from the reports. As instances of collective escape one can cite the massacre of Relizane, on 30 December 1997, where survivors spoke of 'fleeing in the darkness while the gangs stabbed and hacked their victims.'<sup>136</sup> A frequently reported collective reaction in victimised sub-urban neighbourhoods is calling regular security forces for help. Lyes About, a 24-year-old survivor of the Bentalha massacre, told Fox: 'We called the army after 15 minutes. The soldiers came but halted on the other side of that road; they said they wouldn't come closer because they believed this road was mined.'<sup>137</sup> Another survivor of the same atrocity told a British television:

Some people escaped the butchery and went to the military. We were hearing gun-shots and everything. Someone told them clearly come and defend us. The soldier replied: 'I do not have the order to shoot. So I am waiting for the order.' The man told them 'give me at least a kalashnikov and I will defend my family on my own.' The soldier told him: 'you are not going to show me how to do my job.'<sup>138</sup>

In terms of collective resistance, Hirst reported from Ahmed Aitar, a father of 11 children who survived the Bentalha massacre, that

Some of his neighbours took refuge in his house. That is why 24 people died on the first floor, and 17, along with his wife, son and daughter, on the second. About 120 more managed to escape to the roof. There he had been planning some fresh construction; so there was a pile of bricks to hand. We hurled them down at them, as they came up the stairs, then slammed the door,' he said.'<sup>139</sup>

In another example, Mohamed a survivor of the Haouch Khemisti massacre, on 21 April 1997, said: 'my four daughters, two daughters in-law, two sisters, my wife and son were killed. Where is the state? For three hours, they did what they wanted. Two villagers who had weapons managed to resist and killed two of the members of the group.'<sup>140</sup>

#### **4.8. Some Effects of the Massacres**

To the best of our knowledge, no study of the impacts of the massacres on the relatives of the victims, the survivors or the targeted communities, at a psychological or social level, has been made and published so far. This section is devoted to reporting a few of the effects of the massacres on the victimised populations. The psychological sequels on individuals and the trans-generational impacts on families will not be reviewed here as there are only scattered pieces



of information<sup>1</sup>. We focus on only four collective effects: social fear, induced self-defence, mass exodus, and electoral behaviour.

#### 4.8.1. *Social Fear*

The populations living in, or next to, targeted areas perceive their own victimisation as impending and probable and their vulnerability as indefensible. These perceptions generate social fear or terror and, when a dangerous situation actually eventuates, they provoke collective panic, i.e. a spontaneous and disorganised reaction in the populations.

In the autumn of 1997, many reports spoke of ‘the psychosis of massacres that seized Algiers.’<sup>141</sup> People residing in the suburbs of Algiers fled from their homes and sought refuge with friends or slept in public places. Rumours and false alarms provoked scenes of panic. Rachid, a refugee from a victimised village in Blida who fled to a shanty town in Algiers says:

We are surrounded by the most dangerous neighbourhoods of Algiers. Recently a bomb exploded in the middle of the night in a neighbouring estate. I could hear from afar the ululation and the wailing of women. I rung the alarm. We found ourselves in the main avenue, in pyjamas, in an indescribable panic. Today fear adds further to our misery.<sup>142</sup>

The populations in highly victimised areas are in a permanent state of alert, with no possibility of rest; ‘at the slightest alarm, they wake up and make noise.’<sup>143</sup> The terror induced by the massacres sometimes distorts people’s perception of reality and blurs the boundaries between the real, the possible and the imaginary. For instance, the summer and autumn saw a succession of false alarms in Algiers. Larbi, a decorator who volunteered for night vigils in an estate in Birkhadem, narrates:

<sup>1</sup> For example, Malika Sennia who heads the social services unit in Blida said that the children orphaned in massacres go through ‘a period of aggression, then deep mistrust... they are mad at the world.’ Redouane Mebarki, a 14 year old boy who lost his father and two brothers in a massacre, is reported to have said ‘I can’t take it anymore. There is nothing good’. (*Associated Press*, 3 December 1997). K. H., a psychoanalyst in a coastal city of Algeria, told *Les Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace*: ‘Today, all the patients that I treat are cases directly related to the security situation in the country. The number of patients increases steadily. Nine out of ten patients are in a state of depression. There is a substantial increase in the number of suicide attempts. There is no doubt we will soon, reach the suicide rates of western countries.’ (*Dernières Nouvelles d’Alsace*, 12 March 1998). There is a significant number of survivors being insane following the killings. *Libération* on 29 January 1998 reported the testimony of a doctor receiving the injured from a massacre in the autumn of 1997: ‘I remember the first massacre in particular, a lorry parked in the hospital courtyard early in the morning. I saw tens of superposed bodies in the trailer. They were piled one on the other as if they were already dead. It was a nightmare and I did not even dare get closer. They freed a woman; they had attempted to slaughter her from the front and her neck. Another woman was walking on her own. I realised all her right side, from top to bottom, was riddled by a hail of bullets. She was saying: “Walu [I am all right].” It is as if she felt guilty of escaping death while all her kin had been slaughtered.’

At 2:00 am at night we heard a woman screaming 'here they are! The *dbebbahine* [the slaughterers] have come!' We then ran armed with clubs and rods. We saw four men running away. We caught one of them and gave him a good thrashing. He was shouting: 'I am not a terrorist, I am only a thief.' It was true but he should have given up his job at these times.<sup>144</sup>

David reported that in Staouali 'the rumour that an armed group was present in the abattoirs estate completely emptied the town from its population and, within a few minutes, managed to transform a particularly lively coastal town into a deserted ghost town given over to roaming dogs.'<sup>145</sup> This fear-distorted perception of reality is sometimes most cynically exploited. In Baraki, thieves spread rumours of impending massacres and then took advantage of the flight of the inhabitants to steal their furniture in vans.<sup>146</sup> In Bourouba, El-Biar and Baraki, cars would stop and some youths would come out and threaten passers-by with knives or shoot creating 'big stampedes in the terrorised neighbourhoods. The movement of the crowd is sometimes manipulated, used as a weapon: methods which resemble a signature, that of the all-powerful but divided Algerian army. Clearly a faction is attempting to benefit from the situation.'<sup>147</sup>

The massacres have severed the links and trust between the victimised populations and the security forces. Cranshaw reported that 'villagers always stop telling you their story when yet another armed man in uniform slides into earshot.'<sup>148</sup> Lloyd witnessed that 'in no other zone of conflict have I seen people so afraid to speak their minds to a foreigner. This fear is not eased by the constant presence of armed plain clothes 'minders' who shadow almost every move of foreign journalists.'<sup>149</sup>

Regarding the social fears induced by random mass victimisation, residents of cities experience them as a continuous state of anxious anticipation. A resident of Algiers says that 'walking in the streets near parked cars chills you to the bone, as most parked vehicles are feared as lethal things.'<sup>150</sup> As for the fear of mass killings in roadblocks, Leila, a dentist living in Bouira, says: 'We always go in groups of 3 or 4 cars. That way, if we hit at a faux-barrage, only the people in the first car get killed. It is like Russian roulette.'<sup>151</sup>

Social fear has become a pivotal organising structure of life for the populations living in or next to victimised areas.

#### *4.8.2. Induced Armed Self-defence*

The fear and sense of powerlessness experienced individually by members of the victimised populations has prompted many suburban estates, hamlets and

villages to organise their own self-defence systems. These independent self-defence groups were induced by the waves of terror of the summer and autumn of 1997 and located mainly in Algiers and its surroundings. The more common effect of the earlier and subsequent waves of terror has been to induce people from the victimised districts to join the ranks of the army-managed paramilitary militias and vigilante groups.

Here we report mainly on independent self-defence as much literature is available on the army-run vigilante groups and paramilitary militias.<sup>152</sup>

Individuals who joined the independent self-defence committee were reported to have explained, for instance, that 'the government fails to protect us'<sup>153</sup> or 'together we are less afraid'.<sup>154</sup> There are cases where the people feel the army does not just fail, but does not wish to protect them. For instance residents of the hamlet of Les Oliviers neighbourhood in Douaouda in Tipaza (an area victimised on 5 January 1997) were reported to have said: 'It has been 8 months since we asked the authorities to give us weapons but we got nothing. The security forces consider that our neighbourhood is dangerous and helps terrorists.'<sup>155</sup> The suspicious behaviour of the security forces and irregular paramilitary forces was also reported as motivation to join these committees.<sup>156</sup> For example, Ali, a member of such a group in Blida, explains: 'Now on the roofs, people make petrol bombs and bombs with gas cylinders. They throw them on anyone who passes by. They have warned: be it police or terrorists we will throw.'<sup>157</sup>

The fear-induced self-defence is organised through vigilance committees.<sup>158</sup> People sleep in turn to participate in vigils and patrols.<sup>159</sup> For example, in 'El-Harrach, the neighbours organise themselves in groups, demarcate coded sectors and each one is equipped with a powerful alarm.'<sup>160</sup> They 'club together to install projectors to light their estates and its surroundings, and bells to sound the alarm.'<sup>161</sup> 'Door locks are reinforced, windows are barbed-wired'<sup>162</sup> and men arm themselves with 'clubs, hammers, axes, [...] swords, spades, rods, anything.'<sup>163</sup>

These independent self-defence groups, which are circumscribed to Algiers and its surroundings, have been a distinctive effect of the terror waves of the summer and autumn of 1997. The more common response of the victimised estates, hamlets or villages which could not, or would not, leave their homes has been to join the paramilitary militias, a corps supervised by the army and the Gendarmerie. This force has grown into an at least 200,000 strong force since the onset of the waves of massacres. The militias divide mainly into the

GAD (Groupes d'Auto-Défense) and the 'patriots' (Patriots militias).<sup>164</sup> The GAD are essentially villagers and peasants drilled to support the army's territorial defence. The 'patriots' militias are intensively trained by the army to engage in territorial offensive and subversive operations against the insurgents.<sup>165</sup> Unlike the independent 'committees of vigilance' of Algiers, these 'self-defence groups' are trained, armed and paid by the incumbent authorities. They are granted social status (through uniforms and insignas) and social favours (access to jobs, housing, medical care, commerce and business for themselves and their relatives).<sup>166</sup>

#### *4.8.3. Exodus*

Meziani, a survivor of the Relizane massacre, explained his decision to flee his village: 'Leaving is better than dying. I am leaving everything here, my house, my crops, what is left of my livestock. To go where? I don't know but I cannot stay here.'<sup>167</sup> Another survivor of the same massacre said: 'I just do not want to be here anymore.'<sup>168</sup> Ali Benamrane, a 36-year-old farmer who survived the Raïs massacre (on 29 August 1997) fled from his house to the slums of displaced people in Algiers. He explained that 'I left because there is no more state to protect us.'<sup>169</sup> Once an estate or village is targeted, the only secure alternative to joining a self-defence group is exodus. In remote villages in under-populated rural areas peasants leave their homes because 'the authorities ask them to leave their mountains and go to secure areas.'<sup>170</sup> General Kamal Abderrahmane, commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> military district, was reported to have told the victimised residents of Relizane: 'People must either arm or take refuge in towns. The state does not have the means to put a soldier in front of every house.'<sup>171</sup> Farid, a survivor of the massacre in the Mitidja region and now a refugee in Algiers said: 'One morning, the terrorists came with axes and knives. They slaughtered five young women and abducted two 15 year old girls. The next day we found inscription on the walls: "Flight or Death". We decided to leave and come here. It is not paradise but it is better than hell.'<sup>172</sup>

From the news reports, the districts most affected by the exodus are Blida, Médéa, Tipaza, Chlef, Tiaret, Relizane, Jijel, Saida and Tissemsilt. No quantitative estimate of the number of people displaced because of the massacres is available yet, but some numbers have been given for particular districts or events.

For instance, Human Rights Watch suggested, on the basis of an interview with Abderrahmane Denden, a member of the Algerian League of Human Rights, that up to May 1997 more than 2,000 people had left the villages surrounding Tipaza.<sup>173</sup> Weber estimated that following the massacres of Decem-

ber 1997 in Relizane, in which 4 hamlets were totally decimated, the remaining villages in the mountain were deserted by 70% of their occupants.<sup>174</sup> According to the paper *Liberté*, '99 % of the 24 hamlets that make up the town of Had Chekala, in the district of Relizane, were deserted.'<sup>175</sup> The paper gave no source for its figure.

The victimised populations flee to more secure towns and cities. The conditions in which they evacuate their homes are often dramatic. Typical reports speak of people leaving 'bare handed', 'the doors of houses left open', 'untended farms and abandoned cattle',<sup>176</sup> and of 'barefooted children walking clung to the skirts of women who bend under the weight of bundles'.<sup>177</sup> The journey to the final destination causes much anxiety among the refugees because, according to the International Federation of Human Rights, 'hundreds of people were massacred on the roads in roadblocks controlled by armed groups, or attacks on buses or else in ambushes'.<sup>178</sup> On arrival to towns and cities the refugees settle in mosques, stores, courtyards of hospitals, stair-wells of buildings, public squares or tents in emergency camps provided by a few councils. Reporting on the exodus of the inhabitants of Baraki, an oft-victimised suburb of Algiers, in the first few days of September 1997, David says:

The quarter of Hussein-Dey was stormed in the middle of the night by refugees with meagre luggage packed into battered pick ups. Woken up with a start towards one o'clock in the morning, the tetanized residents thought it was a terrorist attack. The quarter shrieked with sirens of police and Gendarmerie vehicles all night.

It took several hours, practically until sunrise, to reassure the residents and 'control' the refugees who were treated as potential enemies as a precaution. The toing and froing between the police and the refugees continued throughout Sunday.

Those who managed to escape from the police spent the night in the stair wells of buildings they had forced to open. As soon as they were caught, the others were forcefully taken back under escort during the same night to their homes to prevent 'repetitions'. In other quarters of Algiers it is hard to find evidence of this exodus that is promptly repressed by authorities badly in need of normalising the situation. But the Z'mirli hospital in El-Harrach still has visible traces: hundreds of refugees (two thousand according to a nurse working in the hospital) are gathered in the large courtyard of the hospital that has been transformed into a gigantic camp.

Surrounded by armed police, men, women and children of all ages, distressed by the ordeals of the previous night, look frantically at the passers-by who stare at them. The journalists are firmly sent away. Any contact with the refugees is forbidden, the orders come from 'the top'.<sup>179</sup>

The conditions of the refugees who are not forcefully expelled by the police or the military back to areas under their total control and remain in towns

and cities is generally dismal.<sup>180</sup> There have been reports of mass victimisation of refugee families who had escaped earlier massacres. For instance in the massacre of Douera on 13 August 1997, a 15-member family that includes two women and six children was slaughtered. They had fled the Beni-Slimane massacre in Médéa in March 1997, bought a patch of land and built a makeshift home in Douera.<sup>181</sup> The internally displaced populations also face severe problems of housing, health, employment and education. Sakharov prize for human rights winner and journalist Salima Ghezali said:

In Algeria 28 million of women, men and children live in terror of the daily killings. The vast majority of the population suffers, with equal terror, from the denial of the most basic right to decency.

At the bend of the main roads of the capital, thousands of Algerians – men, women and youths – live under tents in insalubrious grounds. Thousands of other Algerians have squatted containers – formerly used to transport the goods that enrich the ruling oligarchy – into which whole families are crammed.

When tens of thousands of Algerians flee the terror reigning in the rural areas to build makeshift shelters around big cities, the bulldozers are the first to meet them.<sup>182</sup>

The Algerian political class largely ignores this problem. While the plight of Algerian refugees abroad is known and cared for<sup>183</sup>, that of victimised and displaced populations within Algeria is largely forgotten by the international community. In January 1998 many Western governments offered humanitarian assistance to massacre-stricken areas but these offers were rejected by Ouyahia, the then prime-minister, on the grounds that 'Algeria does not need them and it has the means.'<sup>184</sup>

#### *4.8.4. Electoral Behaviour*

The effect of the massacres on the electoral status and behaviour of the victimised populations has been largely ignored. Although the plight of the refugees displaced by the massacres has not interested the political parties in power, their electoral utility has. Referring to the political impact of the exodus of the populations from highly victimised districts, Human Rights Watch said:

The troubles have halted political life in these regions; in other respects, some are worried and want to know where and how the displaced persons will vote. According to the electoral law, the voters must register where they reside permanently but the government has neither shown an intention to allow the displaced persons to vote in 'mobile' polling stations nor has it promised to provide security guarantees for them to go back to their homes and vote. The political parties were favourable for the second option.<sup>185</sup>

In the local election of 23 October 1997, Farah, a 36 year-old school-teacher



and mother of three, voting in the working class Algiers neighbourhood of Kouba, was reported to have said: 'I am voting above all for security so that my children don't die with their throats slit.'<sup>186</sup> In the constitutional referendum of 28 November 1996, Said, an 80 year-old resident of Algiers, was reported to have said: 'I am voting so that I don't get accused of being an enemy of the nation. And I voted yes, but I don't know what use this is going to be.'<sup>187</sup>

Because the distribution of votes and allegiances become known after the elections, voters were reported to be afraid to be associated with the municipality of the 'wrong' political allegiance or persuasion. This is the meaning of 'voting for security', an instinctive understanding of the political geography of the victimisation and of the security cost of political choices. Louisa Hanoune, leader of the Labour Party, testified that:

To travel by bus from Algiers to another city is to run grave risks. Very recently, a bus in which one member of our party was travelling was stopped in a roadblock on the road to Sétif. Armed members forced all the passengers to disembark. They were about to kill them. They then consulted each other and let them go without any explanation. On the Algiers-Tlemcen road, an identical scenario took place. It was on 26 December 1996. They forced all the passengers to disembark and filmed them. The passengers had to answer how they voted in the referendum on the new constitution held on 28 November 1996. They were incredibly lucky but this insanity is the daily lot of millions of Algerians.<sup>188</sup>

Using tables A and B, one can look at the time evolution of the SMV and RMV activities in the weeks leading to the elections, during the elections and after them. In the case of the constitutional referendum of 28 November 1996 one finds a total of 14 SMV and RMV events (134 deaths) in the four weeks leading to the poll, no massacre on the day of the referendum, and 4 SMV and RMV events (52 deaths) in the two weeks following the referendum. For the parliamentary elections of 5 June 1997, the tables give 15 SMV and RMV events (171 deaths) in the 4 weeks preceding the election, no massacre on election day and 7 SMV and RMV events (112 deaths) in the two weeks following the poll. The municipal elections of 23 October 1997 were preceded by 37 mass killings (618 deaths) in the four weeks leading to the poll. There was only one bombing on election day and 14 SMV and RMV events (131 deaths) in the fortnight following the poll.

Figure 44 shows the weekly fluctuations of the total SMV and RMV activity for the November 1996 referendum and the June and October 1997 elections. It is striking that election days are breathing spells preceded by a flare-up and then subsiding of mass killings, and followed by a rise in mass killings again. Election days appear as lulls between terror waves. As was pointed in




Figure 44: Weekly Fluctuations of SMV and RMV activity at Election Times.




Figure 45: Weekly Fluctuations of Deaths from SMV and RMV at Election Times.



section 3.2, Merloo suggests that in the application of the strategy of waves of terror with lulls in between, the breathing spell 'can be used to much better advantage for political persuasion and mass hypnosis provided some new wave of terror is anticipated.'<sup>189</sup>

Figure 45 displays the weekly fluctuations of the numbers of victims of selective and random mass victimisation. It corroborates in the three cases the time modulation of the atrocities relative to election days shown in figure 44.

One can calculate the district distribution of the mass terror for these periods (4 weeks before, and 2 weeks after, the elections). For the November 1996 referendum, Algiers, Blida and Médéa account for 77.8 % of the total victimisation activity and 79 % of the total victimisation volume. For the June 1997 elections they contribute 63.6 % of the victimisation activity and 44.5 % of the victimisation volume. In the case of the October 1997 elections, they account for 50 % of the overall massacre activity and 56.2 % of the victimisation volume. See the discussion on the political geography of the mass killings in section 3.3.2.

Referring to the June 97 parliamentary elections, the International Federation of Human Rights also noted:

On 21 April 1997, the closing day for candidates to put forward their names in the elections, 93 men, women and children were executed in the middle of the night in a farm in the region of Bougara, south of Algiers. On 14 May 1997, on the eve of the launch of the electoral campaign, 30 civilians were massacred in the region of Chebli, not far from Bougara, in the Mitidja plains – a stronghold of the GIA and the armed militias supported by the regime.<sup>190</sup>

An illustration of the effect of such terror on voters in the Mitidja region can be found in the report of David a day before the 5 June 1997 elections. Mourad, a café-owner resident in Blida, told David: 'Elections have always been a period of extreme insecurity for us. The sooner they are over, the better for us. The next local elections and all the elections to come are useless.'<sup>191</sup>

## 5. Criminological Elements

We now consider the third unit of analysis of this inquiry: the population of crimes and alleged perpetrators. This is the traditional object of interest of criminology that measures and examines the nature and distributions of crimes and criminals.

This, however, is not a criminological study. It is simply a literature digest on these aspects. We pointed out in section 2 that the alleged perpetrator informa-

tion is probably the most distorted and unreliable component of the data. But rather than ignore this data totally, we chose to discriminate it into three elements and review the corresponding literature. These three elements are crimes and weapons, number and modus operandi, and appearance and identity of the perpetrators. The crimes and weapons information may be the least distorted; published photographic evidence support part of it. There are, however, dramatic discrepancies in the identity of the perpetrators depending on the nature of the source (victims, alleged perpetrators, human rights NGOs and media reports).

We discuss the weapons and crimes associated with SMV and RMV events in section 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. Section 5.3 summarises reports about the organisation of the perpetrators (numbers, modus operandi etc.). In section 5.4 we review all the conflicting allegations about the identity of the perpetrators.

### 5.1. Weapons and Crimes in SMV Events

A weapon inventory in the news and witness reports yields:

*Firearms:* machine-guns, kalashnikovs, handguns, grenades, hunting rifles, shotguns and sawn-off shotguns, petrol and cylinder bombs;

*Sharp objects:* knives, axes, machetes, saws, swords, hatchets;

*Blunt objects:* clubs, metal bars;

*Other weapons:* spades, picks, chain saws<sup>192</sup>, guillotines.<sup>193</sup>

The data are not quantitative and hence not subject to a quantitative trend analysis.

The targets of selective mass killings rarely survive the atrocities. Table A lists a national total of only 877 injured for 8675 killed. The use of sharp objects seems the most frequent weapon used by the perpetrators. The most frequently reported method of killing is throat-cutting with knives. There are many reports of beheading, evisceration and hacking of men, women and children with the sharp objects listed above.<sup>194</sup> The use of firearms is reported mainly as a method of killing of fleeing victims.<sup>195</sup> In the massacres of Bentalha and Relizane there were reports of babies bashed to death against walls<sup>196</sup> and babies and children thrown to their deaths from rooftops and balconies.<sup>197</sup>

The perpetrators use fire in various ways to burn their victims alive. A witness of the Larbaa massacre on 28 July 1977 explains a burning technique frequently used when residents of a house barricade themselves in:

They drilled a hole in a window or a door and then introduced the pipe of a cylinder of gas to burn alive those hidden inside. They finished off all those who came out. I saw it all through my shutters.<sup>198</sup>

Grenades and dynamite were also reportedly used to evict forcefully victims barricaded in their homes who were then slaughtered.<sup>199</sup> Reports also speak of victims individually burnt alive without specifying the flammable agents.<sup>200</sup> In the massacre of Bentalha, a baby was reportedly burnt in a kitchen oven.<sup>201</sup>

A wide range of sadistic and necromaniac practices accompany the massacres. The bodies of the dead are reportedly hacked, mutilated, disfigured, dismembered or burned.<sup>202</sup> The perpetrators of the massacres use the parts of their dismembered victims for spectacularly ghoulish effects. There are reports of children crucified on trees<sup>203</sup> and heads spiked on stakes<sup>204</sup>, put on doorways<sup>205</sup>, trees or on the road.<sup>206</sup> Survivors of the massacre of Had Chekala in Relizane reported that they had found 'the head of a man on the decapitated body of a donkey'<sup>207</sup> and, in the October 1997 massacre of Hamadi, the perpetrators 'beheaded a man and a dog before attaching the man's head to the dog's body and vice versa.'<sup>208</sup>

Various necromaniac acts were reported. In the November 1996 massacre in Douaouda, in Tipaza, men were castrated before their throats were slashed.<sup>209</sup> In the January 1997 massacre of Haouch El Hadj, in Blida, one of the female victims was reportedly found with one of her severed breasts in her mouth.<sup>210</sup> In the January 1998 Relizane massacre, a baby was reportedly found with his extirpated heart in his mouth.<sup>211</sup> In this same massacre a foetus was reportedly extirpated from an eviscerated woman and slaughtered.<sup>212</sup>

The perpetrators' passion for tearing apart living structures and terrorising extends also to animals. In the December 1997 massacre in Sidi Senoussi, in Tlemcen, 500 sheep were slaughtered along with the six shepherds to whom they belonged.<sup>213</sup>

Along with the mass killings, the perpetrators rape and kidnap women. As was discussed in section 4.4.2, most of the kidnapped women are reportedly found dead a few days to a few weeks after their abduction.

The perpetrators also victimise the property of their selected targets. There are reports that they ransack houses of their victims and steal food, clothes, money, jewellery, sheep etc.<sup>214</sup> A large number of reports state that they destroy the houses of the victimised families or villages with explosives or torch them.<sup>215</sup> They also burn the parked vehicles of the victims.<sup>216</sup>

## 5.2. Weapons and Targeting in RMV Events

Two kinds of random mass killings of victims belonging to random sub-groups of the population were listed in table B: bombings in public places or transport, and events involving the machine-gunning or slaughter of random passengers of cars or buses stopped at roadblocks.

Figure 46 shows the annual variations of the number of deaths and injured in RMV events. Unlike the case of selective mass killings, here the number of the injured is always larger than that of the dead. Table B gives a total of 5192 injured for all the bombings since 1992. This figure is definitely an underestimate and points to contradictions in the figures released by the incumbent authorities. On 14 March 1998, on the occasion of the national day of the handicapped, the state radio of Algeria released a figure of 5 000 children with amputated limbs caused by bomb attacks since 1992.<sup>217</sup> The figure we calculated is therefore an underestimate as it just accounts for that of injured children, supposing the latter is not distorted.

Four types of explosive bombs have reportedly been used in the attacks against civilians. Some attacks were made with sophisticated remote-controlled devices,<sup>218</sup> but the bulk of the bombings involved vehicle bombs, home made bombs and mines. Reported vehicle bombs include cars, trucks and cement mixers.<sup>219</sup> These cause vast human and property damage. Typical home-made bombs were cylinders stuffed with scraps of metal, bolts and nails<sup>220</sup> and




Figure 46: Annual Fluctuations of RMV Death and Injured Volumes.

acetylene cylinders stuffed with explosives.<sup>221</sup> These do not cause as much property damage as the vehicle bombs but cause a large number of deaths. Mines have also been used against random civilian users of public roads.<sup>222</sup> In most cases the reports do not indicate which type of bomb was used so that it is not possible to quantify the relative proportions of these different types of explosives.

The perpetrators often choose the times at which they set the detonations to maximise casualties: shopping hours, times for congregational prayers or when students go to schools emerge, from the reports, as the most frequent timings in the bombings of the corresponding targets.<sup>223</sup>

The RMV events in table B divide into 53 roadblock mass killings and 230 bomb attacks. The reports identified the nature of the target in only 157 bomb attacks so that there still remain 73 cases of unknown targets. Figure 47 gives the distribution of bombing events by type of target. In the commercial target category we included all the bombing events that occurred in shopping centres and avenues, markets, cafes, bars, restaurants, hotels, cinemas and stadiums. In the vehicle category we counted the instances of explosions of lethal bombs left in trains, buses or taxis. The public utilities here stands for bomb attacks – leading to loss of civilian lives – on water, electric or gas facilities, transport




Figure 47: Target Distribution of Bombings.

Table 13: Target Distribution of the Bombings

Target	Bombings	Deaths	Injured
Commercial	70	507	2113
Vehicles	27	200	485
Public Utilities	17	75	338
Educational Facilities	10	52	88
Law Enforcement	9	88	622
Residential	8	40	105
Mosques	8	33	211
Cemeteries	7	17	45
Media	1	17	52

infrastructure (bus or train stations or airports) and hospitals and council buildings. For law enforcement property we counted the instances of mass killings of *civilians only* (table B does not include attacks on the security forces or the army nor does it list attacks on the insurgents). The nature of the rest of the targets in figure 47 is self-evident. Figure 47 shows that the preferred targets of the perpetrators are the random users of commercial facilities.

Table 13 gives the corresponding victimisation volumes (deaths/injured) for each type of target. No data about the nature and costs of property victimisation in these attacks are available.

Figure 48 shows the annual trends of deaths for commercial targets, vehicles and public utilities and figure 49 presents them for the rest of the targets. Attacks on random users of public utilities decrease steadily since 1996, whereas the profile of the bombings of random users of commercial facilities and vehicles follows the same trend as that of the RMV annual activity (see figures 10 and 28). This is also the case for the attacks on residents and random users of educational facilities and mosques as shown in figure 49.

The attacks on law enforcement property leading to loss of civilian lives have decreased steadily since 1995 but, unlike all the other types of targets, bombings of visitors of cemeteries show an increase from 1997 to 1998.

Attacks on cemeteries may seem rather puzzling. One example: in the bombing of the Bourkika cemetery, in Tipaza, on 17 June 1998 three women and a ten-year old girl died in the attack.<sup>224</sup> Witnesses quoted by *La Tribune* said ‘the women came early in the morning to meditate at the grave of a parent who had died 3 days earlier [...]’<sup>M</sup> He was the father of a terrorist.<sup>225</sup> Houria Zouiten, a visitor of the cemetery near Bentalha who lost her husband in a massacre in

<sup>M</sup> The extract denoted ‘[...]’ is from the *La Tribune* journalist (Amel Nour).




Figure 48: Deaths by Type of Target.




Figure 49: Deaths by Type of Target (cont'd).

1994, told Ganley: 'Even in a cemetery, we are not safe.'<sup>226</sup>

Cemeteries are spaces of immortality, communal memory and connections between generations. In a repressive context, a family's commemorating its dead allows the idea of dissidence and resistance to be passed from generation to generation. Attacks on cemeteries, just like the anonymous 'disappearing' of people, seek to prevent the reproduction of dissidence, social death.<sup>227</sup>

Now turning to random mass killings in roadblocks, table B includes 53 such events. This form of random mass terror appeared in 1996: there were 9 events reported in 1996, 22 in 1997 and 22 in 1998. Figure 50 shows the district distribution of this type of RMV for the districts with at least 3 such attacks. Note that for Bouira all the RMV events are roadblock attacks.

The total victimisation volumes are 681 dead and 95 injured. The associated property victimisation is unknown. The perpetrators use firearms (machine guns and handguns), sharp objects (knives) and inflammable agents to kill random users of public roads (cars and buses) they stop at roadblocks. The highest death toll recorded in a single event is the attack on a bus in Baloul, in Saida, on 2 August 1998. Sixty people died when the perpetrators blocked the exits of the bus and torched it burning alive all its passengers.<sup>228</sup>




Figure 50: District Distribution of Roadblock Massacres 1992-1998.



### 5.3. Organisational Aspects of the Perpetrators

The selective mass killings are not the work of single individuals. The organisational structure and logistics needed to support the perpetration of the waves of terror of the kind discussed in section 3, over such a vast territory as Algeria, continuously for many years, suggest the perpetrators are an organised collective with some continuity of leadership, membership, recruitment ability and logistical support.

The testimonial reports also point to organised death squads. Table 14 lists a sub-sample of massacres for which some figures for the number of assailants are reported. The sources used are the same as those given in section 2 and in the corresponding entries in table A in the appendix.

Table 14: Reported Number of Assailants

Date	Location	Deaths	Assailants
17/08/96	Batna	63	100
03/11/96	Douaouda/Tipaza	13	20
06/01/97	Douaouda/Tipaza	18	100
12/01/97	Tabainat/Blida	14	20
23/01/97	Baba Ali/Blida	22	20
17/02/97	Kerrach/Blida	33	20
21/03/97	Ouazra/Medea	7	40
03/04/97	Thalit/Medea	52	20
13/04/97	Chaib Mohamed/Blida	36	32
21/04/97	Haouch Khemisti/Blida	113	200
14/05/97	Chebli/Blida	30	50
11/07/97	Balili/Tipaza	14	20
12/07/97	Mfetha/Medea	33	20
18/07/97	Bou-Ismail/Tipaza	14	20
22/07/97	Benachou/Blida	11	20
17/07/97	Larbaa/Blida	51	30
30/07/97	Matmata/Ain-Defla	48	40
31/07/97	Sidi-Madani/Blida	38	20
29/08/97	Rais/Blida	400	300
22/09/97	Bentalha/Algiers	300	100
26/08/97	Beni-Ali/Blida	64	60

Table 14: Reported Number of Assailants (Cont'd)

05/10/97	Ouled Sidi Yahia/Ain Defla	10	50
05/10/97	Sekmouna/Medea	16	20
11/10/97	Souidania/Blida	14	20
08/11/97	Hmalit/Blida	27	50
29/11/97	Hassi Labed/Saida	29	60
08/01/98	Sour-El Ghozlane/Bouira	26	10
23/01/98	Kaid Benlarbi/Bel Abbes	12	50
23/01/98	Beni Messous/Algiers	8	8
24/01/98	Houch Mecharef/Tiaret	27	20
01/02/98	Sabra/Tlemcen	10	20
26/05/98	Mactaa Lazrag/Blida	11	20
17/06/98	Hammaicha/Medea	13	30
20/07/97	Rebaia/Medea	11	20
16/07/98	Sidi Ouadah/Tiaret	21	50
28/12/98	Zmala/Ain Defla	19	30

Table 14 counts 1710 assailants for 1628 victims killed in 36 massacres. Figure 51 shows how the average number of assailants varies with the magnitude of the massacres. For each death group per event we calculate the total




Figure 51: Average Number of Assailants by Death Group.

number of assailants and divide by the total number of events associated with the group. For massacres of up to 50 deaths per event the average number of assailants is about 30 but increases rapidly for massacres with higher death tolls per episode.

If one assumes that the sub-sample in table 14 is representative of the population of assailants that perpetrated the massacres listed in table A, one can use various auxiliary assumptions to approximate the total number of perpetrators implicated in the sample of SMV events. In the unlikely assumption that each assailant participated only once in any of the massacres, one can deduce that 4396 assailants would have perpetrated the 149 massacres with 5-10 death tolls per incident, 2670 assailants would have perpetrated the 89 massacres with 11-20 kill-ratio per event. There would also be 1521 assailants implicated in the 41 massacres with 21-30 death tolls per incident and 898 assailants perpetrating the 34 mass killings with 31-50 kill-ratio per event. The 12 massacres with death tolls greater than 100 per incident would have involved 2400 assailants. The total number of assailants involved in the selective mass killings listed in table A would be 12 358. This sets some upper limit for the sample. If one now assumes that each assailant participated in say 5 massacres of the same magnitude, the estimated number of assailants would be 2471. Assuming a ten-massacre participation rate for each assailant still requires a force of 1236 perpetrators. Clearly, one is dealing with an organised collective of perpetrators.

According to reports, the perpetrators arrive in trucks, open-backed trucks and other vehicles<sup>229</sup> and horses.<sup>230</sup> In the case of the massacres of Raïs, Bentalha and Relizane some reports say they arrived in helicopters.<sup>231</sup> They arrive late at night to catch their victims off guard. Once in the target site they cut electrical power.<sup>232</sup> They split into three groups: 'one is in charge of surveillance, another one blows up doors and the third one massacres.'<sup>233</sup> Reports say the attackers slaughter their victims in their own houses but also use fire-bombs or grenades, or blow up doors to get their victims out, cram them into some houses, the public place of the hamlet or waste grounds and then slaughter them.<sup>234</sup> The perpetrators are frequently reported to act 'methodically' and 'with confidence'.<sup>235</sup> Witnesses reportedly say the perpetrators act 'without emotion'<sup>236</sup>, with 'no expression on their face, may God curse them'<sup>237</sup> and another survivor reportedly said 'the screams of the women and children at no time made the assassins hesitate... they burst into laughter each time a neck was sliced.'<sup>238</sup>

The news and witness reports say the perpetrators have a chain of command; 'chiefs' or 'leaders' or 'commanders' are said to order the assailants to

destroy the victims.<sup>239</sup> In a few cases these ‘chiefs’ reportedly used walkie-talkies.<sup>240</sup> Some reports say the perpetrators depart from the massacre sites in orderly fashion.<sup>241</sup>

The leadership and membership of the perpetrators remain anonymous. We now review the conflicting allegations about the identity of the perpetrators.

#### 5.4. Contradictory Allegations about Perpetrator Identity

There has been a wide range of partly conflicting descriptions of the appearance of the perpetrators. In some reports they are said to have ‘beards up to the waist’<sup>242</sup>, ‘beards and eyes heavily made up with *kehol*’<sup>243</sup> or sporting ‘long beards dyed with henna and with shaved off brows’<sup>244</sup>, and to be ‘bearded and wearing Afghan clothes.’<sup>245</sup> For the same massacres some other reports say the assailants were ‘well shaven and fed’<sup>246</sup>, ‘wore military battle dress’<sup>247</sup> and ‘bullet-proof jackets.’<sup>248</sup> Other reports say ‘half of them were dressed in military tunics [...] the others wore civilian clothes’<sup>249</sup>, while still other say ‘some wore masks and other wore false beards’<sup>250</sup> or that ‘the attackers were disguised as police officers.’<sup>251</sup>

Take one specific example, the massacre of Bentalha, in Algiers, on 22 September 1997. According to Salima Tlemcani, a journalist at *El Watan* who says she quoted witnesses, the assailants ‘had long beards and wore Afghan costumes.’<sup>252</sup> The newspapers *Al Khabar* and *La Tribune* of the same day, both stating they quoted witnesses, reported that the assailants ‘wore Afghan clothes’, ‘baggy breeches’ and ‘*kashabia*’, had ‘shaggy hair’, ‘long beards’ and ‘looked dirty’ and some others ‘wore jeans and sneakers.’<sup>253</sup> Witnesses quoted by *Le Monde* said the assailants ‘disembarked from a helicopter’ and had ‘bullet-proof jackets.’<sup>254</sup> Another witness quoted by *Le Monde* said: ‘they [the perpetrators] behaved like the *ninjas*<sup>N</sup>, they acted swiftly. I saw one use a rifle with only one hand.’<sup>255</sup> Witnesses from Bentalha shown in a television documentary broadcast on Swiss television said some of the assailants ‘wore *kashabia*, jeans, sneakers, black scarves and sported beards’ and were protected by ‘soldiers in brand new battle dresses, with helmets and bullet-proof jackets.’<sup>O</sup> A survivor of the massacre quoted by Human Rights Watch said he saw two military armoured-

<sup>N</sup> In Algeria, *ninja* designates the special anti-terrorist squads.

<sup>O</sup> See the full transcript of the film in *Autopsie d'un massacre*, section 3.8 of M. Farouk, T. S. Senhadji and M. Ait-Larbi (eds.), *Voices of the Voiceless*, in part I of this book.

<sup>P</sup> The insert in brackets is from Human Rights Watch.

personnel carriers arrive:

They came up to about one hundred meters away from where we were being attacked. They then turned on their floodlights – I don't know why, since they didn't rescue us. The people started to shout that the military had come to their rescue, but the [leaders]<sup>p</sup> responded by saying, 'work calmly, the military will not come, don't worry.'<sup>256</sup>

According to President Zeroual, the first magistrate of the country, the perpetrators are the 'terrorists', or 'bands of criminals, traitors and mercenaries', the official terms used to denote the insurgents.<sup>257</sup> Foreign Affairs minister Attaf alleged that the perpetrators are the 'terrorist groups' that have become 'a killing machine devoid of political, religious or popular ideals.'<sup>258</sup> Prime-minister Ahmed Ouyahia blamed the 'vile beast of terrorism' which perpetrates the mass killings 'to punish the population for standing up to terrorism.'<sup>259</sup>

There are political parties who make the same allegations. Khalida Messaoudi, says 'as a member of the RCD party we say that we know who kills. And we know who is killed. That is to say that the question 'who kills in Algeria?' is indecent. It is not only indecent but it is becoming an act of complicity with the assassins. On the one hand, it is the civilian population which is massacred. On the other it is the armed Islamist groups that are massacring.'<sup>260</sup> Hachemi Cherif, leader of Algeria's communist party, accuses 'fundamentalist terrorism' whose aim behind the killings is to 'decapitate the elite, terrorise society and its elite, perform a moral and religious purification, make off the economy and the finances, and transform the economy, the state and society into a big *bazaar*.'<sup>261</sup>

In public statements, the spokesmen of the incumbent authorities never direct their allegations towards a particular armed group; they blame indiscriminately *all* the armed groups. Asked 'should not one distinguish between the GIA and the AIS, the armed wing of the FIS which seeks a negotiated settlement?', Prime-minister Ouyahia told Chagnollaoud 'in truth GIA, AIS, MIA are subtle distinctions for snobs.'<sup>262</sup>

Prior to Djamel Zitouni commanding the GIA in October 1994, this armed group killed scores of army and security personnel, and unarmed civilians such as civil servants, journalists and other professionals they accused of 'supporting the regime and the repression.'<sup>263</sup> It claimed responsibility for these killings in its publications. These publications do not contain responsibility claims for any selective or random mass killing.<sup>264</sup> The perpetration of selective and mass killings by the GIA is reported to have started just after Zitouni took over the command of the GIA in October 1994.<sup>265</sup> The public claims of responsibility for the mass killings appeared in the GIA literature only after it had disinte-

grated into splinter groups, late in 1995 and early in 1996.<sup>266</sup> The remnant GIA led by Zitouni did claim responsibility for many massacres. For example, it claimed responsibility for massacring the family of a member of the militia in Baraki in May 1996.<sup>267</sup> Armed groups that broke away from the GIA accused the latter of massacring scores of their families and those of members of other insurgent groups.<sup>268</sup> For example, on 31 January 1997, a 31 death toll massacre in Ktiten, in Médéa, targeted the family and relatives of Ali Benhejar. Benhejar had denounced the GIA take over by the military intelligence and broke away from it late in 1995.<sup>269</sup> The GIA claimed responsibility for this mass killing.<sup>270</sup> Splinter groups also denounced the Zitouni-led GIA for bomb attacks targeting civilians<sup>271</sup>; the GIA claimed responsibility for numerous random mass killings and maiming operations in Algeria and France.<sup>272</sup>

Armed groups other than the GIA have not claimed responsibility for selective or random mass killings. The AIS condemned the atrocities and declared in several communiqués its ‘innocence from all the suspicious operations targeting innocent unarmed men, women and children.’<sup>273</sup> The LIDD also denied responsibility for the killings and condemned them.<sup>274</sup>

These insurgent groups have alleged that the incumbent authorities are themselves perpetrating the killings through armed agencies such as the GIA. The AIS refers to the GIA as a ‘perverse group of mercenaries’ and ‘manipulated pawns’ in the hands of the ‘eradicator generals of the military.’<sup>275</sup> Asked by Chagnollaude and Ravenel

You attribute all the atrocities to the GIA and those who manipulate them, but the AIS has taken to the *maquis* to fight and therefore has partial responsibility for the atrocities?

Ghemati, a member of the political leadership of FIS said

The AIS has repeatedly condemned the murder of intellectuals, foreigners, political opponents, journalists and any unarmed person. The AIS prosecutes a selective war. Its operations are aimed only at military targets: barracks, policemen, gendarmes, soldiers or armed militiamen. It has always given a greater importance to its relations with the civilian population and has intervened several times to protect it. The problem is that its publications have restricted circulation.<sup>276</sup>

The LIDD has alleged that it is the ‘eradicator generals’ who ‘killed the innocents in October 1988 and June 1990, [...] perpetrated the military coup of January 1992, [...] massacred hundreds of political prisoners in Berrouaghia and Serkadji prisons’ who perpetrate these massacres ‘to distort the image of Islam and make it look as a religion of violence and blood, and make Muslims look blood-thirsty people.’<sup>277</sup> It has also claimed that the GIA is ‘an armed

group infiltrated from its inception' and 'an agency of the secret services': 'the nation knows who is committing the massacres, sometimes through the hands of the militias, and at other times through the hands of the secret apparatus of the junta known under the name of "GIA" which killed hundreds of the best children of this nation.'<sup>278</sup>

Hirst formulated these conflicting allegations about the GIA's identity in question form:

Is it simply, according to the regime, religious fanatics, bandits or psychopaths? Or do they enjoy the complicity – perhaps of some die-hard faction of the regime itself – which opposes any dialogue or compromise with the Islamist opposition, be it moderate or extreme?<sup>279</sup>

On the nature of the GIA and its responsibility in the massacres of 1997, Human Rights Watch said

The GIA, a group or groups with a record of brutal attacks on security personnel and terror attacks on civilians, had no visible political structure that commented authoritatively on its program or actions. Increasingly extreme edicts were issued in its name, which authorities permitted to be published in the press despite a strict censorship regime that encompassed statements by FIS leaders. Since the killing in 1994 and 1995 of the GIA's original leaders, mass killings increasingly became part of atrocities attributed to it. [...]

Doubts that all of the killings attributed to the GIA were the responsibility of a single organisation acting alone were fuelled by the posture of the security forces towards the perpetrators in 1997 and 1998 and by a series of statements by former security officials claiming Algeria's military intelligence apparatus, the Sécurité Militaire, had both deployed forces masquerading as Islamists and manipulated GIA groups through infiltration.<sup>280</sup>

Other bystanders have gone further than casting doubt on the incumbent authorities' responsibility in the atrocities. Ait-Ahmed, leader of the FFS, alleged that the army was directly responsible for some large scale massacres. When asked 'why did the army not intervene when the massacres took place near army barracks and lasted for several hours?', Ait Ahmed told Chagnollaude and Ravel:

In this story, it is not just the case that the army did not intervene. We have information that special troops from Biskra were involved. They were brought by helicopters and given narcotics to participate in the massacres of Rais and Beni Messous.<sup>281</sup>

Bruno Etienne who specialises in the study of North Africa claimed:

We have made a typology of the terrorist movements. There are approximately 300



cells of 7 to 14 members, and about 15 *maquis* of 18 to 80 people. This means that 400,000 men armed to the teeth cannot neutralise less than one thousand men. And where does the equipment – explosives and weapons – come from in a country whose borders are sealed and controlled by an enormous army? There is another hypothesis: the Algerian regime is spinning yarn. The generals are telling us they are fighting the Islamists but it is more probable that they are tearing each other apart.<sup>282</sup>

The same allegations about the identity of the GIA and the army's responsibility have been made by ex-prime-minister Brahimi, ex-diplomat Zitout, and several military intelligence officers, army officers, and soldiers – a few of whom committed atrocities – who deserted the regime and sought exile in Europe.<sup>283</sup>

The participation of some the militia forces in some of the massacres is uncontroversial. In April 1998, two militia leaders from Relizane, El Hadj Abed and Hadj Fergane were arrested by the incumbent authorities for the massacre of 79 people, some of whom were buried alive, and the racketeering of the commune of Jdioua.<sup>284</sup> They were released 3 days after their arrests. The arrest and release were interpreted as an instance of the power struggle between the military factions for the control of this over 200 000 armed militia force.<sup>285</sup> Djedai, general secretary of the FFS, reported that two massacres, one in Laghouat and one in Tiaret, were the work of a militia warlord acting on instruction from military intelligence. He did not name the warlord but said he controlled hundreds of men in the Soummam valley, in the district of Bejaia.<sup>286</sup> He calls the militia 'the tree that hides the forest.'<sup>287</sup> Human Rights NGOs have also alleged that the militias perpetrated some of the massacres.<sup>288</sup>

Still other alleged organised perpetrators are covert death squads about whom not much is known. In the midst of the flare-up in the factional hostilities of September 1998, general Mohamed Betchine accused general Larbi Belkheir of being 'a common informer of President Mitterand's secretary'. He also alleged that following the military coup of January 1992, Belkheir and general Khaled Nezzar set up 300 covert death squads without even the consent of the Haut Comité d'Etat.<sup>289</sup>

The incumbent authorities have rejected angrily all these allegations.<sup>290</sup> Algerian citizens, political parties and human rights NGOs have demanded that an independent inquiry, national and/or international, be set up to investigate the killings and clarify responsibility. Some governments and international organisations (UN) and NGOs have made similar demands. These calls have been repeatedly rejected. In response to the recommendation by the Human Rights Committee of the UN that independent inquiries be set up to investigate the behaviour of security forces in the massacres, Abdelaziz Sbaa, spokes-



man for the foreign ministry, declared ‘it is outrageous that the UN committee has made such grave accusations on the basis of simple allegations against the institutions of the Algerian state.’<sup>291</sup> Hadri Kemal, communications consul at the Algerian embassy in Washington, said ‘we are against an inquiry because everyone there knows who is killing. The people of Algeria know that it is the terrorists who have been doing the killing.’<sup>292</sup> Foreign Affairs minister Attaf repeatedly said: ‘The situation in Algeria is clear. There is a state standing up and fighting against terrorism with its legitimate means and there is no confusion or doubt that demands an inquiry. Any inquiry commission, be it governmental or non-governmental, would be an interference in our internal affairs.’<sup>293</sup>

## 6. Summary and Conclusion

This paper focused on the massacres in the ongoing war in Algeria. Its approach relied on constructing and analysing various indicators obtained by aggregating the data about individual massacres.

The bulk of the data used are from news reports. They are certainly incomplete and distorted but we estimated that the public education aim was worth the effort. Post-mortem statistics, say in twenty years time, would be more accurate but would be of no use to those slaughtered every day in Algeria.

This being the case, we adopted a differentiated approach to the data distortion, interpreted the behaviour of the indicators with caution, and made sure we did not imply greater precision than actually exists. The sample we used involved 339 selective mass killings and 283 random mass victimisation events.

We first looked at the victimisation events as the unit of analysis. The time evolution of the SMV and RMV events showed that there has been a continuity of attacks by the perpetrators to eliminate the groups they victimise. The magnitudes of the mass killings peaked in 1997 but remained very high in 1998.

The time structures of the SMV and RMV activities were analysed more finely. It was found that their monthly fluctuations are best described as waves of mass killings, exacerbating and abating alternately. This is one of the most striking results of this analysis. We verified that this is not a spurious behaviour by looking at surrogate indicators and found the same pattern. One evidence was presented on the application of terror in an alternating mode as a technique that has a psycho-political rationale and that has been previously used by some political agencies.

The peaks in the waves of massacres were classified into 3 categories depending on their lifetimes. For the period between April 1996 and December 1998, the data revealed two waves of massacres with long lifetimes (about 4 months), three short campaigns of massacres lasting about 2 months each, and two intermediate trains of mass victimisation with a life of about 2.5 months each. The two highest peaks in the terror were in January 1998 and in the autumn of 1997, and the most long-lived massacre campaigns occurred in the autumn of 1997 and between June and September 1998. It is remarkable and intriguing that in the short-lived campaigns of massacres those who perpetrate the selective mass killings and those who perpetrate the random mass killings act in concert, i.e. they exacerbate and abate the terror synchronously, whereas for the long lived campaigns of mass killings the indicators show that the perpetrators of the SMV and RMV act anti-synchronously.

When discussing the monthly fluctuations of the SMV activity we proposed a context that may have relevance in interpreting them. The focus was on political processes within the army, within the armed insurgent movement, and the statements and positions of France and the US. The only uncontroversial conclusion one can infer is that the long-lived waves of massacres are concomitant with periods of strong inter-factional hostilities within the military.

The geography of the massacres showed that they are mainly concentrated in the centre of the country, in the north, especially in the districts of Blida, Médéa and Algiers. The terror campaigns have also diffused westward. The East and the South of the country are largely unaffected.

An analysis of the political geography of the massacres was made using the results of two sets of local and parliamentary elections. It was shown that the degree of victimisation of districts is proportional to their support for the FIS and inversely proportional to their allegiance to the FLN. In other words, it is the social base of the FIS that is the most victimised, in what Addi called 'electoral cleansing.'

The military geography of the massacres indicated that the 1st and 2nd military districts host most of the massacres. The economic geography of the mass victimisation shows that the South with its rich oil and gas fields is free from mass killings but in other parts of Algeria, in particular the poor areas where there is no oil, the population endures victimisation and is denied the protection of the state. We also reviewed some of the land privatising motives behind some of the massacres in the Mitidja. This report also presented maps of some notorious massacre sites that have raised strong suspicions because of the passive proximity of the military.

We then looked at the population of victims as another relevant unit of analysis. The total volume of victimisation found is 10,758 deaths, 8,675 from SMV episodes and 2,083 in RMV incidents. The time evolution and geographic distribution of the victimisation volumes corroborate the first part of the analysis.

We considered the victimisation dependence on age, gender and kinship. Assuming the sub-samples we used are representative, the results show that, on average, one in three victims of a selective mass victimisation is a child, one in five victims is a woman, one in three victims is a female, and two in three victims are akin. Clearly the victims are selected regardless of any charge against them. They are also purposefully massacred irrespective of the fact that they are harmless to the assailants. It was indicated that following the decisive military victory of the incumbent authorities in 1995, the inability of the insurgents to reorganise militarily and defend their social base, and the silence of the most influential members of the international community for years, has left the victimised populations in a highly vulnerable situation. Some of the collective effects of the massacres were reviewed. We looked at social fear, induced armed self-defence, exodus and electoral behaviour. Some light was shed on the problem of internally displaced people, the survivors of the victimised hamlets and villages, a problem largely ignored by Algeria's political class, member states of the UN, and international organisations and NGOs. A most striking regularity was found when looking at the massacre activities from 4 weeks before elections to two weeks after, and this systematically for the three different elections held in Algeria in the past 3 years. Election days were found to be a breathing spell between waves of massacres. The ways in which this affected the electoral behaviour of the victimised areas was reviewed.

The third and final unit of analysis was the crimes and the criminals. We presented a digest of the weapons and crimes in SMV and RMV events and looked at the organisational parameters of the perpetrators. Quantitative estimates of the population of perpetrators of SMV were inferred from an analysis of a sub-sample of cases. This points clearly to the existence of an organised collective with some continuity of leadership, membership, recruitment and logistical support. The criminological digest was concluded with a review of the contradictory allegations about the identity(ies) of the perpetrators.

Keeping in line with the descriptive and explanatory objectives of this study, we have not attempted to make a comparative analysis between the mass victimisation patterns discovered here and those of similar episodes elsewhere. This would, however, be a worthwhile undertaking. In what ways are the pat-

terns of the Algerian massacres similar to, and different from, the types of mass victimisation observed in history? How would the ensemble of Algerian massacres be classified within alternative typologies that have been developed in studies<sup>294</sup> of victimisation of *groups*?

The campaign of massacres does not seem qualifiable as *genocide* in law because the victimisation events do not fulfil the defining requirements of the United Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC), in particular its article II which restricts it to instances when the victimised group is a 'national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.' However they seem to include the elements constitutive of genocide as conceived in social theory. For instance they can be convincingly argued to meet the criteria of Helen Fein's paradigm for detecting and tracing genocide.<sup>295</sup> What should one therefore conclude?

Kuper believes that 'political affiliation can be as permanent and immutable as racial origin'<sup>296</sup> and, on the basis of several case studies, that 'it is impossible to disentangle the political component from the ethnic, racial or religious.'<sup>297</sup> He suggests the use of the notion of *genocidal massacres*.<sup>298</sup> Are the massacres in Algeria of the genocidal type?

Or should one simply refer to them as *politicides* in accordance with Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr's categorisation of massacres of political groups that includes those in rebellion<sup>299</sup>?

Clearly much work remains to be done to analyse, interpret and explain the data and patterns produced in this study. It is our hope that they will draw the research interest of scholars and organisations inquiring into massive human rights violations as a universal problem.

## 7. Appendix

Table A lists the selective mass victimisation events, table B catalogues the random mass victimisation events, table C reports the mass graves publicised so far while table D registers the events in which foreign nationals were killed in SMV events.

The dates of the massacres given in the tables are obtained from the news or witness reports. The few entries for which only the month is given correspond to cases where the news reports give only the month and the year as a date.

In the source column, we have given only one source per entry although in most cases we have studied and integrated several information sources. This was done in order not to clutter the tables. We used an abbreviation system for the source with long names for the same purpose. LB stands for *Le Livre Blanc sur la Répression en Algérie*, DNA is the acronym of *Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace*, AFP indicates *Agence France Presse*, PANA represents *Panafrican News Agency* while AP denotes *Associated Press*.

**7.1. Table A: Selective Mass Killings****District: Blida**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
15/01/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 142	Larbaa	10	-
03/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 76	Blida	82	-
04/04/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 143	Larbaa	8	-
25/11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 145	Boufarik	5	-
07-08/12/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Boufarik	25	-
07-08/12/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Blida	40	-
10-11/12/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Blida	20	-
07/05/95	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Boufarik	6	-
05-06/11/96	Irish Times 07/11/96	Sidi-Lekbir	31	-
13/11/96	Irish Times 14/11/96	Bensalah	12	-
30/11/96	Troubles	Larbaa	20	-
04-05/12/96	DNA 06/12/96	Haouch'Trab/Chebli	10	-
05/12/96	DNA 09/12/96	Benachour	19	-
10/12/96	Troubles	Maayouma	8	-
04/01/97	Irish Times 07/01/97	Benachour	16	-
11/01/97	DNA 14/01/97	Ouled Chebel	5	-
12/01/97	Le Soir de Belgique 14/01/97	Tabainet	14	-

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
22/01/97	Le Soir de Belgique 24/01/97	Haouch Benramdane/Chebli	22	-
23/01/97	DNA 25/01/97	Haouch El Hadj/ Baba-Ali	15/22	-
29/01/97	Irish Times 01/02/97	Sidi-Kadour/ Sidi-Moussa	8	-
01/02/97	Irish Times 04/02/97	Haouch Benouar Louz/Larbaa	7	-
10/02/97	Troubles	Hammam-Melouane	25	-
17/02/97	DNA 19/02/97	Kerrach	33	-
04/04/97	DNA 07/04/97	Amroussa	15/17	-
10-11/04/97	Le Soir de Belgique 14/04/97	Douar Menaa/ Boufarik	22	-
11/04/97	Le Soir de Belgique 14/04/97	Chiffa	7	-
13/04/97	Irish Times 15/04/97	Douar Chaib Mo- hamed/Chebli	31	-
21/04/97	Le Soir de Belgique 23/04/97	Haouch Khmisti Bougara	93/113	25
14/05/97	Irish Times 16/05/97	Haouch Faner/ Chebli	30	-
26-27/05/97	Troubles	Djebabra	8	-
11/06/97	Troubles	Cheraifia/Boufarik	9/12	-
14/06/97	DNA 18/06/97	Haouch Sahraoui	16	-
22/07/97	Irish Times 24/07/97	Benachour	11	-
22/07/97	Irish Times 24/07/97	Yemma-M'ghite	39	-
27/07/97	Irish Times 30/07/97	Si-Zerrouk/Larbaa	51	-
31/07/97	Troubles	Larbaa	20	
03/08/97	Irish Times 06/08/97	Amroussa	26	-

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
05/08/97	Irish Times 08/08/97	Cite Benamor/ Oued-Slama	9	-
08/08/97	Irish Times 11/08/97	Oued-Zeboudj	21	-
20-21/08/97	DNA 23/08/97	Souhane	63	10
26/08/97	Irish Times 30/08/97	Beni-Ali	64	-
29/08/97	Troubles CNN/DNA 30/08/97	Rais/Sidi-Moussa	200/ 300/400	200
04/09/97	CNN 08/09/97	Baba-Ali	6	-
06/09/97	CNN 08/09/97	Blida	30	-
09/09/97	Troubles	Larbaa	9	-
28-29/09/97	Troubles	Chebli	40/48	-
02/10/97	AP 06/10/97	Bouangoud/Chrea	30	-
03/10/97	AP 04/10/97	Ouled-Benaissa	38	-
03/10/97	Hijra	Amroussa	6	
11/10/97	DNA 14/10/97	Haouch Soudania	14	-
08-09/11/97	DNA 11/11/97	H'Malit /Chrea	26/27	-
27/11/97	DNA 30/11/97	Souhane	25	-
11/12/97	Troubles	Blida	8	-
18/12/97	DNA 21/12/97	Djiboulo/Larbaa	31	17
11/01/98	Reuters 13/01/98	Sidi-Hamed/ Meftah/Larbaa	120/ 131/ >400	100
27/01/98	Reuters 28/01/98	Douar Ferroukha/ Soumaa	13	-



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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
07/03/98	Troubles	Haouch Menaâ/ Boufarik	6	-
26/03/98	Irish Times 28/03/98	Bouirat /Lahdab	57	-
26/05/98	DNA 28/05/98	Mactaa Lazrag	11	5

**District: Médéa**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
13/03/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 80	Berrouaghia	40	-
07/11/94	El-Karama 10/01/95	Berrouaghia Prison	513	-
16/11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Berrouaghia	39	-
18/08/96	CNN 20/08/96	Sidi-Ladjel	17	-
12/11/96	Troubles	Berrouaghia	11	-
14/11/96	Troubles	Ouamri	11	-
14/11/96	Troubles	Seghouane	7	-
29/12/96	CNN 30/12/96	Zineddine	28	-
19/01/97	DNA 21/01/97	Sidi-Abdelaziz/ Beni-Slimane	48/49	36
22/01/97	DNA 26/01/97	El Om- aria/Berrouaghia	23/28	-
31/01/97	Irish Times 03/02/97	Médéa	31	-
04/02/97	Irish Times 06/02/97	Benchicao	9	-
04/02/97	Troubles	Boumedfaa	28	-
09/02/97	Troubles	Oued Senane	6	-
21/02/97	Troubles	Tablat	5	-

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
19/03/97	Le Soir de Belgique 24/03/97	Ouled-Antar/ Kasr-El-Boukhari	30/32	-
21/03/97	Le Soir de Belgique 24/03/97	Ouazra	7	-
23/03/97 nières	Troubles	Médéa	5	
03-04/04/97	DNA 07/04/97	Thalit	52	-
04/04/97	DNA 07/04/97	Sidi-Naamane	5	-
22/04/97	Irish Times 26/04/97	El-Omaria	42	-
30/05/97	Le Soir de Belgique 02/06/97	Médéa	5	-
25/06/97	Troubles	Seghouane	22	-
05/07/97	AFP 24/12/97	Médéa	48	-
12/07/97	Irish Times 15/07/97	M'fetha	33	-
12/07/97	Irish Times 15/07/97	Aziz	7	-
20/07/97	Irish Times 27/07/97	Rebaia	11	-
25/07/97	Troubles	Sidi-Salem/ El-Omaria	13	-
27/07/97	Irish Times 30/07/97	El-Omaria	22	
24/08/97	DNA 26/08/97	El-Oumri	29	-
02/09/97	DNA 05/09/97	Ouled Larbi/ El-Omaria	22	-
20/09/97	DNA 22/09/97	Guelb-El-Kebir/ Beni-Slimane	53	-
01-02/10/97	AFP 04/10/97	Benchicao	15	-
02/10/97	Reuters 05/10/97	D'raa Tmar/Ain- Boucif	13	-
02/10/97	Troubles/ CNN 04/10/97	Ouled-Bouchraa	45	-

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
05/10/97	CNN 07/10/97	Sekmouna/ Zoubiria	16	-
09/10/97	CNN 10/10/97	Souaghi/ Beni-Slimane	9	-
12/10/97	AP 13/10/97	Beni-Slimane	22	-
20/10/97	Hijra	Bir Si El-Abed	12	-
17-18/11/97	Irish Times 26/11/97	Labrache/Médéa	7	5
20-21/11/97	Troubles	Oued-Zitoune	8	7
08/12/97	Reuters 09/12/97	Médéa	7	-
28/12/97	Irish Times 31/12/97	El-Faoudj	34	-
27/02/98	PANA 01/03/98	Ouled-Aissa	7/9	-
28/02/98	AFP 01/03/98	Ouled-Salem	8	-
06/03/98	Troubles	Sidi Rabah	6	
08/03/98	Troubles	Haouch Bou- louene/Boumedfaa	11	
08/04/98	Troubles	Ouled Said/ Bir-Ben-Abed	12	-
28/04/98	El-Watan 29/04/98	Chouardia	40/43	-
09/06/98	La Tribune 21/06/98	Médéa	5	-
17/06/98	AFP 21/06/98	Hamaidia	13	6
18/07/98	Reuters 19/07/98	Rebaia	11	2

**District: Algiers**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
12/12/93	LB, vol. 2, p. 146	Benzerga/Bordj-El-Kiffan	13	-
16-17/04/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 74	El-Harrach	6	-
02-03/06/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 65	Cherarba/ El-Harrach	41	-
11/10/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Souk-El-Ansar	8	-
04/11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 141	Eucalyptus	5	-
05/12/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 143	Oued-Ouchaiah/Hussein-Dey	6	-
20/02/95	LB, vol. 2, p. 179	Serkadji Prison	109	-
30/06/96	Troubles	Bab-El-Oued	7	-
23/11/96	Troubles	Bentalha	16	-
21/12/96	Irish Times 24/12/96	Kasbah	5	3
12-13/01/97	Troubles	Djbel-Koukou	5	-
22/01/97	Troubles	Baraki	5	-
08/02/97	Troubles	Cite des Eucalyptus/ Baraki	14	-
17/02/97	Troubles	Algiers	5	-
21/02/97	Troubles	Frais Vallon	5	-
24/08/97	Troubles	Baraki	9	-
28/08/97	DNA 30/08/97	Sidi Madjbar	5	-
29/08/97	Troubles	El Biar	5	-
01/09/97	Irish Times	Hamamat Miramar/	19	-

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
	02/09/97	Bologhine		
05/09/97	DNA 07/09/97	Bainem	5	-
05-06/09/97	Troubles/ Irish Times 08/09/97	Beni-Messous	87/151	100
14/09/97	CNN 16/09/97	Cherarba/El-Harrach	8	-
22/09/97	Troubles/ DNA 24/09/97	Bentalha/Baraki	202/300	100
29-30/09/97	Troubles	Rais Hamidou	10	-
02/10/97	Hijra	Algiers	14	-
05/10/97	CNN 14/10/97	Ouled-Allel/Baraki	10	-
10/97	AFP 27/10/97	Bentalha/Baraki	30	-
16/11/97	DNA 22/11/97	Sidi-Medjbar	7	-
16/12/97	AFP 23/12/97	Cheraga	19	-
22/12/97	AFP 23/12/97	Ouled Allel/Baraki	9	-
23/12/97	CNN 24/12/97	Bainem	11	-
02/01/98	AP 05/01/98	Algiers	18	-
23/01/98	Reuters 24/01/98	Beni Messous	8	
23/08/98	DNA 25/08/98	El-Biar	5	-

**District: Tipaza**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
13/08/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 139	Bourbika	11	-
03/11/96	Troubles	Saint-Maurice Douaouda	13	-
12/11/96	Troubles	Hadjout	5	-

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
09/12/96	Troubles	Kolea	5	-
01/01/97	Irish Times 07/01/97	Douaouda	6	-
06/01/97	Irish Times 07/01/97	Douaouda	18	18
29/05/97	Le Soir de Belgique 02/06/97	Bakoura/ Cherchell	14	-
25/06/97	Troubles	Bourouss	6	-
11-12/07/97	Troubles	Balili	14	-
18/07/97	Irish Times 21/07/97	Bousmail	14	-
24/07/97	AFP 24/12/97	Hadjout	38	-
31/07/97	Irish Times 14/08/97	Ruines Romaines	20	-
14/08/97	DNA 15/08/97	Ouled Djillali/ Douira	15	-
25-26/08/97	DNA 29/08/97	Hamidia / Cherchell	5	-
03/10/97	AP 03/10/97	Mahelma	38	Dozens
13/12/97	AFP 16/12/98	Cheraga	18	-
21-22/12/97	DNA 25/12/97	Moretti	5	-
23/12/97	AFP 24/12/97	Cheraga	11	-
27/12/97	DNA 29/12/97	Chenoua	5	-
07/01/98	Reuters 07/01/98	Ain Tagourait	20/21	-
15/03/98	La Tribune 17/03/98	Ghraba	7	-
25/07/98	AP 28/07/98	Hassasna	8	-
28/08/98	AP	Beldj	6	-

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
	29/08/98			
02/12/98	Reuters 05/12/98	Sidi-Rached	12	-

**District: Ain-Defla**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
03/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 140	Ain-Defla	80	-
29/12/96	Le Soir de Belgique 30/12/96	Dhamnia	34	-
29-30/07/97	DNA 03/08/97	Matmata	48	-
03/08/97	Irish Times 06/08/97	Ouled-El-Had/ Sidi M'hammed	76	-
11/08/97	DNA 15/08/97	Heuraouat	19/28	-
05/10/97	Reuters 06/10/97	Ouled-Sidi-Yahia	10	-
27/10/97	AFP 27/10/97	Oued-Djer	16	-
13/11/97	DNA 16/11/97	Hammama	11/13	-
04/01/98	CNN 05/01/98	Sidi-Aissa	7	-
04/01/98	CNN 05/01/98	Ain-Defla	5	-
30/04/98	El-Khabar 02/05/98	Ain-Defla	9	-
01/05/98	Le Matin 04/05/98	Khemis-Meliana	11	-
13-14/08/98	La Tribune 21/09/98	Sekouma/Dira	11/16	-
30/08/98	DNA 31/08/98	Targhout	10	-
13/09/98	Reuters 15/09/98	Ain Sbaa	38	-
14/09/98	Reuters 15/09/98	Zougala	37	-
11-12/11/98	Reuters 13/11/98	Moussa Abderah- mane/Boumedfaa	17	3

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
16-17/11/98	Reuters 17/11/98	Khemis-Meliana	8	10
28/12/98	Reuters 28/12/98	Ain-Mansour/ Ben-Amrane/Zmala	19	3

**District: Tiaret**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
01/09/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 144	Tiaret	5	-
06/04/97	DNA 08/04/97	Ain Lehdid	15	-
13/07/97	Irish Times 27/07/97	Tiaret	13	-
08/08/97	DNA 11/08/97	Medghoussa	11	-
08/08/97	Irish Times 11/08/97	Ouled Sidi-Yahia	8	-
29/08/97	Irish Times 01/09/97	Mellakou	6	-
30/08/97	Irish Times 01/09/97	Ouled Sidi-Yahia	6	-
27/09/97	Arabic News Com 01/10/97	Ouled Sidi-Yahia	50	-
22/12/97	CNN 26/12/97	Sahari	28	120
23-24/12/97	DNA 28/12/97	Sidi-Lamri M'Ghila	53	
25-26/12/97	DNA 28/12/97	Zouabria	27	-
16/01/98	CNN 20/01/98	Frenda	5	-
25/01/98	CNN 26/01/98	Haouch Mecharef/ Frenda	20/27	-
31/01/98	L'Humanite 03/02/98	Sabra	10	12
21-22/02/98	DNA 24/02/98	Medghoussa	12	-
12/03/98	Troubles	Sidi-Bakhti/ Frenda	8	-



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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
16/07/98	AFP 19/07/98	Douar Bougharba/ Sidi-Ouadah	21	-
05/08/98	Liberté 06/08/97	Tagdempt	10	-

**District: Saida**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/12/96	Troubles	Moulay Larbi	12	-
14/01/97	Le Soir de Belgique 17/01/97	Saida	9	-
28/04/97	Troubles	M'Hamid/ Tassafour	7	-
25/07/97	Irish Times 27/07/97	Sidi Abdelmoumene	8	-
06/09/97	DNA 07/09/97	Saida	11	-
13/09/97	Irish Times 16/09/97	Moulay Larbi	7	-
29/09/97	Reuters 30/09/97	Sidi-Merzouk	6	-
20/10/97	Hijra	Bougtob	11	-
25/10/97	Troubles	Djbel Tellag/ Tadmait	6	-
29-30/11/97	AFP 01/12/97	Daoud/Hassi Labed	29	3
20/01/98	Reuters 22/01/98	Rehal	6/8	-
14/02/98	CNN 15/02/98	Douar Tamesna	17	5
20/02/98	Troubles	Tamesga	6	-
28/02/98	Liberté 01/03/98	Youb	19	-
26/03/98	DNA 28/03/98	Adda-Bensekrane	11	-
24/06/98	Reuters 25/06/98	Hammar El Has	17	5

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
25/07/98	Liberté 27/07/98	Sidi-Abdelmoumene	8	-

**District: Tlemcen**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
06-07/04/97	DNA 08/04/97	Merniche	13	-
25/07/97	Irish Times 27/07/97	Khelil	7	-
25-26/08/97	Troubles	Zahara	6	-
12/09/97	Troubles	Mazar	6	-
23/09/97	Hijra	Abouyene	7	-
29/09/97	Le Soir de Belgique 30/09/97	Ouled-Mimoune	10	-
07/11/97	DNA 11/11/97	Tlemcen	22	-
20/12/97	DNA 23/12/97	El-Bordj	15/30	-
21/12/97	AFP 23/12/97	Sidi-Senoussi	6	-
03/01/98	CNN 05/01/98	Boudghane	6	-
07/01/98	Troubles	Tlemcen	30	-
10/01/98	Reuters 12/01/98	Zouaoua	9	-
11/01/98	AFP 13/01/98	Bensekrane	10	-
14/01/98	Liberté 27/07/98	Oued Zitoune/Sabra	10	-
01/02/98	L'Humanite 03/02/98	Sabra	10	-
05/02/98	Troubles	El Gor	9	-
17-18/02/98	Troubles	Sidi-Djilali	23	-

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
08/03/98	Liberté 27/07/98	El Ourit	7	-
25/07/98	Liberté 27/07/98	Khilil/Bouihi/Sidi-Djilali	12	2
04/08/98	Liberté 06/08/98	Beni-Mester	7	-

**District: Chlef**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
04/05/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 77	Tenes	173	-
10/06/97	Troubles	Tajena	6	-
30-31/08/97	Irish Times 02/09/97	Miramar	19	-
06/11/97	Reuters 08/11/97	Sobha	5	-
17/11/97	Troubles	Tajena	5	-
27/12/97	CNN 29/12/97	Oued-Sly	9	-
27-28/12/97	Irish Times 31/12/97	El-Bouachria	11	-
03-04/11/98	DNA 05/11/98	Douar Sidi Touil/ Oued-Sly	6	3
05-06/12/98	AFP 06/12/98	Tajena	7/9	5
08/12/98	AP 10/12/98	Tajena	81	20

**District: Bouira**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
23/05/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 94	Lakhdaria	30	-
23/06/96	Troubles	Bouira	8	-
20/07/96	Irish Times 23/07/96	Keddara	12	15
19-20/07/97	Irish Times	Dira/	9	-

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
	24/07/97	Sour-El-Ghozlene		
19/12/97	CNN 20/12/97	Lakhdaria	30	-
08/01/98	CNN 10/01/98	Sour-El-Ghozlene	26	-
10/01/98	AP 12/01/98	Bordj-Khriss	11	-
19/01/98	CNN 20/01/98	Bouira	16	-
25-26/01/98	Reuters 27/01/98	Bouira	6	-
06/08/98	Liberté 08/08/98	Ouled-Yekhllef/ Dechmia	9	-
04/12/98	Reuters 06/12/98	Deba/Dechmia	8/12	6

**District: Djelfa**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
24/05/97	Troubles	Ain-Maabed	18	-
19/08/97	DNA 25/08/97	Feid-El-Botma	20	-
21-22/08/97	DNA 25/08/97	Ain-Oura	10	-
28/08/97	CNN 30/08/97	Maalba	40	-
27/09/97	DNA 30/09/97	Ain-El-Hadj/ Charef	19	-
16/11/97	Reuters 20/11/97	Djelfa	11	-
28/12/97	AP 30/12/97	Hassi Bahbah	7	
19/01/98	AFP 20/01/98	Hammam	6	-
27-28/01/98	Reuters 28/01/98	Charef M'seka	9	-
26-27/03/98	DNA 28/03/98	Oued-Bouaicha	47	-

**District: Mascara**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
25/08/97	Troubles	Beni-Moali	9	-
25/08/97	Troubles	Hachem	9	-
07/10/97 10/11/97	AP	Mascara	5	-
28/12/97 29/12/97	ABC News	Safsaf	26/30	-
29/12/97 30/12/97	ABC News	Mascara	14	-
05/10/98 07/10/98	DNA	Tizi	7	-

**District: Laghouat**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
09/01/96 09/01/96	CNN	Laghouat	36	-
21/02/97 25/02/97	Irish Times	Laghouat	5	-
18/12/97 21/12/97	DNA	Aflou	10	-
27/12/97 31/12/97	Irish Times	Aflou	10	-
07/01/98 07/01/98	Reuters	Laghouat	6/7	-
27-28/01/98 28/01/98	Reuters	Benouda/ Sebgag	12	1
13/08/98 14/08/98	AFP	Sidi-Bouزيد	5	-

**District: Relizane**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
30/12/97 03/01/98	AP	Khrouba Sahnoun El-Abadel Ouled-Tayeb	176 113 73 50	- - - -
04/01/98 07/01/98	AP	Remka/Meknassa	117	

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
04/01/98	AP 07/01/98 Troubles	Dhamnia Beni-Moussa Kalaa Oued-Maamer Soumara	150/ 300/500	-
05/01/98	Troubles	Sidi Maamar Kala and Ouled Bounif	29 33	48

**District: Oran**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
02/10/97	CNN 04/10/97	Kharrouba	14/20	30
09/10/97	Reuters 11/10/97	Oran	11	-

**District: Sidi-Belabes**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
26-27/09/97	DNA 30/09/97	Ain-Adden	11	-
23/01/98	Reuters 24/01/98	Kaid Benlarbi	12	7
23-24/01/98	CNN 25/01/98	Kaid-Benlarbi	11	-
02/12/98	AFP 04/12/98	Sidi-Belabes	5	-

**District: M'Sila**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
24/11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 143	M'Sila	5	-
16/06/97	AFP 24/12/97	Dairat Labguar	50	-
14/08/97	Troubles	Bouferdjoun	7	-
30-31/12/97	AFP 03/01/98	Bousaada	6	-
14/02/98	CNN 15/02/98	Sidi-Amer	11	-

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
05/04/98	Reuters 06/04/98	Sidi-Hadjres	8	-

**District: Boumerdes**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
24/02/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 71	Khemis El-Khechna	6	-
18/11/96	Troubles	Benhachelef/ Hasnaoua	7	-
31/07/97	DNA 03/08/97	Sidi Madani	38	12
31/08/97	Troubles	Between Theniat-El-Had and Hassania	25	-
26/12/97	BBC 28/12/97	Ouled-Moussa	21	-

**District: Tissemsilt**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
12/11/96	Troubles	Tissemsilt	6	-
16/06/97	Irish Times 20/06/97	Djouaza	15	-
30-31/08/97	Troubles	Ouled-Ali	7	-
19/06/98	Reuters 21/06/98	Kaabra	14/15	9

**District: Tizi-Ouzou**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
27/04/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 68	Bordj-Menaïel	5	-
18/03/96	Troubles	Tizi-Ouzou	6	-
09-10/07/97	Troubles	Hatatba	8	-
09/05/98	Liberté 10/05/98	Bouberrak/Dellys	10	-
09/12/98	CNN 13/12/98	Maamar	6	-

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**District: Mostaghanem**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 143	Mostaganem	8	-
08/11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 147	Mostaganem	36	-
05-06/04/98	DNA 07/04/98	Boukrina/Arzew	27/28	-

**District: El-Oued**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
12/03/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 84	El-Oued	11	-
09/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 145	Guemmar	7	-

**District: Batna**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
15/02/92	LB, vol. 1, p. 90	Batna	28	-
17/08/96	Le Soir de Belgique 20/08/96	Batna-Msila Road	63	-
04/09/96	Troubles	Batna	18	-

**District: Constantine**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
24/04/94	LB, vol. 1, p. 68	Constantine	5	-
07/09/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 139	Cite Daksi	6	-
17/10/98	Reuters 18/10/98	Hamma Bouziane	9	-

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**District: Bejaia**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
20/10/97	AFP	Bejaia	5	-
	21/10/97			
14/08/98	AFP	Sekouma	7	-
	14/08/98			

**District: Adrar**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
28/02/98	AFP	Ouled-Aissa	7	-
	01/03/98			

**District: Setif**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
18/11/97	Reuters	Tadjenant	5	-
	19/11/97			

**District: Bordj-Bouarreridj**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
24/11/94	LB, vol. 2, p. 141	Bordj- Bouarreridj	11	-

**District: Bechar**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
16/06/97	Irish Times	Bechar	11	-
	20/06/97			

**District: Guelma**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/01/98	AFP	Fedjoudj	8	-
	13/01/98			

**7.2. Table B: Random Mass Killings****District: Algiers**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
26/08/92	Troubles	Algiers Airport	9	128
30/01/95	Troubles	Central Police Station	42	286
31/08/95	La Tribune 02/09/95	Bab-El-Oued	10	104
29/10/95	CNN 29/10/95	Algiers	6	80
12/12/95	Troubles	Cite Ain-Naadja	15	35
05/02/96	Troubles	Algiers	5	-
11/02/96	Irish Times 12/02/96	Place du 1er Mai	17/19	52
11/02/96	Irish Times 12/02/96	Bab-El-Oued	2	41
18/02/96	Troubles	Algiers	17	30
03-04/06/96	CNN 04/06/96	Algiers	20	130
20/07/96	CNN 20/07/96	El-Harrach	6	30
22/07/96	CNN 22/07/96	Algiers	12	-
28/07/96	Troubles	Chateaneuf	1	10
29/07/96	Le Soir de Belgique 31/07/96	El Biar	6	20
30/07/96	Le Soir de Belgique 31/07/96	Bab-El-Oued	1	4
05/08/96	Troubles	Bab-El-Oued	1	4
02/09/96	Troubles	Algiers	2	50

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
24/10/96	Troubles	Train- Algiers to Oran	8	30
10/11/96	DNA 11/11/96	Birkhadem	10	>20
28-29/11/96	DNA 01/12/96	Baraki	3	20
23/12/96	CNN 23/12/96	Larbi Ben-M'hidi/ Algiers	3	70
26/12/96	Le Soir de Belgique 27/12/96	Hussein-Dey	10	68
29/12/96	Irish Times 30/12/96	El Harrach	3	54
07/01/97	Le Soir de Belgique 08/01/97	Didouche Mourad/ Algiers	13/20	100
16/01/97	AP 20/01/97	El Harrach	12	
19/01/97	Le Soir de Belgique 20/01/97	Belcourt	42/21	100/60
21/01/97	Irish Times 22/01/97	Algiers	1	10
23/01/97	DNA 23/01/97	Baraki	16/30	40
11/02/97	Irish Times 12/02/97	Algiers	17	93
24-25/02/97	Troubles	Bouzareah	7	-
17/03/97	DNA 19/03/97	Algiers	11	30
17/03/97	DNA 19/03/97	Kouba	1	-
18/03/97	CNN 18/03/97	Algiers	18	-
27/03/97	DNA 30/03/97	El-Harrach	4	27
25/04/97	Irish Times 26/04/97	Baba-Ali /Train- Algiers to Blida	21	20
06/05/97	Troubles	Bab-El-Oued	5	32
11/05/97	Le Soir de Belgique 12/05/97	Bordj-El-Kiffan	5/13	>30

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/05/97	Le Soir de Belgique 12/05/97	Ben-Aknoun Park	1	12
31/05/97	CNN 01/06/97	Algiers	1	24
01/06/97	CNN 01/06/97	Algiers	7	77
02/06/97	Troubles	Kasbah	7/10	37
19/06/97	Irish Times 20/06/97	Algiers	2	20
26/06/97	Le Soir de Belgique 27/06/97	Algiers	4	>18
07/07/97	Troubles	Belcourt	1	20
14/07/97	Irish Times 15/07/97	Algiers	21	40
19/07/97	Irish Times 21/07/97	Algiers	7	11
30/07/97	Troubles	El-Biar	8	25
25/08/97	El-Watan 30/08/97	El-Biar	7	66
29/08/97	CNN 29/08/97	Kasbah	13	71
04/09/97	CNN 04/09/97	Bouzareah	2	7
14/09/97	Hijra	Cherarba	8	-
10/10/97	AP 10/10/97	Bouzareah	7/8	20/45
28/10/97	Troubles	Ben Aknoun	1	-
06/11/97	CNN 06/11/97	Bab-El-Oued	6	-
14/11/97	Reuters 15/11/97	Algiers	1/3	27/37
14/01/98	Troubles	Baraki	1	-
20/01/98	ABC News 22/01/98	Ben-Aknoun	4	24

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
21/01/98	Libération 22/01/98	Algiers	2	3
23/01/98	Troubles	Bologhine	1	2
28/01/98	Troubles	El-Biar	2	-
12/02/98	Troubles	Algiers	1	17
12/02/98	Troubles	Birkhadem	1	4
22/05/98	CNN 23/05/97	El-Harrach	15/18	30/61
01/07/98	El-Watan 02/07/98	Cite Rabia Tahar/ Bab-Ezzouar	1	22
09/07/98	El-Watan 10-11/07/98	Oued-Kenis/ Ruisseau	13	42
17/07/98	El-Watan 19/07/98	Franco Beach/ Rais Hamidou	2	4
30/07/98	El-Watan 01/08/98	Jolie-Vue/Kouba	2	33
30/07/98	El-Watan 01/08/98	Baraki	1	13
31/08/98	DNA 03/09/98	Trois Horloges/ Bab-El-Oued	25	53/61
05/10/98	CNN 06/10/98	Algiers	3	62
07/12/98	AP 09/12/98	Algiers	1	5
13/12/98	Reuters 15/12/98	Algiers	1	7

**District: Blida**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
19/01/95	Troubles	Bougara	2	209
06/08/95	Troubles	Boufarik	11	-
02/09/95	Liberté 03/09/95	Meftah	6	83

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
14/01/96	Troubles	Blida	5	25
22/06/96	Troubles	Blida	4	10
07/07/96	Troubles	Boufarik	1	Many
17/07/96	Troubles	Blida	10/15	12
29/07/96	Troubles	Blida	1	10
12/09/96	Troubles	Blida	2	28
21/09/96	Troubles	Zeboudja	1	16
27/09/96	Le Soir de Belgique 28/09/96	Boufarik	15/27	78/80
07/10/96	Troubles	Khazrouna	1	-
24/11/96	Irish Times 26/11/96	Blida	5	15
25/11/96	Irish Times 26/11/96	Blida	1	13
11/12/96	Le Soir de Belgique 12/12/96	Benkhelil	20	-
16/01/97	Irish Times 17/01/97	Boufarik	14	50
21/01/97	CNN 22/01/97	Blida	3	Tens
22/01/97	Le Soir de Belgique 24/01/97	Boufarik	8	40
28/01/97	Troubles	Oued-El-Alleug	1	10
17/02/97	DNA 19/02/97	Boufarik	1	-
24/02/97	DNA 25/02/97	Boufarik	1	12
11/04/97	Troubles	Haouch Gros / Boufarik	4	-
16/04/97	DNA 17/04/97	Blida	7	26

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
22/04/97	Troubles	Chiffa	1	-
22/05/97	Le Soir de Belgique 23/05/97	Boufarik	12	31
17/07/97	Troubles	Ouled-Yaich	1	-
03/08/97	DNA 05/08/97	Hammam Melouane	8	-
23/08/97	Troubles	El-Affroun	8	-
08/09/97	CNN 08/09/97	Blida	10	-
12/09/97	Troubles	Bouinan	1	3
12/09/97	CNN 12/09/97	Rais/Sidi-Moussa	4	-
14/09/97	Irish Times 16/10/97	Bouinan	1	3
26/09/97	Troubles	Blida	5	-
03/10/97	DNA 05/10/97	Blida	6/10	20/50
05/10/97	DNA 11/10/97	Bouinan	17	-
10/10/97	CNN 11/10/97	Sidi-Moussa	1	-
27/11/97	DNA 30/11/97	Larbaa	25	-
19/12/97	CNN 20/12/97	Blida	4	20
22/12/97	Le Soir de Belgique 23/12/97	Ouled-Allel	9	-
25/12/97	CNN 27/12/97	Sidi Ali/Carbana	3	-
01/01/98	Troubles	Boufarik	1	1
22/01/98	La Tribune 25/01/98	Bougara/Larbaa	3	5
23/01/98	TG 24/01/98	Blida	2	Many

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
25/01/98	AFP 26/01/98	Blida	2	-
06/02/98	DNA 08/02/98	Chebli	2	4
06/02/98	CNN 06/02/98	Birtouta	2	2
07/02/98	DNA 08/02/98	Blida	2	4
23/02/98	AFP 24/02/98	Boufarik-Chebli	18/21	25/52
21/04/98	Troubles	Blida	5	40
10/05/98	DNA 11/05/98	Train- Boufarik	2	10
24/07/98	DNA 26/07/98	Ouled-Yaich	1	3
10/09/98	El-Watan 12/09/98	Larbaa	1	12
08/10/98	AP 10/10/98	El Affroun	3	-
15/12/98	Reuters 15/12/98	Sidi-Moussa	1	7

**District: Médéa**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/02/96	Irish Times 12/02/96	Between Ain-Bessam and Médéa	11	52
14/02/96	CNN 15/02/98	Ain Melh	4	-
07/03/96	Troubles	Berrouaghia	2	10
25/11/96	Irish Times 26/11/96	Berrouaghia	1	13
22/04/97	CNN 24/04/97	Ouzera	5	-
11/05/97	Troubles	Metafha	2	11
27/07/97	Troubles	Maasouma	2	-



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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
20/08/97	DNA 25/08/97	Kaf Houas	3	20
26/08/97	Troubles	El-Omaria	1	7
06/09/97	CNN 06/09/97	Médéa	1	Many
14/09/97	DNA 16/09/97	Between Beni-Slimane and Berrouaghia	12	-
17/09/97	CNN 17/09/97	Kitene	7	-
20/10/97	CNN 20/10/97	Ribai	5	-
08/11/97	Troubles	Sidi-Najdi	2	1
01/01/98	AFP 03/01/98	Médéa	1	-
04/01/98	Reuters 05/01/98	Médéa	7	-
05/01/98	Reuters 05/01/98	Ksar El Boukhari	5	-
09/01/98	CNN 10/01/98	Médéa	2	-
14/01/98	Reuters 18/01/98	Ouzera	6	-
19/01/98	AFP 20/01/98	Médéa	2	12
29/01/98	AFP 31/01/98	Ouezra	1	-
06/02/98	Liberté 07/02/98	Médéa	1	2
26/02/98	DNA 27/02/98	Bouachoune	10	16
05/03/98	APS 07/03/98	Médéa	1	1
28/04/98	Reuters 25/04/98	Médéa	2	-
20/06/98	Reuters 21/06/98	Médéa	3	7

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
01/07/98	CNN 01/07/98	Ouled-Bey/Khemis-Djouamaa	4	14
06/08/98	AFP 08/08/98	Médéa	1	27
08/11/98	Troubles	Tablat-Larbaa Road	3	-

**District: Tipaza**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
18/08/95	CNN 18/08/95	Club des Pins	2	7
20/07/96	Troubles	Kolea	5/9	30
23/08/96	CNN 24/08/96	Kolea	7	-
30/08/96	Troubles	Staoueli	7	20
21/09/96	Troubles	Gouraya	3	Many
11/10/96	Troubles	Kolea	10	70
23/12/96	Troubles	Douaouda	1	1
04/11/97	CNN 04/11/97	Staoueli	3	19
08/11/97	CNN 08/11/97	Ain-Benian	1	3
13/11/97	DNA 16/11/97	Tipaza	3	37
28/11/97	Troubles	Tipaza	1	2
20/01/98	ABC News 22/01/98	Zeralda	7/10	70
07/02/98	DNA 08/02/98	Mahelma	3	8
17/06/98	DNA 19/06/98	Bourkika	4	4
14/08/98	AFP 15/08/98	Sidi-Rached	1	10

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
20/11/98	DNA 22/11/98	Ain Tagourait	1	-

**District: Ain-Defla**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/02/96	CNN 11/02/96	Khemis Meliana and Ain Bessam	11	52
14/02/96	CNN 15/02/98	Ain Defla	3	-
30/12/96	Troubles	Zeddine	8	-
26/08/97	Troubles	Khemis Meliana	1	1
30/08/97	DNA 02/09/97	Khemis Meliana	14	-
12/10/97	DNA 14/10/97	Ksar El Boukhari	9	-
14/10/97	AFP 15/10/97	Khemis-Meliana	2	Many
27/11/97	DNA 30/11/97	Oued Djer	4	-
11/12/97	Troubles	Hadessari/ El-Biri	2	2
18/01/98	Troubles	Oued-Djer	2	-
26/05/98	DNA 27/05/98	Miliana	7	8
11/06/98	El-Watan 13/06/98	El-Khemis	17	31
30/06/98	DNA 02/07/98	Ain-Defla	3/4	14
12/08/98	DNA 13/08/98	Hammam Righa Train	7	11
20/08/98	AFP 22/08/98	El-Khemis	13/16	36/39
27/09/98	DNA 28/09/98	El Khemis	4/7	24/25
20/11/98	DNA 22/11/98	Ain-Tagourait	1	-

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
03-04/12/98	Reuters 05/12/98	Khemis-Miliana	19	50
27/12/98	AP 28/12/98	Khemis Meliana	15	40

**District: Tlemcen**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
08/03/96	Troubles	Tlemcen	12	20
07/11/96	DNA 08/11/96	Beni-Ouarsous	5	-
22/05/97	Troubles	Maghnia	7	-
22/05/97	Troubles	Ghazaouet	5	-
22-23/05/97	Troubles	Tlemcen	9/18	12
19/07/97	Troubles	Tlemcen	1	30
29-30/08/97	Troubles	Kalaa	2	Many
06/10/97	Reuters 06/10/97	Tlemcen	3	13
25/10/97	Reuters 25/10/97	Ain-Fezza	1	Many
07/11/97	AP 10/11/97	Tamjout	22	-
08/11/97	CNN 08/11/97	Tajmout	4	-
11/01/98	Reuters 12/01/98	Zouiya	5/9	-
31/01/98	L'Humanite 03/02/98	Hennaya	2	-
02/02/98	Troubles	El Gor	15	-
19/09/98	AFP 21/09/98	Tlemcen	7	

**District: Mascara**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
27/03/97	DNA 30/03/97	Sig	2	18
02/05/97	Troubles	Bouhnifia	15	23
30/10/97	Hijra	Ouled Ali	6	-
30/01/98	AFP 31/01/98	Mascara	1	7
04/04/98	Reuters 05/04/98	Fekkana	1	1
15/06/98	El Watan 16/06/98	Hacine	8	-
05/10/98	DNA 07/10/98	Mascara	3	61
04/12/98	AFP 09/12/98	Ghriss	6	>30

**District: Tiaret**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
08/12/96	Troubles	Tiaret	1	Many
05/01/98	AFP 07/01/98	Sidi-Nammer	29	12
05/01/98	AFP 07/01/98	Ouled-Bounif	12	12
06/09/98	AFP 13/09/98	Mechraa-Sfa	5	11
08/09/98	El Watan 19/09/98	Rahoui	1	22
18/09/98	DNA 20/09/98	Zaroura	22/26/30	125/150

**District: Boumerdes**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
23/09/97	CNN 23/09/97	Reghaia	2	25
04/06/98	Liberté 05/06/98	Bordj-Menaïel	4	2

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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
23/02/97	Le Soir de Belgique 26/02/97	Saida	18	
17/03/97	Irish Times 19/03/97	Saida	7	-
24/06/97	Le Soir de Belgique 27/06/97	Between Ain Sek-houna and El Maamoura	15	
08/01/98	CNN 10/01/98	Saida	9	-
18/01/98	Reuters 19/01/98	Saida	1	-
30/07/98	AFP 03/08/98	Saida	3	-
02/08/98	Reuters 03/08/98	Baloul	40/60	-

**District: Tizi-Ouzou**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
18/03/96	Troubles	Tizi-Ouzou	6	26
04/05/96	Troubles	Tizi-Ouzou	2	15
12/07/97	Troubles	Dellys	7	11
21/07/97	Irish times 24/07/97	Maakouda	4	-

**District: Jijel**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
25/11/97	Reuters 26/11/97	Toualbia	4	Many
31/01/98	AFP 01/02/98	Kaa-El-Djbel	2	6

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**District: Chlef**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
21/08/98	AFP 22/08/98	El Guettar	2	2
30/08/98	Hijra	Chlef	14	-
12/09/98	AP 14/09/98	Chlef	4	-
05/10/98	CNN 06/10/98	Chlef	3	62
07/10/98	AP 07/10/98	Ben Abdelkader	7	5
24/11/98	Reuters 25/11/98	Chlef	2	2

**District: Bouira**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
21/07/96	Le Soir de Belgique 22/07/96	Keddara	12	15
18/12/97	DNA 21/12/97	Lakhdaria	6/30	-
15/01/98	Reuters 18/01/98	Sour El Ghoulane	17/18	
19/01/98	Troubles	Hamman Ksana	13	-
12/06/98	Liberté 16/06/98	Bordj Menail	14	Many
04/12/98	AFP 04/12/98	El Kadiria	11	6

**District: Relizane**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
22/10/95	CNN 23/10/95	Relizane	8/11	82
28/11/96	DNA 01/12/98	Relizane	11	>10

**District: Oran**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
09/03/96	CNN 09/03/96	Oran	10	16
11/05/97	DNA 13/05/97	Gdyel/Ras El Ain	22	-
15/08/97	Troubles	Diplimo	9	-
26/08/97	Troubles	Doublinou	6	-
29/08/97	Troubles	Oran	10	20
12/10/97	Reuters 14/10/97	Sidi Daoud/Sig	43/50	35
30/08/98	Reuters 31/08/98	Sidi Akli	1	1
02/09/98	AFP 03/09/98	Sidi Ali Cherif	1	-
11/09/98	La Tribune 12/09/98	Ghidyl	3/4	42/44

**District: Djelfa**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
15/08/96	CNN 04/01/98	Ain Oussera	17	-
08/08/97	Irish Times 11/08/97	Djelfa	7/11	20
21/07/98	Reuters 23/07/98	Djelfa	3	-

**District: Laghouat**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
20/03/96	Troubles	Aflou	10	-
07/10/96	Troubles	Ksar El Hirane	38	-
13/09/98	AFP 13/09/98	Sidi-Bouزيد	2	1
13/09/98	AFP 13/09/98	Aflou	2	-



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Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
13/12/98	Reuters 13/12/98	Aflou	1	-

**District: Sidi-Belabes**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
28/12/97	Troubles	Sfisef	14	-
28/12/97	Troubles	Mustapha Benbrahim	17	-
30/01/98	AFP 01/02/98	Tenira	5	3
10/02/98	CNN 15/02/98	Telagh	10	-
13/10/98	La Tribune 14/10/98	Ras El Ma/ Moulay Slissen	4	-

**District: Tebessa**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
23/10/97	Reuters 23/10/97	Ghjira	5	-
23/03/98	Troubles	Tebessa	5	-
15/07/98	CNN 18/07/98	Ma El Abida	3	2

**District: Annaba**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
11/01/98	AFP 13/01/98	Ain-Berber	5	-
11/01/98	AFP 13/01/98	Ain-Berber	4	-

**District: Constantine**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
13/09/98	DNA 14/09/98	Constantine	1	5

**District: Setif**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
23/01/98	AFP 23/01/98	Setif	4	21

**District: Bejaia**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
04/11/98	Troubles	Bejaia	1	-

**District: Mostaghanem**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
01/11/94	LB, Vol. 2, p.143	Mostaghanem	6	17

**District: M'Sila**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
23/06/97	Troubles	M'Sila	3	-

**District: Oum El Bouaghi**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
07/01/97	Troubles	Ain El Fakroun	7	11

**District: El Tarf**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
04/09/96	CNN 04/01/98	Border with Tunisia	18	-

**District: Ghardaia**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths	Injured
06/09/96	CNN 04/01/98	Road to Ghardaia	12	-

**7.3. Table C: Reported Mass Graves**

<b>Date of finding</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Location/ District</b>	<b>Number of Graves</b>	<b>Type of Grave</b>	<b>Body Count</b>
Aug. 96	Le Soir de Belgique 30/08/96	Ouled Allel/ Blida	4	Well	Undisclosed
Aug. 96	Le Soir de Belgique 30/08/96	Oued Slama Blida	3	-	Undisclosed
Oct. 97	CNN 09/10/97	Ouled Allel/ Blida	1	Well	40
17 Dec. 97	AFP 24/12/97	Labaaiziz/ Blida		1	10
Feb. 98	Liberté 01/03/98	Bordj Ouk- hriss/ Oran	1		30
19 Jul. 98	Reuters 19/07/98	Bainem/ Algiers	2	-	Undisclosed
Nov. 98	AP/Reuters 13/12/98 11/12/98 10/12/98	Hafiz Farm/ Meftah/ Blida	2	Wells	110/  >200
Feb. 99	Reuters 14/02/99	Ouled Allel/ Blida	1	Well	70
18 May 99	Le Monde 22/05/99	Djelfa	1		18

**7.4. Table D: Mass Killings of Foreign Nationals**

Date	Source	Location	Deaths
14/12/93	Troubles	Médéa	12 Croats
07/07/94	Troubles	Djendjen /Jijel	7 Italians
11/07/94	Troubles	Algiers	7 East-Europeans
03/08/94	Troubles	Ain-Allah /Algiers	5 French
27/12/94	Troubles	Tizi-Ouzou	3 French 1 Belgian
05/05/95	Troubles	Ghardaia	5 Foreigners
21/05/96	Troubles	Médéa	7 French

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.multimania.com/troubles/politique.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> Amnesty International, *Algeria: Fear and Silence: A Hidden Human Rights Crisis*, MDE 28/11/96, November 1996; *Civilian Population Caught in a Spiral of Violence*, MDE 28/23/97, November 1997. Also see Amnesty International (AI), Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Reporters Sans Frontière (RSF), *Le Livre Noir*, Editions La Découverte, Paris 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Elections in the Shadow of Violence and Repression*, E904, June 1997; *Six Months Later Cover-up Continues in Prison Clash that Left 100 Inmates Dead*, E705, August 95.

<sup>4</sup> Comité Algérien pour la Dignité Humaine et les Droits de l'Homme, *Le Livre Blanc sur la répression en Algérie*, vols 1, 2 & Supplément, Editions Hoggar, Genève 1995, 1996.

<sup>5</sup> V. Hugué, 'Algérie: les urnes de la terreur', *L'Express*, 29 May 1997

<sup>6</sup> Reuters, 9, 10, 12 and 13 December 1998

<sup>7</sup> Interview of Abdelhamid Brahimi, former Algerian prime-minister, in *Impact International*, November 1998, p. 26; *Le Monde* 26 March 1997; G. Mouffok, *Jeune Afrique*, No. 1774, 5-11 January 1995; D. Priest, *Washington Post*, 12 November 1998; J. Cesari, 'Les rapports France-Algérie: l'effet Airbus', CNRS-IREMAM; F. Gèze, 'Algérie: Face au poids de l'histoire et à la manipulation', *Politique Autrement*, No 13, June 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Article 19, *Algeria: Press Freedom Under the State of Emergency*, Issue 19, 26 December 1992; International Crisis Group, 'Between Death Threats and Censorship', *Algeria Report*, 31 March 1998; M. Margenidas, 'L'Information Asservie en Algérie', in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1998, p. 19; Reporters Sans Frontière, 'Algérie: La guerre civile a huit clos', in AI, FIDH, HRW, and RSF, *Le Livre Noir*, op. cit, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> CNN, 29 August 1997.

<sup>10</sup> *Le Monde*, 5 September 1997.

<sup>11</sup> CNN, 29 August 1997.

<sup>12</sup> *The Washington Post*, 18 October 1997.

<sup>13</sup> A. Gorissen, Interview with Louisa Hanoune, *Le Soir de Belgique*, 29 January 1997.

<sup>14</sup> CNN, 22 January 1998.

<sup>15</sup> *Libération*, 23 January 1998.

<sup>16</sup> Comité des Droits de l'Homme de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, 63eme Session, *Compte Rendu Analytique de la 1682 eme séance*, Genève, 20 July 1998, reference CCPR/C/SR.1682.

<sup>17</sup> Interview of General X, Amir Taheri, *Politique Internationale*, No. 79, Spring 1998, p.11.

<sup>18</sup> *El Moudjabid*, 27-30 June 1999; *El Watan*, 27-30 June 1999.

<sup>19</sup> Meeting with the international press at the Djenan El Mithaq Résidence on 9 July 1999, *Algérie Presse Service*, 10 July 1999. The statement was part of an answer to Abderahmane El Rached from the *Shargh Al Ansar* newspaper.

<sup>20</sup> *Associated Press*, 23 January 1998.

<sup>21</sup> See references in note 1. A year earlier Amnesty International had put forward a figure of 50 000 deaths (in AI:MDE 28/11/96).

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<sup>22</sup> *La Tribune de Genève*, 11 December 1996.

<sup>23</sup> *Agence France Presse*, 28 May 1999.

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<sup>29</sup> A collective five-man presidency which acted as a civilian front for the cabal of officers who carried the coup d'Etat of 11 January 1992.

<sup>30</sup> Rally for Culture and Democracy.

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<sup>33</sup> National Libération Front.

<sup>34</sup> Front of Socialist Forces.

<sup>35</sup> Movement for Democracy in Algeria.

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<sup>37</sup> Mouvement de la Nahda [En-Nahda Movement] or Islamic renaissance party.

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- <sup>56</sup> *El Moudjabid*, 16 June 1990
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- <sup>256</sup> Human Right Watch World Report 1999.
- <sup>257</sup> *Dernières Nouvelles D'Alsace*, 25 January 1997.
- <sup>258</sup> *Le Monde*, 20 February 1997.
- <sup>259</sup> *L'Authentique*, 30 August 1997.
- <sup>260</sup> *L'Humanité*, 21 January 1998. Messaoudi also said 'I call brotherly onto all those who asks themselves the question 'who is killing?' in good faith. Each time you exonerate the assassins, you degrade the absolute victims and destroy the credibility of the Algerian State. And I do distinguish between the State and *le pouvoir*' (see the monthly French magazine *Regards*, October 1997).
- <sup>261</sup> H. Cherif, 'La lumière et les tenebres', in J-P. Chagnollaude (ed.), *Confluence Méditerranée*, No 25, printemps 1998, Editions L'Harmattan, Paris 1998, pp. 83-92.
- <sup>262</sup> A. Ouyahia, 'Notre peuple contre le terrorisme', in J-P. Chagnollaude (ed.), *Confluence Méditerranée*, op. cit., pp. 67-72.

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<sup>263</sup> Amnesty International, *Algérie: Le silence et la peur*, MDE 28 November 1996.

<sup>264</sup> See all the issues of the *al Raia* (The Banner) and *al i'tissam* (Unity) periodicals.

<sup>265</sup> Katibat al Médéa (The Médéa Battalion), *al Waathiqah ashar-'iya* (The Legal Document), No 2, 8 February 1996.

<sup>266</sup> See the *Al Ansar* (The Supporters) and *Al Jamaa* (The Collective) periodicals of that period.

<sup>267</sup> *Al Qital*, No 34, 20 May 1996. *al Raia* and *al i'tissam*, op. cit.

<sup>268</sup> Katibat al Muhajirun (The Battalion of the Emigrants), Mintaqat al wassat (Central Region), *Bayan Tandibi* (Communiqué for Clarification), 18 February 1997.

<sup>269</sup> Katibat al Médéa (The Médéa Battalion), *al Wathiqah ashar-'iya* (The Legal Document), No 2, 8 February 1996.

<sup>270</sup> *Al Ansar*, No 155, 18 April 1998.

<sup>271</sup> Katibat al Médéa, op. cit.

<sup>272</sup> See for instance *Al Ansar*, No 129, 28 December 1995 and *al Jamaa*, No 12, March 1997.

<sup>273</sup> Armée Islamique du Salut, Communiqué, 9 December 1996.

<sup>274</sup> Ligue Islamique de la Dawa et du Jihad, Communiqué No 1, 5 February 1997, Communiqué No 3, 15 September 1997.

<sup>275</sup> Armée Islamique du Salut, Commandement Ouest, Communiqué, 15 March 1996, 18 February 1997; *Al Inqad*, No 22, 1 January 1997, p. 5.

<sup>276</sup> A. Ghemati, 'A qui profite l'escalade dans l'horreur?', in J-P. Chagnollaude (ed.), *Confluence Méditerranée*, op. cit., pp.109-115.

<sup>277</sup> Ligue Islamique du Jihad Armé, Communiqué No 1, 5 February 1997.

<sup>278</sup> *Arrabita* (The League), No 1, September 1997, No 2, October 1997.

<sup>279</sup> D. Hirst, 'This where they shot my wife. Here they killed my daughter with an axe', *The Guardian*, 20 October 1997.

<sup>280</sup> Human Rights Watch World Report 1999, op. cit.

<sup>281</sup> H. Ait-Ahmed, 'La politique d'éradication a échoué', in J-P. Chagnollaude, *Confluence Méditerranée*, op. cit. pp. 99-108.

<sup>282</sup> L. Mandeville, Interview with Bruno Etienne, 'Ce sont les généraux qui se déchirent', *Le Figaro*, 30-31 August 1997.

<sup>283</sup> *The Guardian*, 30 October 1995, 11 November 1997; *The Times* 9 December 1997; *The Independent*, 1 and 3 November 1997; *The Observer*, 25 May 1997, 26 October 1997, 9 November 1997, 16 November 1997, 11 January 1998; *Der Spiegel*, 12 January 1998, *Die Tageszeitung*, 2 February 1998; *Libération*, 20 November 1997; *al watan al arabi*, 2 January 1998; *Maroc Hebdo*, May 1998. See also material in the Internet site <http://www.anp.org> by dissidents from Algeria's military (the Algerian Movement of Free Officers).

<sup>284</sup> J. Garcon, 'La dérive sanglante des milices d'Etat', *Libération* 15 April 1998.

<sup>285</sup> F. Zemmouri, 'La sanglante saga des milices d'Etat', *Le Nouvel Afrique Asie*, June 1998 *Courrier International* claimed it had access to a document from Algeria's military security which reports that '50 % of the "false roadblocks" are the work of militiamen. Some racket and sometime kill civilians and impute these deaths to the GIA.' See A.M., 'Comment les services spéciaux ont contré le Président', in *Courrier International*, No 361, 2-8 October 1997.

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<sup>286</sup> A. Djeddaï, 'La politique d'éradication a échoué', in J.-P. Chagnollaud, *Confluence Méditerranée*, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>287</sup> 'Djeddaï: Relizane, c'est l'arbre qui cache la forêt', *El Watan*, 21 April 1998.

<sup>288</sup> Amnesty International Report 1998; AI, FIDH, HRW and RSF, *Le Livre Noir*, p. 90.

<sup>289</sup> *Demain l'Algérie*, 7 September 1998; H. Larbi, 'Le pays otage des clans', *Libre Algérie*, No 1, 14 September 1998.

<sup>290</sup> BBC, 3 July 1997; ABC 7 January 1998.

<sup>291</sup> Agence France Presse, 3 August 1998.

<sup>292</sup> ABC News, 12 January 1998.

<sup>293</sup> L'Humanité, 10 January 1998.

<sup>294</sup> H. Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimisation During the Holocaust*, Free Press, New York, 1979; H. Fein, 'Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and Critical Responses', in I. W. Charny (ed.), *Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide*, Westview Press, London, 1994; B. Harff and T. R. Gurr, 'Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No 3, 1988, pp. 39-371; B. Harff and T. R. Gurr, 'Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression since 1945', *International Review of Victimology*, Vol. 1, 1989, pp.23-41; L. Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, Yale University Press, London 1981; I. L. Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*, Transaction, New Brunswick, 1982; F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990; I. W. Charny (ed.), *Genocide: A Critical Bibliography*, Vol. 1, Facts on File Publications, New York, 1988.

<sup>295</sup> H. Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*, Sage Publications, London, 1993, pp.8-31.

<sup>296</sup> L. Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide*, Yale University Press, London, 1985, p.16.

<sup>297</sup> L. Kuper, *The Prevention of Genocide*, op. cit., p. 100.

<sup>298</sup> L. Kuper, 'Other Selected Cases of Genocide and Genocidal Massacres: Types of Genocide', in I. W. Charny (ed.), *Genocide: A Critical Bibliography*, Vol. 1, Facts on File Publications, New York, 1988.

<sup>299</sup> B. Harff and T. R. Gurr, 'Genocides and Politicides Since 1945: Evidence and Anticipation', *Internet on the Holocaust and Genocide*, Vol. 13, 1987, pp.1-7; B. Harff and T. R. Gurr, 'Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression since 1945', *International Review of Victimology*, Vol. 1, 1989, pp.23-41.